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INTRODUCTION 
 
WHY ENHANCEMENT? BIOETHICS AND TRANSHUMANISM 
 
 Enhancement is the use of medical and technological strategies to augment human 
traits. The strategy of genetic enhancement, perhaps the most controversial, would use 
genetic engineering technology to achieve this end. Bioethicist John Harris claims that 
enhancement is good and desirable by definition; according to him, “if it wasn’t good for 
you it wouldn’t be enhancement” (2011, 131).  Yet, “enhancement” is a loose concept 
that could apply to a variety of things humans can use; for example, anything from shoes 
and caffeine to neural implants and prosthetics could count as enhancements (e.g. 
Buchanan 2011, Preface and Bostrom and Savulescu 2011, 2). Indeed, for some 
proponents of enhancement, the moral acceptability of enhancement strategies stems 
directly from their supposed similarity to everyday activities of improvement, such as 
learning (cf. Bostrom and Savulescu 2011, 3).
1
  
Ethically separating, for example, strength training and steroids seems to require 
uneasy notions of the “natural” or the “authentic,” wherein strength training is morally 
acceptable while steroids involve “cheating.”  Or, the invocation of the long-contested 
divide between therapy and enhancement could separate reconstructive plastic surgery 
from cosmetic plastic surgery.  Some bioethicists maintain that only therapeutic or 
natural “enhancements” are morally acceptable, while others such as Harris argue that all 
enhancements are not only morally acceptable but also possibly morally obligatory.  
                                                          
1
 Some counter that novel medical interventions are a unique set of means for everyday ends – i.e., beauty 
(social acceptability) and the like (e.g. Parens 1998). 
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Meanwhile, many feminists and disability theorists find it suspect that critics of 
enhancement often seem forced to prove why one shouldn’t do what is obviously good 
for one or one’s children (Buchanan et al. 2000, Ch. 5; Ida 2011, Sandel 2004 and 2007).  
Usually debates over enhancement are debates over what types of enhancements 
are morally acceptable.  Many times they revolve around the difference between negative 
eugenics, which aims to cure diseases and prevent so-called birth defects, and positive 
eugenics, which aims, in Harris’s words, to “make better people.”  I seek to reframe these 
debates in terms of the explicit and implicit goals and desired futures proposed by 
proponents of enhancement.  Rather than enter debates over where we should draw the 
lines between therapeutic interventions or enhancements, negative or positive eugenics, I 
critically analyze the ways that  proponents’ discussions of the ethics of enhancement for 
humans not only involves specific goals and desired futures, but also are often less about 
available technology than potential technology deemed worthy of investment. For them, 
investment in the research and development of potential futures becomes a moral 
obligation. I argue that the burden in the debate should fall to proponents of 
enhancement, not critics, especially in light of the goals of proposed enhancements 
themselves, which often are couched in fantasies of possible transhuman futures that 
presuppose notions of health, ability, and the good life.  
The added benefit of this re-framing of debates in bioethics over enhancement is 
that it allows one to critically assess the suspect claim that enhancement is good, full 
stop. My project, then, examines closely the goals of enhancement’s enthusiasts, 
transhumanists. Because I respond to the argumentation of these enthusiasts, I take up 
enhancement in the way they do: namely, as the practice of adding to, protecting, or 
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maximizing capabilities by way of technological intervention upon the body. I am, 
therefore, engaging the question of radical enhancement, which Nicholas Agar describes 
as the possibility that medicine, science, and technology would so radically improve 
various aspects of life that the beings who would result would not be recognizably human 
(Agar 2010, 1-2). I look to the extremists within the debate to gain understanding of the 
heart of the issue; more moderate philosophers have played it safe by making proposals 
with which no one would disagree, such as being sure any proposed enhancement is 
accessible, effective, and that harm to individuals is to be avoided at all costs. In the next 
section, by briefly discussing these “half-way” measures, I demonstrate that these 
qualifications do not get us very far. I also expose the crucial similarities between those 
who go further to either promote or argue against enhancement measures in 
contemporary debate. 
 
Contemporary Debate 
 
Today’s bioethicists ask: is human enhancement ethically permissible? As 
posited, this question tends to ask “why not?” (e.g. Buchanan et al. 2000, Ch. 5: “Why 
Not the Best?”). Mainstream bioethicists and philosophers tend to seek reasons that an 
individual or institution should not pursue enhancement (in particular or in general), 
rather than asking why one should, or what reasons exist for pursuing it. As posed, 
sometimes the answer to the question of “why not” is, simply: there is no good reason 
why not (e.g. Buchanan 2011a and 2011b). After all, who doesn’t want the best? One 
consequence of this focus is that the social construction of and the historical sources, 
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justifying stigmas, exclusions, and implications, of pursued traits—for example, strength, 
beauty, I.Q. points—fail to get attention.2 Further, the notion of enhancement itself is 
rarely critically investigated or thoroughly explained.  
 In most bioethical studies of enhancement a basic orienting framework toward 
possible technology is established. Many agree, first, that it makes sense to discuss 
possible improvements only if the related procedures are safe and also if outcomes are 
effective (Brock 1998, Juengst 1998); second, many concede that it is nonsense to spend 
money or time on improvements if they are futile (Brock 1998, 60; Juengst 1998, 29-30, 
42). By “futile” these thinkers mean, for instance, the “arms race” of use of the human 
growth hormone or similar steroids (Sandel 2004, Bostrom 2003b) or the unequal nature 
of “positional” goods more generally (Singer 2009). A positional good is one which, in 
order to be enjoyed, must be enjoyed unequally; in other words, height and beauty are 
both thought to lack meaning when they are equally distributed. Relatedly, many bio-
ethicists also wonder, will access to enhancement technologies be possible for all? If not, 
then clearly one is dealing with increasing inequality of a certain kind which should (but 
perhaps can) be ameliorated (e.g. Brock 1998, 59; Fukuyama 2004, Mehlman and Botkin 
1998).
3
 I do not dismiss these questions—in fact, it is important to recall that we speak of 
enhancements in a capitalist context of unequal resources, and enhancement appears to 
                                                          
2
 One notable exception, although there are others, is Surgically Shaping Children: Technology, Ethics, and 
the Pursuit of Normality, a volume of essays edited by Erik Parens in collaboration with The Hastings 
Center (2006). For example, here the normalization of physical appearance, stigma, and social construction 
of concern regarding craniofacial differences and height is taken quite seriously and investigated. The 
helpfulness of surgeries meant to “correct” such differences is re-evaluated on the basis of the experiences 
of would-be or past “patients” (Aspinall 2006, Sanford 2006). 
 
3
 For an idea of what kinds of enhancements are believed to avoid problems regarding unequal benefits, 
reference Buchanan 2011b, 56. Examples include immune system enhancements, enhancements of the 
ability to repair tissue damage, and enhancements surrounding the way humans eat and live that may 
release pressure on the environment (cf. Liao et al. 2012). 
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only be conceptually intelligible when some persons can realize it and some cannot (i.e., 
when there is no futility, and when enhancements aim toward positional goods).
4
 But a 
philosophical investigation of enhancement will involve much more than this. 
 Enhancement procedures indicated in bioethical writings on the topic are a motley 
crew of medical interventions, both sought-after and already accomplishable. Bioethicists 
consider enhancement strategies to include the body-contouring effects of liposuction (a 
surgery requiring the use of anesthesia and the removal of fat) aimed at greater slimness, 
to scientific research aimed at discovering ways to counter-act the aging process in cells. 
But, most attention in the literature (and among the public at large) is focused upon 
genetic selection and related scientific and technological enhancements. The core issue 
for mainstream bioethics today is enhancement created through drugs or surgeries, and—
often—genetic enhancement. In other words, what is at stake in these discussions is the 
acceptability of heritable, permanent, or semi-permanent medical interventions upon the 
human body in order to improve it.  
 The permanent, heritable, or semi-permanent features of enhancement strategies 
have led a few scholars at the core of the debate (who commit further than the above 
“half-way measures”) to either speculate about exciting changes to the basic human 
experience or worry over forecasts of the loss of humanity. While the main-line half-way 
measures do not get us very far, the core of the debate represents a group of bioethicists 
who supposedly disagree but, as I will show, are actually in lock-step with regard to 
several main ideas, rather than a diverse and searching philosophical discussion. I turn to 
those main ideas now. 
                                                          
4
 I discuss issues connected to rationing in chapter two. 
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In the formative years of the field of bioethics, Paul Ramsey, an original “bio-
conservative,”5 rejected the imagery of manufacture as a replacement for procreation 
(1970, 136-137; Kass claims Ramsey as a mentor, 2002). Ramsey believed that the “man-
God” of genetic futures takes leave of humanism because it abandons (as reported by 
Francis Crick, a founder of the double-helix structure of DNA) the “prejudice about the 
sanctity of the individual” (146). This closes off possibilities and leads eventually, 
Ramsey worries, to species-suicide, the deliberate abandonment and dissolution of 
humanity (152-153).
6
 Some of the most familiar objections to improvement and 
enhancement among conservative responders to new technologies follow Ramsey in 
spirit and therefore include the obligation to cede control over and interference in such 
matters to God, gods, or a causal force in a god-like role (e.g. Kass 1997; for in-depth 
analysis of the nuances of this point of view see Coady 2011). In other words, some 
believe enterprising scientists would do well to recall the Icarus myth, a favorite of 
conservative bioethicists—don’t fly too close to the sun (Dhanda 2002, O’Mathúna 2009, 
                                                          
5
 Responses to enhancement which garner the most attention tend to fall into two groups which are self-
consciously placed on either end of a (alternative) political spectrum: so-called bio-conservatives (those in 
this group are even called “bioluddites” by some transhumanists, e.g. James Hughes 2004) and, opposing 
and sometimes deriding them, those who are pro-enhancement (sometimes called bio-libertarians or 
variations thereof, e.g. Rubin 2008, 154). 
 
6
 Another philosopher and early bioethicist, the Australian John Passmore, took a historical approach to the 
question of enhancement by outlining ideas of perfectibility from Plato to twentieth-century Christian 
ethics (1970). According to him, no variety of perfectibility had completely disappeared at the time of his 
writing; each persisted through time (260). Worries about human diversity and discussion of the positions 
of “genetic perfectibilists” led Passmore to comment: “if we deliberately try to breed for perfection, we 
shall breed a population which will die out” (187; more recently, utilitarian Peter Singer rejected this 
concern as weak, because intervention must be sustained and directed to a very high degree in order to 
affect diversity, at which point the practice could be discontinued, 2009, 283-284). Yet, Passmore 
concludes that “in spite of these reflections, which might lead us to reject perfectibilism in any of its forms, 
it is very hard to shake off the feeling that man is capable of becoming something much superior to what he 
now is” (326). Quoting Jean-Paul Sartre, Passmore notes that “to reach towards being God” is a “useless 
passion” but “[human] passion is not useless, if they help [humans] to become a little more humane, a little 
more civilized” (327). For Passmore, then, taking control is justified if changes prove helpful and he 
suggests that angling for this control is perhaps just one way of being human. 
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cf. Passmore 1970). Ultimately, the boundaries of human nature, along with the dignity 
felt to be inherent to humanity, are shored up as something with to be protected from 
interference and temptation (Bibeau 2011, Engelhardt 1990, Habermas 2003 23-26, 
among other places; Sandel 2004). Tied to this are appeals to human wisdom and 
appropriate humility (Kass 1997, 2002, O’Mathúna 2009, 191; Sandel 2004; as satirized 
in Bostrom 2005a). Ramsey ventured forth into this, at his time new, milieu with the idea 
that enhancement of human beings through biotechnological means was, in effect, 
“playing God.” He commented: “Men ought not to play God before they learn to be men, 
and after they have learned to be men they will not play God” (1970, 137).  
The “playing God” objection remains important as long as bioethicists ask the 
question “why not,” and this objection fundamentally assumes that technology allows us 
to be in control of such radical changes that we might as well call ourselves God. 
Curiously, transhumanists embrace the God-like extent of technological control—even 
though it might make more rhetorical sense to de-mystify technology in order to make it 
more widely appealing (Bostrom 2003a). Belief in the absolute power of technology over 
human nature via bodily intervention is shared by proponents and opponents of 
enhancement technologies alike. Therefore, although arguments which react to and reject, 
or pursue and embrace, the question of whether enhancement is permissible appear to cut 
a wide swath of argumentation strategies, “conservative” and “libertarian” responses are 
actually relatively uniform and often share more presuppositions than they disagree upon.  
One can draw other common conceptual fixtures from what appear to be 
diametrically-opposed positions regarding enhancement. I argue that three further 
examples of shared presuppositions among otherwise opposed bioethicists are: the 
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distinction between artificiality and authenticity, the uniqueness of human beings, and the 
importance of equal opportunity. With the exception of the issue of authenticity, these 
shared presuppositions go unnoticed by participants in the debate. 
First, authenticity appears in bioethical commentary regarding fair play and 
competition as the goal of the search for the self, and how enhancement degrades this 
(e.g. Daniel 2011, 41, Elliott 2004 and 2011, Sandel 2004).
7
 In the early 90s, Peter 
Kramer famously wrote about issues regarding authenticity and the use of the drug 
Prozac, showcasing the point of view of users who felt they lost their identity in taking 
Prozac (1993, cf. Buchanan et al. 2000, 98 and Parens 2009, 186). Kramer inherits 
worries that drove the political philosopher Robert Nozick. Nozick, writing in 1974, 
warned of the possibility of a “genetic supermarket” and spoke to issues of artificiality 
and the pursuit of authenticity. Nozick devised the well-known “experience machine” 
hypothetical (315n, 42-45), which he used to demonstrate that one would reject 
pleasurable experiences, even if very intense, if one knew they were contrived (i.e., 
created by machine). Moreover, Erik Parens has noted the prevalence of the issue of 
authenticity and its appearance in the arguments of those who do and those who do not 
support various human enhancement strategies (2009). In particular, Parens claims, both 
groups appear to subscribe to the concept of an “authentic self”—that is, each group 
believes, for its part, that either embracing or shunning enhancement technologies will 
promote authenticity and reconcile (or avoid) self-alienation.
8
 In this discourse, I argue 
                                                          
7
 See Kelly Oliver’s critique of the issue of “fair play” in this conversation as connected to obsessions with 
sports and celebrity in 2010, 77, along with her critique of the border between the artificial and the 
constructed throughout the essay. 
 
8
 Here Parens references ideas articulated by Søren Kierkegaard and, later, Charles Taylor in the context of 
political liberalism (Taylor 1991). Given the widely-shared commitment to authenticity, Parens believes 
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that the border between the “real” and the “constructed” is policed (e.g. Habermas 2003) 
or assumed and then transgressed (e.g. Harris 2007).  
Second, both sides of the debate agree that the human being is uniquely placed 
among the things in the natural world. Authentic human living might mean, then, 
respecting or responding to the boundaries of what is considered unique to human 
“nature,” which might include or depend upon parenthood (Sandel 2007, cf. Ramsey 
1970) or “traditional” sexual reproduction (Kass 2002) or even some nameless X-factor 
(Fukuyama 2002). In fact, many in the group of conservative responders tend to reject 
enhancement as threatening what is valuable about humanity or the social world in which 
human beings find themselves. But, as transhumanists argue, the quest for authenticity 
and respect for human beings could also mean following the all-too-human drive toward 
innovation by embracing change through directed evolution, or refusing to accept things 
like aging and death, which cause great distress (Bostrom 2004 and 2005a, cf. Huxley 
1948). Along these lines, transhumanists Nick Bostrom and Anders Sandberg argue that 
paying attention to human wisdom (as the bio-conservative desires) requires taking 
enhancement seriously because humans are uniquely situated to draw lessons from 
history and evolution (Bostrom 2004, Bostrom and Sandberg 2011, cf. Kass 1997).  
Third and finally, equality of opportunity is called upon to both justify and object 
to interventionist medical and technological enhancement strategies (recall the focus on 
                                                                                                                                                                             
that some enhancement technologies will appear acceptable to the usual opponent and some may appear 
unacceptable to the usual proponent (2009, 192-194). For example, Parens himself is thrown from his usual 
critique of enhancement by the narrative testimony of transgendered persons seeking sexual reassignment 
surgery and drug therapy. For him, it is clear that the use of medical intervention in such cases involves the 
pursuit of the patient’s vision of the authentic self (194). On the other hand, he suggests that proponents of 
enhancements would be unsettled by the idea that someone may desire to take a pill that creates feelings of 
sexual intimacy, and wonders whether, in this case, proponents might suggest other modes of tackling 
one’s lack of such feelings. If they would, this would indicate a commitment to an authentic self situated in 
the “real” (193). 
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fair play). Buchanan et al. return again and again to the concept of equality of 
opportunity in From Chance to Choice (2000). These authors claim that the arena of 
justice is, in effect, a phenomenon of slow “colonization” of circumstances once left to 
chance (82-84, emphasis mine). According to Buchanan et al., intervention in the name 
of justice is only accomplishable when we have control over (have colonized) 
circumstances, but that realm grows all the time through new technologies and scientific 
understanding.  
What Buchanan and the other authors of this text describe is a technological 
imperative underlying the development of new technologies. That is, as technology 
becomes available that can be used to intervene upon the human body, one should use it. 
When medical technology was less advanced and there were fewer available strategies, 
concerns of justice were restricted to that over which control could be exercised 
(education, for instance, is a concern for equality of opportunity; publically available and 
affordable education was and remains an issue for justice according to Buchanan et al.). 
With fresh advances, however, new interventions can be justified via the concept of equal 
opportunity. The authors imply that the growth of arenas of control is without limit, and 
that outside of those arenas only chance operates. This discussion follows from the 
authors’ claim that Thomas Scanlon’s brute luck conception of justice should not be 
limited to nullifying the inequality resulting from natural or social lotteries; instead, it 
should be applied earlier, to the genetic lottery, in order to remain consistent with its 
claims regarding justice and equality of opportunity (108-152).
9
  
                                                          
9
 John Harris, a strong proponent of enhancement, critiques this particular application of equal opportunity 
strongly (2011). 
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Meanwhile, Peter Singer invokes the concept of equal opportunity to discuss 
possible negative effects of enhancement, specifically genetic interventions, upon persons 
who are not immediately concerned. He claims that genetic intervention would likely 
work at cross-purposes with equal opportunity unless it is regulated in some way (2011). 
This is because of its potential, in a global marketplace, to be used only by already-
advantaged persons with ready access to wealth. Because Singer believes that 
enhancement via genetic intervention could be successful, this type of enhancement 
would solidify the advantages the wealthy enjoy over the poor by passing along 
advantageous traits to descendants, widening the gap between rich and poor (cf. Silver 
1998). Echoing Singer on this point, Fukuyama claims that transhumanism is the world’s 
most dangerous idea (2004). Solidified advantages enjoyed by the wealthy over the poor 
violate equal opportunity. 
I have argued that three important features are shared by proponents and 
opponents of enhancement. But, as I will now argue, a fourth conceptual habit is the most 
important shared feature within this small but influential core of scholars: reductions of 
social and political circumstances – along with hopes for change – to biological facts.10 
Moving forward, I will refer to this as “reduction to the biological.” This is an especially 
important feature of transhumanism, which is cashed out today as genetic determinism. In 
a biological reduction, relevant information about individual or social circumstances is 
read through features and facts about the body. Genetic determinism and related beliefs 
reads information through genes. Further, genetic determinism renders the body, taken as 
                                                          
10
 Jacques Derrida makes a similar point in Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, where he notes that the debate 
on cloning—supposedly a bitter debate at a moral crossroads—is dictated on both sides by biological 
reductionism (2005, 146-148, cf. Mendieta 2003, 172-173). 
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a bundle of genes, the site of human (and therefore, social and political) improvement 
while at the same time taking for granted that technological interventions on the body, 
especially genetic interventions, have the power to “enhance” (as Singer does, above).11  
Genetic determinism has two different inflections directly relevant to 
philosophical conversation in bioethics today regarding enhancement, including genetic 
testing and selection (my case study in this project, which I analyze in chapter two). The 
first inflection is that if a trait is identified as genetically determined, or even biologically 
determined, it is unchangeable (or opportunities to alleviate it are significantly limited), 
and responsibility for the issue falls to the individual rather than political or social 
institutions (Haslam 2011, 819; Lewontin 1992, 23, 36-37; Nelkin and Lindee 1995, 16, 
18, 93).
12
 The second inflection, important for arguments surrounding genetic 
enhancement technologies, is that if a trait is genetically determined it can be removed or 
changed if it is genetically or technologically intervened upon (Nelkin and Lindee 1995, 
101). But, simply because a trait is considered changeable within a discourse influenced 
by genetic determinism does not mean that social or political elements shaping the trait 
are necessarily considered. In a genetic biological reduction, a genetic problem requires a 
genetic solution. For example, an intervention considered able to interrupt the work of 
                                                          
11
 Influential mainstream bioethicist Norman Daniels does object to the “genetic determinism” necessary to 
the belief that certain enhancement strategies can change human nature (2011). But, his objection is based 
on the fact that “human nature” is a population concept and one that picks out certain features as important 
(and we could be wrong about these); therefore, he says, “we can modify human nature, but it takes a very 
tall tale. We must affect the (or at least a) whole population of humans, and we must do so with a trait 
central to that nature” (2011, 36). Modifying human nature is thus possible, for Daniels, although perhaps 
not in the way most worriers conceive of the possibility; he goes on to argue that whether or not one should 
do so is another question altogether.  
 
12
 For an example of a move to individual responsibility, consider the case of allergies or genetic 
predispositions to certain sensitivities that would rule out a person working in certain environments. Rather 
than ensuring safe working conditions in a workplace, the employer has recourse to requiring a person to 
disclose any sensitivities and then declaring the worker not fit for the workplace (as opposed to the 
workplace being unfit for workers) (Nelkin and Lindee 1995, 161). 
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genetic determinism is to “select against” an embryo carrying an unwanted genetic trait 
(as suggested by e.g. Savulescu 2001a, 2001b, 2008; I return to this as my case study in 
chapter two).  
 Philosophers David Resnik and Daniel Vorhaus have argued that four common 
objections to genetic modification technologies are based in or influenced by genetic 
determinism. These arguments are: the freedom argument, which claims that genetic 
modification interferes with human freedom; the giftedness argument, which claims that 
children will become products rather than gifts; the authenticity argument, which claims 
that “talents and abilities” resulting from modification are not really one’s own; and the 
uniqueness argument, which claims that clones are persons whose uniqueness has been 
violated (Resnik and Vorhaus 2006). Each of these arguments significantly overestimates 
the value of genetic factors.  
 But, arguments supporting genetic modification, especially because they are often 
motivated by the desire to achieve increased quality of life, fall into the same trap. 
Transhumanist James Hughes’ essay “The Struggle for a Smarter World” both promotes 
and strongly predicts the impending feasibility of human enhancement with regard to 
intelligence. There, he describes a study as substantiating the claim that “genetics are the 
overwhelming predictor of intelligence for kids from middle-class and affluent 
backgrounds” (2008, 943). Hughes worries that that humans have reached the limits of 
their potential without genetic intervention, an argument which implicitly relies on the 
essentialist concept of innate potential. He claims that “twins raised in different homes 
have almost exactly the same intelligence,” implying the strong genetic causation behind 
xx 
 
intelligence as a characteristic (2007, 944).
13
 In order for investments in genetic 
modification strategies to make sense, some strong portrait of gene action is necessary. In 
other words, arguments supporting programs of genetic enhancement are immediately 
susceptible to the charge of genetic determinism. Making public policy recommendations 
that would dedicate a vast sum of funds to create genetic enhancement technologies and 
make them available to the public at least approaches what Mianna Lotz calls 
“geneticism”—the privileging of genetic causes over other factors—if not a stronger 
variety of genetic determinism (Lotz 2008). I return to a close description of genetic 
determinism at the end of chapter one and provide an example of transhumanism’s 
commitment to genetic determinism (negative genetic selection as a moral principle) in 
chapter two.  
In sum, I have argued that supposedly diametrically opposed positions in core 
bioethical debate surrounding enhancement share fundamental presuppositions, which 
only accentuates the need to philosophically investigate the terms upon which the debate 
is structured—especially genetic determinism.14 I now turn to the strongest group of 
                                                          
13
 The significant problems with regard to separating factors in twin studies are well documented in R.C. 
Lewontin’s Biology as Ideology (1992, 32-33). To start, he notes that volunteers for twin studies are part of 
a self-selected group and that most twins have at least some contact and common environment—for 
example, often “the reason that twins are separated at birth may be that their mother has died in childbirth, 
so that one twin is raised by an aunt and another by a best friend or grandmother” (32). Lewontin also 
tackles problems related to IQ testing (33-37). 
 
14
 It is important to also note the masculinism undergirding these bioethical texts; one example is the 
pressure individuals supposedly feel to be tall and deliberation regarding the use and distribution of the 
human growth hormone to the end of tallness (see esp. Daniel Brock and Eric Juengst in Parens 1998, or 
Buchanan et al. 2000, 115-119). The example is usually posed as a problem among young boys, and indeed 
the issue of tallness seems specifically to plague white masculinity. Historically, white males were over-
enrolled in early trials of human growth hormone treatment (Rothman and Rothman 2003, 172). I argue 
that the insistent focus on this body issue as an example of a desired enhancement (along with the difficulty 
of determining the difference between enhancement and treatment in this case) obfuscates and trivializes 
the bodily stigma and pressure to conform felt by those whose bodies have been raced, sexed, and dis-
abled. In fact, the constancy of this example shows that the white men who write within this literature are 
concerned about alleviating the impact of stigma they are familiar with. In this project, I also note and trace 
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proponents of radical enhancement, transhumanists. I seek access to the issues at the 
heart of the question of enhancement and an understanding of why our culturally and 
historically specific variety of enhancement is desired in the first place. After I introduce 
transhumanism, identify two key transhumanist goals, and argue that transhumanism is 
utopian, I explain my methods in this project and conclude my introduction. 
 
Transhumanism 
 
 Transhumanist philosophy focuses on the potential achievements of evolving 
technology, the desirability of developing new technology, and the possibility of 
enhancing current human capabilities (Bostrom 2005b, 8). It would be accurate to 
classify transhumanism as a type of applied ethics, given its concern with the practical 
implications of technology and possibilities for its future use for improving human life. 
According to the “Transhumanist Declaration,” penned in 1998 as a founding document 
of the World Transhumanist Association, transhumanists recognize that technology has 
the power to impact human life in a fundamental way that would “redesign” it (Bostrom 
2005b, Appendix). Instead of turning away from technology or indulging in 
“technophobia,” (the mistake of bio-luddites) transhumanists believe that new 
technologies, particularly those made possible by the “GRIN” fields—genetics, robotics, 
information, and nanotechnology—should be welcomed as potentially improving human 
life, although they are risky (ibid., see also Garreau 2005, 115 and Rubin 2008, 137). For 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the masculinist tendencies of transhumanism. Transhumanist literature is written by white men and seems 
directed at the concern of white men to maintain and order the social world in such a way as to maximize 
their own independence and freedom. I return to this issue in the Conclusion. 
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transhumanists, global society should invest time and research into technology to 
improve cognition, anti-aging techniques, reproductive technology, and life suspension 
techniques such as cryogenics—all of which are cited by the Declaration—in order to 
understand both their risks and possibilities. Ultimately, what individuals stand to gain, 
according to transhumanists, is the “use of technology to extend their mental and physical 
(including reproductive) capacities and to improve their control over their own lives” 
(Bostrom 2005b, Appendix, emphasis mine). In sum, the Declaration claims that 
transhumanists “seek personal growth beyond our current biological limitations” (ibid.).15 
It seems that for transhumanists, only two reactions to technology—that is, passivity and 
activity—are possible. Activity is preferable because (or so it is claimed) technology has 
the potential to ameliorate or eliminate human suffering and put individuals in control, 
while passivity should be rejected because it may increase, or at least extend, human 
suffering.
16
 Passivity represents ignoring possible control over one’s future. 
 Nick Bostrom, Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Future of Humanity 
Institute and the Programme on the Impacts of Future Technology at Oxford University, 
is one of transhumanism’s chief academic proponents and co-founder of the World 
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 The aforementioned Ramsey presciently outlined the same possibilities for enhancement that represent 
the highest hopes transhumanists today. In Fabricated Man, Ramsey notes the desire for intelligent 
machines, hybridized with organic material, the pursuit of longer or limitless life, and the increase of 
intelligence (1970, 155-157, cf. Bostrom 2008, Kurzweil 2006, Savulescu 2001b, and Stock 1993). He took 
these suggestions from a landmark academic text of the time written by Gerald Feinberg and entitled The 
Prometheus Project (1968).  
 
16
 Many transhumanists dismiss arguments coming from those derogatively referred to as 
“bioconservatives” who are believed to opt for passivity. Even bioethicist Arthur Kaplan, whose views on 
enhancement are relatively moderate, refers to the troubling “anti-meliorists” when he encounters critique 
from those worried about the aims of or limits to enhancement (“Good, Better, or Best?” in Savulescu and 
Bostrom 2011). But characterizing worries about radical enhancement as a refusal to alleviate suffering 
closes off conversation prematurely; there are, as we shall see, good reasons to worry about enhancement 
strategies conceived today that have little to do with bioconservatism. 
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Transhumanist Association.
17
 For Bostrom, transhumanism stands for the “radical 
extension of human health-span, eradication of disease, elimination of unnecessary 
suffering, and augmentation of human intellectual, physical, and emotional capacities…” 
(Bostrom 2003b, 5). In a 2005 essay, Bostrom traces a history of transhumanism. Taking 
literary epics, ceremony, and religion as a guide, he notes that cultures around the world 
have long bemoaned death and sought immortality. He regards Renaissance humanism 
and the Age of the Enlightenment as primary precursors of today’s transhumanist point of 
view, because, like transhumanism, both of these historical frames emphasized 
“intellectual rigor” and relied upon empiricism and human judgment to investigate the 
world and its possibilities, therefore eschewing dogma (Bostrom 2005b, 2). Following 
Francis Bacon, Bostrom argues that science should be used to “achieve mastery over 
nature in order to improve the living conditions of human beings” (ibid., see also Rubin 
2008, 137). In short, “rational humanism” is where transhumanism locates its heritage.  
 Among the influential ideas from these periods is the far-reaching belief that the 
human is an object of nature to be conquered. As Bostrom puts it: “humans themselves 
can be developed through the appliance of science” (2005b, 3). Thus, it is Immanuel 
Kant’s motto “Sapere aude! Have courage to use your own intelligence!” to which 
Bostrom finally turns (2005b, 4; cf. Wolfe 2009, xiv). Meanwhile, Bostrom distinguishes 
transhumanist aims from Friedrich Nietzsche’s overman, arguing that Nietzsche did not 
have “technological transformation” in mind (Bostrom 2005b, 4). But, he finds 
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 Those I consider a part of the “cultural” movement of transhumanism include pop-culture icon Ray 
Kurzweil, famous for his articulation of the “singularity” – a future time when humans can “transcend 
biology” (2006). He is now director of engineering at Google. Others in this group are Natasha Vita-More 
and her husband Max More, who have been globally influential among laypersons interested in life 
extension and enhancement (Alexander 2000, Heard 1997). 
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inspiration in Nietzsche’s 19th-century contemporary, J.S. Mill, the English liberal thinker 
and utilitarian (2005b, 4). Transhumanism looks forward to and promotes a future where 
technology reshapes the human being as it is now conceived.
18
 According to Bostrom’s 
vision, this reshaping would be directed toward improvement for human beings in terms 
of capabilities, but also, in harmony with Mill, happiness.  
 Transhumanism’s hoped-for, reshaped human being is often referred to as the 
posthuman. To be posthuman, according to transhumanists, is to inhabit a state generally 
considered to be not only a departure from what are commonly considered human 
qualities but also radically better than, or transcendent of, humanity as we know it 
(Bostrom 2008). “Current standards” of humanity would not apply to the posthuman 
(Garreau 2005, 231-232, cf. Wolfe 2009, xiii). According to the “Transhumanist FAQ,” a 
collectively authored document Bostrom participated in: “Posthumans could be 
completely synthetic artificial intelligences, or they could be enhanced uploads…or they 
could be the result of making many smaller but cumulatively profound augmentations to 
a biological human” (Humanity + 2012).  
 
Transhumanism’s sense of the posthuman is not the only contemporary meaning 
of the term. Transhumanism’s posthuman is not equivalent, for instance, to the concept of 
posthuman used in critical animal studies to challenge philosophical investments in or the 
moral relevance of traditional species boundaries. For example, in What is 
Posthumanism? Cary Wolfe forcefully distinguishes transhumanism from the critical 
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 Human-machine hybridity is already a reality in the use of prosthetics, computers, handheld devices, 
assistive technologies, and other complex technological systems upon which most of us rely every day (cf. 
Francis 2009 on complex cognition). For more obviously radical examples of hybridity, look to world-class 
athletes Oscar Pistorius and Aimee Mullins. While it may thus be argued, along with Donna Haraway (I 
return to her work below) that we are already “posthuman,” here I am concerned with investigating specific 
transhumanist promotion of a special, hoped-for, future posthuman, believed by transhumanists to be so 
increased in capacities that it would be difficult to assign the word “human” to this being. 
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posthumanism he endorses. Wolfe draws this line precisely because of the humanism that 
Bostrom identifies as the “roots” of transhumanism, a sense of “posthumanism [that] 
derives directly from ideals of human perfectibility, rationality, and agency” (Wolfe 
2009, xiii). Wolfe uses posthumanist critique to target these ideals, and to show that the 
positive “aspirations” of humanism are “undercut by the philosophical and ethical 
frameworks used to conceptualise them” (2009, xvi). Among these aspirations are better 
treatment of nonhuman animals and persons with disabilities that the confining 
“normative subjectivity” of humanism prevents (2009, xvi-xvii). Wolfe compares 
posthumanism to transhumanism in this way: “posthumanism in my sense isn’t 
posthuman at all—in the sense of being ‘after’ our embodiment has been transcended—
but is only posthumanist, in the sense that it opposes the fantasies of disembodiment and 
autonomy, inherited from humanism itself…” (Wolfe 2009, xv). Bostrom’s vision of the 
posthuman is a realization of the fantasies of disembodiment and autonomy and so 
supports, rather than questions, normative subjectivity. 
A version of posthumanism has been attributed to philosopher Michel Foucault 
because of his remark that the human being, as known to us in the contemporary world, is 
a recent invention that may soon be left behind or die out (Foucault 1973, 386-87). 
Foucault’s sense of posthumanism would amount to the recognition that discourse and 
power relations always shape human identity, which can shift and be refashioned. Unlike 
Bostrom, who considers the intellect trapped in the body (an inheritance from Plato, who 
suggested the same thing about the soul), Foucault believed that the soul was the “prison 
of the body” (Foucault 1979, 30). Arnold Davidson, in an introduction to the Abnormal 
lectures, explains that Foucault provides a “historical analysis” and “political history” of 
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the body by focusing on the way that the concepts of the psyche and personality came 
about, contributing to “gradation from normal to abnormal” in the classification of bodies 
(Davidson, in Foucault 2003, xix). But, Foucault investigated and uncovered systems of 
subject-making and normalization precisely because he was a critic of Enlightenment 
humanism (Sawicki 1994, 288). Meanwhile, because transhumanism lacks Foucault’s 
insights, which suggest that beliefs about what the human being is can impact acceptance 
and rejection of particular bodies, I will argue that transhumanist philosophy serves to 
further advance the construction and support of notions of abnormality that are in turn 
used to exclude certain bodies from political and social privileges. 
 Despite rallying around a vision of the posthuman, transhumanism conflicts with 
the ironic cyborg utopia first imagined by Donna Haraway in 1985. Haraway, another 
philosopher of posthumanism, is the author of “The Cyborg Manifesto” (1991), an iconic 
essay of political ironism in which she imagines border crossings that break oppressive 
dualisms and acknowledges that human beings are already chimeras and cyborgs. Wolfe 
identifies Haraway’s legacy as the “cyborg” strand of posthumanism and claims that 
although transhumanism takes cues from her work, it does not much resemble the spirit 
of Haraway’s attempted intervention (xiii). Transhumanism looks forward to a time when 
posthumans arrive, and Haraway’s work argues that distinctions which uphold the figure 
of the human as autonomous, whole, and rational are already broken down.
19
 
 Just as feminists have been concerned to criticize the vision of the human as 
autonomous or a carrier of pure rationality, we should be concerned to criticize 
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 Shulamith Firestone is another feminist claimed for the transhumanist point of view (e.g. Bostrom 
2005c). But her call for liberating reproductive technology for women must be read as part of her feminist 
reading of Marx and her feminist political goals (1970). 
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transhumanism because it turns the boundless rationality once thought to conquer nature 
back upon human beings to remake them in accordance with this rational image. 
Transhumanists envision an extension of capabilities further into space and time and the 
multiplication and maximization of autonomy and intellect. In this way, rather than going 
beyond the notion of an autonomous rational subject, transhumanism merely expands 
these ideals into a posthuman world (cf. Hayles 1999, 287; cf. Wolfe 2009 xv). And what 
emerges from this world is not a hybrid that has no origin—as Haraway envisioned—a 
being outside of hierarchies that privilege men over women and culture over nature, 
including the human/animal, organism/machine, and physical/non-physical divides, 
putting stigmatizing norms into question (Haraway 1991, 151-153). Transhumanism is 
the realization of these hierarchical privileges, now extended. 
 Katherine Hayles, a proponent of her own type of posthumanism, critiqued 
transhumanist Hans Moravec because of his dreams of extended autonomy. She writes:  
When Moravec imagines ‘you’ choosing to download yourself into a computer, 
thereby obtaining through technological mastery the ultimate privilege of 
immortality, he is not abandoning the autonomous liberal subject but is expanding 
its prerogatives into the realm of the posthuman. (Hayles 1999, 287; cf. Wolfe 
2009 xv) 
 
While radical, promising forms of posthumanism that contribute to feminist projects like 
Haraway’s ironic political myth exist, transhumanism’s posthuman is not among these. 
Transhumanism uncritically adopts the tenets of classical humanism. Transhumanism’s 
imagined “cyborg” does not celebrate difference but rather the maximization and 
optimization of familiar valued traits such as cognitive ability, physical strength, rational 
choice, and beauty. All of these ideals inform and support existing hierarchies (cf. 
Humanity + 2012). Posthuman pleasures claimed for transhumanist futures are often 
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hyper-realized versions of current desires, as in Bostrom’s “Why I Want to be a 
Posthuman When I Grow Up,” where he suggests that posthumans will enjoy intensely 
pleasurable music, friendships, and special multi-player games (2008). In chapter one, I 
situate transhumanism within a history of enhancement strategies in the twentieth 
century, beginning with “physical culture” at the turn of the century and ending with the 
framing of modern bioethics in the 1970s and the genetic beliefs underlying today’s 
enhancement conversation and transhumanism itself.   
 Now that I have introduced transhumanist thinking, I will draw out two major 
transhumanist goals and strategies upon which I focus in this project. 
 
Transhumanist Goals and Strategies 
 I here conduct a brief critical discussion of the specific views of Bostrom and 
Julian Savulescu and their respective transhumanist enhancement strategies of 
transcending the body and negative genetic selection. I choose these two figures because 
both are influential scholars in bioethics whose views have special interest for feminist 
disability scholars.
20
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 Both Bostrom and Savulescu are influential bioethics scholars. It should be noted that besides their own 
numerous publications and academic institutional influence, the two are widely cited in other philosophical 
and scholarly works. A cited reference search utilizing both the Social Sciences Citation Index and Arts and 
Humanities Citation Index in Thomson Reuters’ Web of Knowledge database yields 1,575 academic works 
citing Savulescu on topics ranging from ethics to social issues. Works citing Savulescu include (but are not 
limited to) 1,111 peer-reviewed articles, 85 book chapters, and 22 books. This is a wealth of support 
compared to the relatively “fringe” Bostrom, cited (according to a search conducted via the same 
constraints) in 148 academic works on topics ranging from ethics to social issues. Works citing Bostrom 
include (but are not limited to) 120 peer-reviewed articles, 17 book chapters, and 8 books. But, Bostrom 
features largely in the work of mainstream bioethicists, like Nicholas Agar. In his recent book Humanity’s 
End: Why We Should Reject Radical Enhancement, Agar dedicates an entire chapter to the work of 
Bostrom (2010). Agar also references Savulescu on the topic of enhancement for elite sports (201). Agar 
also cites Bostrom in Liberal Eugenics: In Defence of Human Enhancement (2004). Transhumanism as a 
movement has also received considerable scholarly attention. For example, Hastings Center Report 
published a piece by Agar which takes for granted the importance of transhumanist literature in 2007 and 
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 Bostrom promises a future of increased happiness if only we invest in 
enhancement technologies – not only a future of new pleasure, but also an increasingly 
moral and politically just future (Bostrom 2008). He bases his argument upon the 
desirability of an increased opportunity range and the unknown potential of increased 
intellectual capacity. An opportunity range is an idealized set of possibilities based on 
available capacities; as defined by bioethicist Norman Daniels, an opportunity range is 
“the array of life plans reasonable persons…are likely to construct for themselves” 
(Daniels 1985, 33). Because the posthuman is an erstwhile human with radically 
increased capacities, Bostrom argues that the opportunity range of a posthuman is larger 
in scope than the opportunity range of a human. These ranges can be represented by two 
concentric circles, with the posthuman opportunity range encompassing that of the 
human. Bostrom thereby contends that posthumanism should be pursued (2008). He is 
using the logic of extended autonomy defined by way of multiplication of choice. 
 Bostrom argues that the posthuman state is better, offering pleasures and 
fulfillments worth pursuing, although he simultaneously acknowledges that his vision of 
posthuman life is by definition unknowable to mere humans because it involves the 
attainment of new capacities and, thus, new insights (2004 and 2008, 112). He writes, as 
if from the future: “[Posthumans] love life every instant. Every second is so good that it 
would blow our minds had their amperage not been previously increased” (2010, 8).21 
This point is typical of the utopian rhetorical strategy employed by Bostrom; a fact which 
                                                                                                                                                                             
subsequently gave space to replies from both transhumanist James Hughes and Bostrom, along with a reply 
from Agar (Agar 2007). Also, a recent (December 2012) issue of Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science, a 
journal published by Wiley-Blackwell with an impact factor of 0.274, published 4 articles on 
transhumanism as part of a special issue. 
 
21
 As Lisa Guenther pointed out after reading an earlier draft, Bostrom sounds as though he is describing 
the perfect orgasm. 
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has not gone unnoticed among other scholars, or even Bostrom himself, who seems to 
embrace the term “utopia” (e.g. Hauskeller 2012, Bostrom 2010). Bostrom contrasts an 
unknowable future of intense happiness with today’s world, and describes today’s world 
in dismal terms, taking suffering for granted. Both extremes seem unjustified. For 
example, regarding today, he writes: “Every way you turn it’s the same: soot, casting its 
veil over all glamours and revelries, despoiling your epiphany, sodding up your white 
pressed collar and shirt” (Bostrom 2010, 2). Readers are thus exhorted to promote a 
transhumanist vision of the future. Bostrom asks us to recall the best moments of our 
lives and hold them in our hearts as an “aspiring ember”; he argues that the best moments 
of human life correspond with a “higher state of being,” the thought of which should 
provide motivation enough to pursue radical enhancement (Bostrom 2010, 3; cf. 5).  
 Bostrom describes human bodies as fragile houses unfit for bliss and happiness: 
“it is not well to live in a self-combusting paper hut! ... one day you or your children 
should have a secure home. Research, build, redouble your effort!” (2010, 2 and 5). 
Bostrom is not only relying on utopian rhetorical strategy, he also feeds the fantasy of a 
disembodied intellect in search of a better home from which it can operate and experience 
life. This intellect, trapped, appears to be the real posthuman and is waiting to be 
released. Bostrom rejects the human body as vulnerable and issues a moral imperative 
(echoed, as we shall see, in the work of Savulescu) to provide new sorts of containers for 
one’s children that are not vulnerable. 
 Bostrom’s transhumanism is informed by the strong desire to avoid the suffering 
of disease and pain as well as moral urgency derived from the sense that death is unjust 
and society is culpable for failing to address its victims (Bostrom 2007). Yet, in order to 
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achieve rhetorical goals, current suffering is overstated (Bostrom 2003b and 2005a).  
Bostrom quips: “What is Guilt in Utopia? Guilt is our knowledge that we could have 
created Utopia sooner” (2010, 8 and 7).22 In Bostrom’s work and its promise of 
immortality or radically-decelerated aging, transhumanism represents the fantasy of wish 
fulfillment. Bostrom denigrates the body and, implicitly, dependence as part of his 
program of human enhancement, as indicated by his imagery of the self-combusting 
paper hut. For him, the goal of transhumanism is to leave the vulnerable body behind to 
protect the intellect and to augment the therefore disembodied intellect by way of 
technology. He views this as an integral part of the journey to a better, happier, more 
moral and politically just future.  
 I turn now to Julian Savulescu, editor-in-chief of the Journal of Medical Ethics 
and director of the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics. Savulescu’s work, like 
Bostrom’s, is motivated by moral urgency; Savulescu and Igmar Persson claim that 
humans must enhance themselves morally or face extinction because of moral ineptitude; 
they draw on evolutionary psychology to describe “common-sense” morality and believe 
that this morality must be changed to mitigate or eliminate threats such as climate change 
and war (Savulescu 2009 and Persson and Savulescu 2010 and 2012).  
Along these lines, Savulescu argues that “eugenic” genetic selection is the best 
way to achieve human enhancement (with Hemsley et al. 2006).  In other words, the 
population must be protected from internal threats in order to protect it from global, 
external threats. Savulescu calls the obligation to select for the best or better traits 
“procreative beneficence” (2001b, 425, cf. Savulescu 2002, 2008) and he makes clear 
                                                          
22
 In contrast, Bostrom writes of the future: “What is Suffering in Utopia? Suffering is the salt trace left on 
the cheeks of those who were around before” (2010, 7). 
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that genetic markers for known disabilities are among the traits targeted as worse and to 
be avoided by those who are morally conscientious (Savulescu 2008). He believes that 
any trait which potentially curtails quality of life should be selected against. Parents are 
morally responsible to choose future children on the basis of particular traits in order to 
secure greater happiness and freedom for them – or at least provide the best chances at 
happiness and freedom (2001b, 415). For Savulescu, in other words, parents have a moral 
obligation when reproducing to select for the traits that will contribute to the best chances 
for the best life (ibid.). Given existing technology, this means employing either selective 
abortion on the basis of the presence of certain traits uncovered via prenatal diagnosis or 
utilizing a combination of in vitro fertilization and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis to 
select a favored embryo. Savulescu argues that the latter method is psychologically 
preferable for reproducers, although either is acceptable in light of procreative 
beneficence (2001b, 416). In the future, procreative beneficence would mean the moral 
imperative to use any technology available when reproducing to ensure the birth of the 
child with the best chances at the best life (cf. Savulescu and Kahane 2009, recall here 
Buchanan et al.’s views regarding the “colonization” of justice).  
 Savulescu likens the reasoning involved in selecting embryos to playing the 
Wheel of Fortune; no matter how weak the link between genotype and expected eventual 
quality of life, he argues that a parent should select the embryo, of available embryos, 
with the best traits – or, which is unmarked by negative test results (2001b, 414). Key 
among favored traits is cognitive ability, measured individually via IQ, which he argues 
is essential to living a good life on most major versions of moral living (420). According 
to Savulescu, most moral conceptions of how to live a good life are based in or could be 
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improved with maximized cognition (419-420). Undesired traits are many, including 
traits for asthma and bad tempers, which Savulescu argues negatively affect quality of 
life significantly enough to warrant negative selection (417 and 420). In chapter two, I 
discuss procreative beneficence and develop a “disability critique”23 of the view. I will 
argue that procreative beneficence is ableist, sexist in its disregard for women who would 
be required to use it, and should be of concern because it stigmatizes dis/abled and 
otherwise marked bodies. 
 Using a disability lens to view procreative beneficence helps uncover the tableau 
of statistical risk embedded in Savulescu’s account. For example, prenatal diagnostics 
presents medical, hereditary, and age-related statistics along with risk of deviation and 
associated costs to potential parents; it also requires decisive action in response to those 
statistics (see Waldschmidt 2005, 205). Parents can, using prenatal diagnostics, choose 
against “misfortune” by utilizing the platform of “statistical calculation” (204-205). As 
Savulescu puts it, reproduction becomes a game of the Wheel of Fortune, and the fetus 
becomes a site of risk. Do the risks, assessed through prenatal diagnostics, justify 
continued pregnancy? Potential parents are thus asked to participate in the avoidance of 
risk, and risk is most often figured as the risk of disability. 
 Savulescu, in seeking a better future, suggests genetic selection as a primary 
enhancement strategy. But, as I will argue, his account of the moral use of reproductive 
technology naturalizes or participates in stigma against persons with disabilities and is 
sexist in its disregard for women who must use it. In a close parallel to the work of 
Bostrom already discussed, the prenatal diagnostics at the heart of Savulescu’s 
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 The “disability critique” is a specific point of view most famously supported by Adrienne Asch. I employ 
Asch’s work and develop a version of this view in chapter two. 
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enhancement strategy emphasizes the risks of embodiment. I now return to Bostrom to 
forecast more thoroughly the role I see the concepts of disability and vulnerability 
playing in transhumanist argumentation. 
In his parable “The Fable of the Dragon-Tyrant,” Bostrom figures death as a 
murderous dragon waiting for its victims on the outskirts of a city (2005a). The city is 
forced to pay tribute to this monster, which salivates endlessly for human flesh. The 
tribute comes from all parts of the community, sparing no family, and grief always 
follows. The leaders of the city, and many within it, have become so used to the rule of 
this monster that they offer no resistance. Cartloads of individuals are sent to the dragon 
every day. Bostrom describes the desire of some brave members of the community to 
slay the dragon; but, these individuals are undercut by established powers. The hero of 
Bostrom’s story is the one who finally, against the complacency of the leaders of the city, 
hatches a plan to slay the dragon and succeeds. Bostrom thus poses death as conquerable. 
When we consider Bostrom’s story, we should notice the ideological struggle in 
particular. Who objects to the desire of the transhumanist to defeat death, aging, and the 
illnesses which are tied to them? Taken literally from the fable, the objector is the status 
quo – complacent leadership (2005a). This fits with Bostrom’s indictment of bioethics as 
rife with “status-quo bias” and the inability of most of us to see what humanity’s biggest 
problems really are (most importantly—death) (cf. Agar 2010, Bostrom 20087). But, I 
argue, a better interpretation of the “enemy” of transhumanism is the vulnerability of the 
body, which – if it is not rejected or ameliorated – will stymie the plan of enhancement 
for transhumanists. Vulnerability-as-enemy can be seen in Savulescu’s contention that 
enhancement is necessary to stave off extinction and negative genetic selection will 
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achieve enhancement for everyone. The dragon, representing death, inspires in 
transhumanists the need to defend and arm the human body. The fleshly human body 
becomes the transhumanist target of innovation as a result of its unacceptable 
vulnerability to injury and death.  
While transhumanists believe all human bodies are wanting and should be 
enhanced, disability is a special subject of concern for transhumanism. Common human 
capabilities are not, for transhumanists, the endpoint of human progress but a shaky 
beginning. Transhumanists reject Norman Daniels’ normative concept of species-typical 
functioning, as many disability rights activists and theorists have done. At least at first, 
then, it seems that transhumanists do not value the disabled body less than the abled 
body; rather, they consider all bodies to be in some sense deficient. This would be an 
improvement upon the view that the species-typical body is acceptable while bodies that 
deviate are not. But, I argue that transhumanism actually rejects the disabled body and 
can increase stigma against persons with disabilities for two reasons. First, it plays upon 
fears of disablement. As I have shown and will continue to argue, transhumanist thinkers 
emphasize the fragility of the body and its susceptibility to risk. Taking Bostrom’s image 
of the body as a paper hut together with Savulescu’s focus on pre-natal or pre-
implantation genetic profiles – which make the fetus a site of statistical risk – I argue that 
the risk of refusing transhumanist aims is the risk of disablement. This makes a disabled 
body the symbol of a feared outcome and a stand-in for death. Instead of seeing disability 
as a complex interrelationship between the body, social structures, and social norms, 
disability becomes the outcome of a too-complacent posture toward death and 
“technophobia.” Second, the transhumanist point of view endorses a hierarchy of value 
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and well-being among lives on the basis of capabilities; that is, the greater the number of 
capabilities, the larger the opportunity range, the better the life. Disability theorists, 
contra transhumanists, have worked to disentangle well-being from capability and argue 
that while capability is valuable, the lack of a capability should not be assumed to 
diminish well-being (e.g. Asch 2003, 318, see discussion in chapter two). 
Bostrom combines Kant’s motto, which exhorts readers to have courage to use 
intelligence, with Bacon’s imperative of mastery, and thereby encourages seeking 
mastery over the body. The body also appears as an impediment to autonomy, making 
mastery of the body even more essential (cf. Hauskeller 2012, 43).  The division between 
intellect and body, and the possibility of intellectual release from the body through 
technology, recalls old hierarchies between body and mind. These hierarchies have 
served and can still serve as rationales for devaluing persons with disabilities, especially 
cognitive disability. Relatedly, Bostrom commits transhumanism to an “emphasis on 
individual liberties,” which casts humans in an atomistic light and downplays or devalues 
human interdependence. Atomistic conceptions of the human are also targets for 
disability theory, as they tend to devalue the lives of those with disabilities (Bostrom 
2005b, 4; recall Wolfe’s discussion of the “the fantasies of disembodiment and 
autonomy”). Transhumanist visions seek to curtail or eliminate dependence and 
vulnerability rather than embracing these features as shared or as a starting point for 
ethics.   
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Transhumanist Utopias 
Transhumanism is distinctly utopian—a point I briefly make here before turning 
to my methodology in this project. Transhumanist calls for the use of science and 
technology to make life better are appealing, and feed off common fears of death and 
pain. Transhumanism promises the fulfillment of wishes to avoid both. As 
aforementioned, Nick Bostrom advocates for the pursuit of posthumanity by way of the 
following argument:  
[Consider] our current ignorance and the vastness of the as-yet unexplored terrain. 
Let Sh be the ‘space’ of possible modes of being that could be instantiated by 
someone with current human capacities. Let Sp be the space of possible modes of 
being that could be instantiated by someone with posthuman capacities. In an 
intuitive sense, Sp is enormously much larger than Sh (2008, 122). 
 
This argument begs the question regarding the desirability of enhancement and one is 
cornered; bigger is always better and better is always better. Bostrom builds a specific 
vision of the future by way of contrast, without justifying why his means – intervention 
upon the body – are the appropriate path to get to that future.24 He invokes the idea of 
unknowability of that future when he writes: “You could say that I feel surpassing bliss. 
But these are words invented to describe human experience. What I feel is as far beyond 
human feeling as my thoughts are beyond human thought” (3).  
Twentieth-century German sociologist Karl Mannheim’s treatise on ideology, 
Ideology and Utopia, treats utopian thinking as imperative (demanding action) and notes 
that it refuses to consider the present on its own terms, instead viewing it through the lens 
of a desired future. He writes:  
                                                          
24
 One should be quick to notice that a transhumanist future, and its accompanying transcendence of 
unhappiness and ills, is often touted as “inevitable” (e.g. Dhanda 2002, xi; Silver 2004, Stock 2002). 
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Utopian thinking … [is] so strongly interested in the destruction and 
transformation of a given condition of society that [these thinkers] unwittingly see 
only those elements in the situation which tend to negate it…They are not at all 
concerned with what really exists; rather in their thinking they already seek to 
change the situation that exists (1991, 36).  
 
Mannheim goes on: “[utopian] thought…can be used only as a direction for action” (36). 
Elsewhere, Mannheim defines a utopian “state of mind” as a state “incongruous with the 
state of reality in which it occurs” and “oriented toward objects which do not exist” 
(173). Finally, he points to the wish fulfillment imbued in utopian thinking: “When the 
imagination finds no satisfaction in existing reality, it seeks refuge in wishfully 
constructed places and periods” (184). 
 Transhumanism is utopian in that it requires action and its appeals for social 
investment often require an exaggeration or misrepresentation of the present and its 
suffering. Transhumanists suggest enhancement is one way to achieve long-standing 
goals, like reducing negative environmental impacts, because it has the potential power 
(if we pursue it) to create human beings who are more sociable (less selfish and more 
altruistic) in their dealings (Liao et al. 2012). Others argue that enhancement is a strong 
imperative since it can create humans who have greater moral aptitude, which we need to 
do for fear that we will become extinct (Persson and Savulescu 2010 and 2012, Savulescu 
2009). Transhumanist ideals include wide access to technology, in part in order to 
address frequent concerns that (expensive) enhancement technology will only be 
available to the lucky few, making entrenched inequality even more permanent (Bostrom 
2003b and Fukuyama 2004). Given that wide access to bio-technology is highly unlikely 
and there are no concrete plans provided for its fulfillment, I argue that this is yet another 
feature of transhumanist utopian thinking and desire for wish fulfillment.  
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Transhumanist utopias are Romantic human dreams. Especially in Bostrom’s 
work, transhumanists emphasize romantic feelings of happiness, even-temperedness, 
relief from suffering, and “zest” – all of which are understood as a result of choosing 
one’s future. In other words, choice-making unlocks bliss. Bostrom writes of physical 
and mental changes which will accompany a chosen transhumanist future: “You begin to 
treasure almost every moment of life; you go about your business with zest; and you feel 
a deeper warmth and affection for those you love, but you can still be upset and even 
angry on occasions where upset or anger is truly justified and constructive” (2008, 111). 
Bostrom also describes increased kindness to animals, better political efforts (more 
justice), and better ecological support. Finally, also recall that posthuman pleasures 
embedded in transhumanist futures are most often hyperrealized human desires, as in 
Bostrom’s “Why I Want to be a Posthuman When I Grow Up,” where he suggests that 
posthumans will enjoy intensely pleasurable music, friendships, and multi-player games 
(2008). Bostrom again invokes the unknown, a realm of complete transcendence:  
As we seek to peer farther into posthumanity, our ability to concretely imagine 
what it might be like trails off. If, aside from extended healthspans, the essence of 
posthumanity is to be able to have thoughts and experiences that we cannot 
readily think or experience with our current capacities, then it is not surprising 
that our ability to imagine what posthuman life might be like is very limited. 
(2008, 112) 
 
…what you had in your best moment is not close to what I have now – a 
beckoning scintilla at most. If the distance between base and apex for you is eight 
kilometers, then to reach my dwellings requires a million light-year ascent. The 
altitude is outside moon and planets and all the stars your eyes can see. Beyond 
dreams. Beyond imagination. (2010, 3) 
 
Michael Hauskeller notes that for utopian transhumanists, the body is seen as a 
constraint, not merely a site, for action. For transhumanists: “[bodies] seem to prevent us 
from being entirely autonomous” (2012, 43). This, then, is especially true of needy 
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bodies, bodies constructed as dis/abled. I return to the pervasive transhumanist idea of 
bodily enhancement as a mode of multiplying choice and creating freedom throughout 
this project, but especially at the end of chapter two in a discussion of genetic counseling. 
Examining the utopia of transhumanists is a way to wonder about the good of 
enhancement and its maximizations and call into question the connection of atomized 
choice-making with happiness and bliss. Why is more strength, more beauty, more 
intelligence, or a longer life good for us? In what sense is it better? What can “better”, or 
even “best” mean? Why is freedom (specifically freedom from un-enhanced bodies, as I 
argue in chapter one) viewed as choice-making, the choice to enhance, the mode of 
achieving intense happiness? Freedom is actively equated with both power and happiness 
in transhumanist literature. 
John Harris scoffs at these questions, and insists that the answers are self-
evident—enhancements are always about making one better, and better is always good. 
Savulescu assumes simply that “better” at least means more intelligent, as measured by 
any available cognitive tests (2001b, 414). But to the contrary, I argue that the 
transhumanist vision of better relies on what society now values, and is shaped by deep-
seated prejudices concerning what bodies and lives are best. If conceptions of “better” do 
not question stigma, they will reify it. 
I turn now to a description of my strategy in this project and, finally, a brief 
outline of the chapters to follow. 
 
 
 
xli 
 
Methodology 
 
Feminists, in various ways, have theorized the dependency at the heart of human 
life and subjectivity (see e.g. Martha Fineman, Nancy Fraser, Linda Gordon, Eva Kittay, 
Martha Nussbaum and Kelly Oliver in Kittay and Feder 2002). Eva Kittay argues that 
although interdependence is universal, the material conditions of social life disguise the 
dependence of some and showcase or expose that of others (Kittay 2001, 570, sees also 
Fineman 2002). Meanwhile, the transhumanist Bostrom is working from the assumption 
that subjectivity sans dependence or interdependence is normal and preferable, and 
deviance from that norm is to be avoided.   
In consequence, I argue that critique of transhumanist philosophy is important for 
feminist disability scholarship insofar as transhumanist philosophy has troubling 
implications for persons with disabilities and women. The affirmation and extension of 
traditional humanism embedded in transhumanism’s vision of the future supports 
traditional hierarchies between body and mind and among capabilities. Atomized 
cognitive ability, for example, is considered uniquely important to the good life —
especially if it can be relieved of interference from a body vulnerable to injury and death 
— and the addition of capabilities is linked tightly to increased wellbeing. Philosophers 
of disability and feminist theorists should work in tandem to critique transhumanism for 
these assumptions, especially insofar as they become evidence to support investment in 
research and technology to be used upon bodies (cf. Garland-Thomson 2002, Rohrer 
2005, and Wendell 1996). Because of its assumptions regarding the importance of 
capability in general and cognitive capability in particular, transhumanism seems 
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philosophically at odds with disability rights and the aims and goals of the disabled 
people’s movement.25 In this project, I draw from the work of Adrienne Asch, a 
philosopher of disability, feminist philosopher of care Eva Kittay, and Foucauldians 
Shelley Tremain and Anne Waldschmidt in particular to gain a theoretical foothold in my 
critique of transhumanism. 
 Feminist bioethicist Christine Overall distinguishes between preferences and 
practices. In her feminist work on sex selection, for example, Overall seeks to draw 
attention away from individual preferences for male offspring, which may or may not be 
sexist (although she argues that such preferences are not “easy to justify” 2012, 232, n. 6) 
and toward the social practice of sex selection — which contributes to sexism in culture 
(Overall 1987, Ch.2; cf. Callahan 1995, 135-136). In other words, where some 
bioethicists focus on the morality of individual choices, Overall wants to focus on the 
politics of stigmatizing practices. In parallel with Overall, I want to refocus attention 
away from individual preferences against, for example, unwanted traits, which may or 
may not be ableist (prejudiced against persons with disabilities), and toward social 
practices involving reproductive technology that can contribute to ableism. But this 
distinction seems faulty, especially given the feedback loop between individual 
preferences and stigmatizing social practices. How can we focus attention on stigmatizing 
                                                          
25
 I do not wish to claim, however, that the relationship between transhumanism and the disabled people’s 
movement is a simple matter. Gregor Wolbring, a well-known disabled scholar and activist, for example, 
identifies as a transhumanist (Wasserman 2012). Indeed, as David Wasserman notes, transhumanist 
thinkers invoke members of the disability community as representative of the forefront of the potential and 
promise of new technologies because of their use of assistive technology and prosthetics and the 
community’s acceptance of human bodies in a variety of forms (ibid.). Given the transhumanist goal of 
adding to or increasing capabilities and its invocation of the disability community as uniquely friendly to or 
dependent upon technology, controversy surrounding the ethics of radical human enhancement implicates 
disabled people in a key role. Yet, as Wasserman suggests, the proliferation of enhancement technologies 
might exacerbate existing prejudices by promoting value hierarchies among capabilities rather than, as 
Wolbring hopes, by alleviating prejudices through difference (ibid.). For more on Wolbring, see the 
forthcoming documentary Fixed: The Science/Fiction of Human Enhancement (www.fixedthemovie.com). 
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practices and cultural attitudes without morally evaluating the actions of individual 
agents?  
For Foucault, biopolitics focuses on the “species body” and involves the 
“supervision” of “propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy 
and longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these to vary” (Foucault 1990, 139). 
Recall Savulescu’s concern about the extinction of the species if no recourse is made to 
enhancement; in this, the action of bio-power is clear. Bio-power seeks to protect the 
population from biological threats, or what Savulescu calls “existential threats” – the 
health of society must be defended (Bernasconi 2010, 207-208 and 211). Accordingly, 
the following examination and evaluation of transhumanist thought, informed by my 
feminist and critical disability lenses, focuses on a culture of stigmatization of bodily 
deviance and its expression in bioethics and beyond, not on individual decision-making. 
My investigation bears out the desire to investigate aggregate social practices and discern 
stigma where it appears and is fed. 
 The work of Foucault on biopolitics and normalization inspires and helps shape 
my project, as in the historical turn in chapter one, and also provides routes for 
philosophical examination of transhumanism and disability, as in chapter two’s 
discussion of risk management and chapter three’s discussion of minority politics. Some 
uses of reproductive technology, Overall writes, may involve the “presupposition…that 
we can ensure that only high-quality babies are born, and that ‘defective’ fetuses can be 
eliminated before birth. The foetus is treated as a product for which ‘quality control’ 
measures are appropriate” (Overall 1993, 58). Foucault’s notion of biopolitics is meant to 
capture and discuss precisely this type of presupposition and the normalizing forces—
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which distinguish between normal and abnormal traits and bodies and provide gradation 
and taxonomies among them—it represents. Foucault helps us identify the question I 
argue is at the heart of transhumanist philosophy: the bio-political question of who should 
live. 
  
Chapter Outline 
 
To conclude my introduction, I turn now to a brief chapter outline. In chapter one, 
“From Physical Culture to Genetic Culture: A Genealogy of Gene-ology,” I investigate 
the historical and cultural context of enhancement strategies in the 20
th
 century, which I 
argue are structurally linked to those of the 21
st
. At each moment I outline, definitions of 
health and wellness provide blueprints of bodily deviance, which in turn shape and 
construct conceptions of disability. I end with a description of genetic determinism, 
which I argue links the continuous reduction of social and political problems to the body 
throughout the 20
th
 century with transhumanist points of view today. In chapter two, 
“Negative Genetic Selection: Enhancing Risk, Enhancing Disability,” I take Savulescu’s 
suggestion regarding negative genetic selection as a transhumanist case study, 
demonstrating its linkage to genetic determinism and stigma wielded against those 
identified as disabled (i.e. those whose traits lack social acceptance). From my case study 
I segue into a discussion of the roles risk and disability play in the setting of genetic 
counseling.  
I take a political turn in chapters three and four. In chapter three, “Models of 
Disability: Medical, Social, Political,” I lay out the major models of disability at play in 
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political and bioethical contexts, arguing that disability must be viewed as significantly 
socially constructed and shaped by stigma. Of available models of disability, I affirm the 
cultural model and its Foucauldian heritage as the most helpful for understanding social 
constructions and settings of disability. In chapter four, “Reciprocity and Trope: 
Disability and Liberalism,” I follow through on the insights made possible by the cultural 
model and argue that a significant location of disability is liberal theory. I critique one 
attempt at an inclusive liberalism, penned by Christie Hartley, which I argue locks into 
place an endemically asymmetrical relationship between those considered abled and 
those considered disabled. I compare this attempt unfavorably with the more 
transformative political views of Kittay, whose non-ideal theorizing allows us to identify 
and respond to the shared dependency at the heart of the social, and Anita Silvers.  
Finally, in the Conclusion, “Transhumanist Utopias in Context,” I reiterate the 
ground I have covered and my overall insights regarding transhumanism. There, I make 
special note of the political context of transhumanist utopias and the ways in which this 
context heightens the importance of my project. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
FROM PHYSICAL CULTURE TO GENETIC CULTURE: A GENEALOGY OF 
GENE-OLOGY 
 
“Long, long ago I became convinced that nearly all the happiness and nearly all the 
misery of this world comes from the fact that either the right or the wrong people get 
married.” 
  
Albert Wiggam, “Wanted: A ‘Eugenics Conscience’” (1934)  
 
In this chapter, I consider the historical setting and influencing factors of today’s 
bioethical debate surrounding human enhancement technologies and their use by 
conducting a history of enhancement strategies in the 20
th
 century. This cultural and 
historical genealogy uncovers a continual return to the body as a site for fixing social 
problems, biological reductions, as well as the rootedness of ableism as showcased in the 
rejection of deviant bodies throughout multiple modes of understanding the healthy 
individual. The strategies and rhetoric of enhancement upheld and reproduced social and 
cultural prejudices through time by distinguishing between the sick and the healthy, the 
acceptable and unacceptable, the good and the bad body. Strategies of enhancement are 
marginalizing discourses, and in this chapter I expose the shape of three key historical 
moments of this marginalization: physical culture at the turn of the century, the birth of 
the field of endocrinology in the 1910s and 1920s, and post-WWII rehabilitations of 
eugenic thinking in the 1950s and beyond.   
Transhumanism today is a pressure point of marginalization, a discourse that 
shuttles between fantastic plans for the future and dismissive estimations of today and the 
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bodies of today. Transhumanism justifies and supports ableism, oppressing and 
marginalizing those with targeted bodies deemed “unfit for the future” (Persson and 
Savulescu 2012). In a continuation of enhancement strategies present throughout the 
twentieth century, beginning with “physical culture” at the turn of the century (an 
inheritance from the Victorians), transhumanism operates by reducing questions of social 
change to a discussion of altering the body and rejecting deviant bodies, biological 
reduction which is now primarily genetic. I end the chapter, therefore, by outlining 
genetic determinism, which I argue is endemic to transhumanist thinking and connected 
in character to the biological reductions performed repeatedly in the 20
th
 century. 
 
The Quest for Enhancement: Anchors in History and Culture 
 
Before I begin my discussion of three historical moments of marginalization due 
to enhancement strategies, I should note that I here tell an alternative eugenic history. A 
different approach, which I forgo, is to analyze the impetus toward enhancement 
technologies through reference to a history of eugenic thought to culminate with the 
German Nazi regime and Nazi medicine during WWII. Many invaluable scholarly works 
outline the history of attempts to remake the human body and improve it with direct 
reference to the eugenic ideology which surfaced in the German Nazi regime—but 
which, of course, is rooted in much earlier history (e.g. Kevles 1985, Paul 1995, Proctor 
1988). Many have shown that continuous and recent attitudes toward the centrality of 
genetics or the rejection of persons with “marked bodies” are in line with or provided a 
basis for Nazi ideology (Bauman 1989, Kerr and Shakespeare 2002, Kittay 2010a, 
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Kröner 1999, Snyder and Mitchell 2006, esp. Chapter 2, cf. Mitchell and Snyder 2000, 
ix).  
The rejection of exposed genocidal policies and eugenic practices of the Third 
Reich in the mid-twentieth-century changed the topography of academia in the United 
States (Buchanan et al. 2000, 37-40). Prior to WWII, North American and European 
eugenicists cited one another as academic and legislative resources (Snyder and Mitchell 
2006, Ch. 3; Buchanan et al. 2000, 38). After the war, U.S. scientists and theorists did 
everything they could to distance themselves from the discredited eugenic label 
(Buchanan et al. 2000, 39). This widespread, post-war period rejection led to the eventual 
transformation of journals and societies previously explicitly dedicated to aspects of 
eugenics (39). 
Bioethicists today note the “shadow” of eugenics, originating with the Nazi 
regime, over conversations regarding enhancement technologies and ask whether this is 
“new” or “old” eugenics (e.g. Buchanan et al. 2000, Ch. 2; Crook 2008, Sparrow 2011). 
This leads these philosophers wonder in what sense eugenic policies themselves, apart 
from Nazi medicine, are morally wrong. Buchanan et al. argue that the individual policies 
themselves must be drawn out and discussed without reference to the loaded eugenic 
label in order to allow history to guide the future (2000, 9-10). One point of consensus 
among Buchanan et al. is the idea that some eugenic goals—for instance, better health for 
the population—become morally wrong when mixed with state coercion, but may not 
otherwise be wrong (cf. Buchanan et al. 2000, 12-13; see also Sparrow’s analysis and 
critique of this argument, 2011). It is also argued that eugenic goals become morally 
wrong if they are mixed with racist ideology and false biologically-based race theories or 
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other pseudo-sciences, but may not otherwise be wrong (Buchanan et al. 2000, 27, 40-
41). Buchanan et al. also argue that genetic determinism is perhaps the decisive element 
of the “shadow” of eugenics, a claim I pick up on here and deepen by way of my 
alternative history (2000, 23-25). 
Instead of pursuing a direct critique of Nazi medicine, which is done excellently 
elsewhere, I trace the roots of genetic determinism and follow the example of disability 
theorists Sharon Snyder and David Mitchell who argue that Nazi ideology is continuous 
with modernism rather than “an aberration” and also that “all bodies”—“not merely 
disabled bodies”—are affected by the notion that excessive hardship and deviance are 
embedded in embodiment itself (2006, 5). Zygmunt Bauman, likewise, sees Nazi 
eugenics as a continuation rather than an aberration of modernist projects (1989). An 
important part of these modernist projects, which I argue is still manifest today in 
transhumanism, is the “[promise] to rid the land of all defectives” (Snyder and Mitchell 
2006, 79). As Snyder and Mitchell put it, this promise is tied up in a “uniquely modern 
utopian fantasy of a future world uncontaminated by defective bodies” (129). I take this 
fantasy as the transhumanist fantasy, guiding in today’s enhancement discussions. I 
already touched on this desire in the introduction, and continue to explore this fantasy in 
the following chapters. 
In what follows, then, I prioritize describing and exploring sometimes-neglected 
aspects of eugenic history. These include: 1) lasting commitments to a particular kind of 
discipline and transcendence of the body, 2) the equation of physical and mental health, 
both of individuals and populations, with morality, happiness and sociability, and 3) 
continuous reference to and reconstruction of what counts as a deviant body. The 
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alternative eugenic history I draw should act as layering scenes of biological 
reductionism, which is deeply connected to transhumanism and genetic determinism. The 
structure of genetic determinism – as well as its exclusions (its ableism) – is revealed in 
these historical moments, although the content and meaning of the reduction to the 
biological has shifted and built up across time. To begin, I go to “physical culture” to 
reveal what, at that time, fell under the as-yet untarnished banner of “eugenics.”  
 
Physical Culture, Discipline, and Healthy Choices 
 
 In 1913, the “Life Extension Institute” was founded in the United States 
(“National Society to Conserve Life” 1913; William H. Taft was the chairman of the 
board). The scientific work of Irving Fisher and Eugene Fisk undergirded its goals and 
philosophy, which aimed at prolonging human life.
26
 In hopes of accomplishing this aim, 
the Institute focused upon the elimination of disease and the sterilization of those 
considered unfit. Irving and Fisk co-authored the group’s major tract: How to Live: Rules 
for Healthful Living Based on Modern Science (1916). The book presented a combination 
of recommendations regarding diet, exercise (including deep breathing) and hygiene. It 
recommended “thorough mastication” (Chapter 2, Section 4) and good posture (Chapter 
3, “Poisons”, Sec 2). More telling and less benign was its directives regarding marriage 
and reproduction, essay “Comparison of Degenerative Tendencies Among Nations” (286-
292) and a concluding section on “Eugenics” which recommended both forced 
                                                          
26
 This of course remains a primary goal of promoters of enhancement today; see Bostrom 2005a; 2008, 
113-116; Harris 2004, Heard 1997, Shostak 2002, and see Baudrillard 2001 and Glannon 2008 for 
critiques. 
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sterilization (cf. 167, 323) and the works of Sir Francis Galton. Galton is considered the 
founder of eugenics and, in 1869, expressed for perhaps the first time the idea of parental 
duty with regard to heritable traits (293-324; Buchanan et al. 2000, 30-31; Snyder and 
Mitchell 2006, 25, I return to this in my case study in the next chapter). 
 According to the text written by Fisher and Fisk, morality and immorality are 
inheritable and dependent upon “family lines” (1916, 298):  
Moral Traits.—Among the moral traits known to possess inheritable elements are 
generosity, piousness, independence, industry, will-power, faithfulness, fairness, 
sociability, reliability, self-reliance, tendency to work hard, perseverance, 
carefulness, impulsiveness, temperance, high-spiritedness, joviality, benignity, 
quietness, cheerfulness, hospitality, sympathy, humorousness, love of fun, 
neighborliness, love of frontier life, love of travel and of adventure. The same 
may be said of immoral traits, such as criminality, pauperism, delinquency, 
irascibility, lying, truancy, superstition, clannishness, secretiveness, despondency, 
slyness, exclusiveness, vanity, cunning, cruelty, quickness to anger, 
revengefulness, etc (298). 
 
While Fisher and Fisk’s text elsewhere clearly outlines and prioritizes a set of 
recommendations connected to personal habits, it does not ultimately conclude that 
physical health and morality can be left up merely to individual behavior; instead, as this 
excerpt shows, such things were thought to be inheritable and therefore a “thoroughgoing 
eugenic program” was needed and must be used for “society as a whole” (1916, 167). 
Besides outright sterilization, strategies to achieve this general program involve the 
segregation of persons considered defective and—in addition to “wise marriage laws”—
the “development of an enlightened sentiment against improper marriages” (167). Notice, 
just as in the case of today’s enhancement advocates, transhumanists, happiness (“high-
spiritedness”; recall the “zest” of which Bostrom spoke, above) and even use-value 
(“industry”) are taken to be a biological matter which could be increased by (then proto-) 
genetic choice-making. 
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 So, at the turn of the century, health and morality was linked to reproduction and 
segregation on the level of the population as well as the discipline of the body through 
hygiene and diet on the level of the individual. Prolonged life is considered an utmost 
goal, one that would surely improve human beings and the social world. Marriage is 
brought under scrutiny as part of this multi-faceted focus, and the implication is that 
“bad” marriages (to people with the wrong sort of biological inheritance) will result in a 
bad society.
27
 The frontispiece Fisher and Fisk’s volume reads: “Prevent Life-Waste—
Upbuild National Vitality” (1916). This is the first indication in my genealogy that the 
health of a population is dependent upon eliminating the influence of “sick” members 
(Life-Waste)—and so enhancement strategies must be “chosen” for everyone. This 
feature of enhancement strategies is a touchstone in the pages that follow. 
 Today, as discussed in the Introduction, morality is still considered heritable and 
manipulable through science and technology; the latest writings from bioethicists who are 
strongly pro-enhancement include calls to improve human beings morally and socially 
through scientific and technological means (e.g. Buchanan 2011a and 2011b, Liao et al. 
2012, Persson and Savulescu 2011, 2012). For example, Savulescu argues that bad 
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 For a propaganda film of this time period regarding appropriate marriage, see Are You Fit to Marry? 
(1927), first released as The Black Stork in 1917 (a silent film). In it, eugenicist and medical doctor Harry 
Haiselden played himself as part of a personal campaign. He claimed that he and many others let 
“impaired” infants die, although this was unspoken, and that, as journalist Laurie Block put it, “the burdens 
of the disabled should not be imposed on the physically and mentally able” (Block 1996). The film opens 
with Haiselden viewing a child on crutches from a window, and then dialogue appears: "It's not the fault of 
the child, but someone is to blame." Black Stork follows a couple, who are told by Haiselden that any child 
resulting from their union would be “defective.” The couple ignores Haiselden and their eventual baby is 
depicted as thin and sick. The mother considers what to do. She dreams that the child, grown up and 
disfigured (with a hunchback), is a criminal and a miserable person. He shoots the doctor who failed to kill 
him at infancy. Upon waking, the mother decides to end the child’s life and the film ends with the infant’s 
death. According to Haiselden: It is the will of God that this baby be born a defective, and without the 
meddling of surgery, it is the will of God that the child die” (Block 1996). Besides the clear eugenics theme 
of troubled heredity, notice the illicit connection (and reduction) of crutches, criminality, and personality to 
heredity. While there is no explicit racial narrative in the film, the title suggests creeping worries about 
race-mixing. 
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tempers should be curbed through genetic selection, and S. Matthew Liao et al. argue that 
increased altruism is a valuable goal of scientific and technological human enhancement 
(2001b and 2012, respectively). Allen Buchanan argues for enhancement of the capacity 
for impulse control and sympathy, among other valued social traits, and Nick Bostrom 
argues that it is important to enhance human capability with regard to “appropriate 
affect,” among other things (Buchanan 2011 and Bostrom 2008, 108). 
 Against the backdrop of the focus on inheritability and social and personal 
hygiene exemplified by the aims and status of the Life Extension Institute, so-called 
“physical culture” flourished at the turn of the century in the United States and in Europe 
(Fair 2012). Physical culture explicitly linked physical health and discipline with 
responsibility and moral goodness, and delineated and denigrated a group of dangerous 
outsiders which must be dealt with: the sick and the weak. A popular magazine entitled 
Physical Culture, founded in 1899, enjoyed a print run lasting through the 1940s (Bennett 
2012). The magazine, which (in line with the Life Extension Institute’s 
recommendations) promoted diet, exercise, sunlight, and cleanliness as routes to a happy 
life, declared: “every influence which interferes with the attainment of superb, buoyant 
health should be recognized as menace” (1934, 63). In other words, one must protect 
one’s health from continuous outside threat, especially those contained within other 
bodies.  
 Physical Culture magazine was probably inspired by a similar earlier publication 
in Britain produced by Eugen Sandow, a Prussian bodybuilder present at the World’s 
Columbia Exposition in Chicago in 1893. Theodore Roosevelt (U.S. President from 
1901-1909) also influenced the “physical culture movement” of which Sandow was a 
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symbol through advocacy of the “strenuous life” and its power over his own childhood 
sickness (Fair 2012). 
But physical culture was not merely about body-building and the wonders of 
strenuous exercise for overcoming disease. Albert Wiggam, a frequent contributor to 
Physical Culture magazine, declared a new standard for choosing a marriage partner, and 
partner reproducer, derived from the knowledge of biologists. In an article entitled 
“Wanted: A Eugenics Conscience,” he writes: 
[The biologist] means not only that the parents shall be healthy, happy and 
congenial, but that they shall be carrying healthy, happy and congenial germ-cells 
from their ancestors and, thus, be capable of transmitting healthy, happy and 
congenial bodies and minds to their children (Wiggam 1934, 16). 
 
The wrong partner can be a “menace” to the “attainment of superb, buoyant health” and 
so too can one’s parents; one might lose all chance at happiness if the wrong match 
(genetic choice) is made. In contrast, a physically healthy parent was viewed as 
maximally important; so writes Mrs. Earl Wood, from Detroit, Michigan: “When I was 
born into this world, my mother had bestowed upon me one of the greatest gifts of life—
perfect health” (1934, 6). Mrs. Wood must mean what Doctor X, later in the issue, calls 
“an intelligence of the physique” which would have “won laurels and plaudits” in a 
“simpler, more heroic society” such as ancient Greece (15). But notice that this 
“intelligence of the physique” is not merely a set of physical attributes, but also attributes 
of mind, mood and attitude: “healthy, happy and congenial bodies and minds,” according 
to Wiggam. So we see, again, that happiness, health, and therefore social congeniality is 
heritable and impacted by proto-genetic choice-making—and also depends later upon 
choosing physical exercise, diets, and vitamins.  
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 In the same issue, a father writing about the experience of his son’s birth feels 
anxiety with regard to passing along his own traits and claims for himself deep parental 
responsibility. He writes of the events of his son’s birth: “‘There’s a defect here!’ The 
doctor cried sharply to the midwife. ‘Defective heart action.’ That was like a dagger of 
remorse to me for I thought I had done the unpardonable—transmitted my own bad heart 
to my son” (12). The mention of unpardonable action is no accident—bad health was 
truly considered a crime. In an oft-repeated motto printed on the front cover of the June 
1947 issue of Physical Culture, this attitude is declared: “Sickness is a sin: Don’t be a 
sinner” and “Weakness is a crime: Don’t be a criminal.” The sick and the weak, then, 
constituted a population of undesirables who were both sinful and criminal, threatening 
the health of all with their bad choices. 
 In fact, Bernarr Macfadden,
28
 who founded the magazine, wrote the above motto, 
and authored dozens of books about physical culture, figured the relationship between 
abnormality and criminality as running both ways. He claimed that criminals “are all 
abnormal—there are but few exceptions” (Macfadden 1934, 4). This violent pairing is not 
unfamiliar to anyone versed in racist and ableist eugenic ideology (cf. Mitchell and 
Snyder 2006, esp. Ch. 3). He went on to write: “If we owned a cat or a dog, or any 
domestic animal, that was deformed and misshapen as is the average ‘human,’ it would 
not be considered worth keeping and death would end its earthly pilgrimage” (1934, 4). 
Macfadden, by referring to the subjection of the animal in this passage, believes he is 
making an argument for the subjection of the sick and the weak. Because he is advocating 
death for this population, he is moving to not only insulate and protect the strong from 
                                                          
28
 Cf. Adams 2009 and Ernst 1991 on the life of Bernarr Macfadden and his influence on American 
physical culture. 
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criminal elements but also declaring that life is not worth living for the sick and the weak. 
He asks and answers the question: who should live? 
 In another article in Physical Culture, the aforementioned Wiggam again calls for 
a “eugenics conscience”, this time a bit more directly. Here, he asks, in line with 
Macfadden’s suggestions: “Shall We Breed or Sterilize Defectives?” (1934, 16). Who 
should live? Wiggam calls upon the authority of Charles Davenport
29
 of the Carnegie 
Institution in order to argue that “migrating families” of “gypsies” ought to be sterilized 
so that valuable social resources could be saved—enhancement for the whole population 
(16-17). He is aghast that some object to the method of sterilization in response to those 
populations and individuals he considers undesirable and writes:  
If such persons [who would object to sterilization] would turn and consider the 
money expended on these worthless breeds, which ought to be used and could be 
used to educate and furnish jobs for their own children it would seem that this 
alone would answer all their objections. If they further would consider the moral 
corruption in addition to the havoc wrought by the spread of disease that I have 
myself witnessed many times in a community brought about by the sex-looseness 
of some good-looking feebleminded or moron girl, again it would seem this 
would answer their objections (17).
 30
 
 
In this excerpt, cost and benefit analyses are plainly layered upon pronouncements 
regarding the immorality or a-morality of deviant bodies and populations. Today, 
similarly, the feasibility and desirability of incurring medical costs of caring for persons 
with disabilities is laid open for debate; this is, however, often placed in a context of 
health-care rationing.
31
 Savulescu considers this question with regard to cardiac care and 
                                                          
29
 For a group of insightful essays on the work and legacy of American eugenicist Charles Davenport, see 
Davenport’s Dream: 21st Century Reflections on Heredity and Eugenics (Witkowski and Inglis 2008). 
 
30
 For an excellent treatment of the hyper-sexualization of the female disabled body as irresponsible and 
fertile, see Snyder and Mitchell 2006, 86. 
 
31
 For a philosophical argument which argues for the necessity of medical rationing see Fleck 2009. 
12 
 
persons with Down syndrome, concluding that triage is necessary because resources are 
limited and therefore equality of access is not as attractive as it might seem (2001c). In 
general, the re-direction of medical resources from atypical bodies remains at issue today; 
persons with a-typical bodies or minds experience more difficulty accessing medical 
resources (for an example, see Chandler et al. 2006, I discuss this issue at length in 
chapter two). 
 To return to Wiggam’s argument, while Wiggam brings himself to note that not 
all the “feeble-minded and moron people” he has in mind are “necessarily bad”, he 
quickly establishes that, if nothing else, “they are all irresponsible people.”32 The linkage 
of personal irresponsibility—that is, bad choice-making—with the sick and the weak, 
along with the rehabilitation on the level of the population of an underlying “defective” 
genotype which must be destroyed, is repeated in earnest in founding, theological-
bioethical texts of the 1970s (Passmore 1970, Ramsey 1970). 
 Irresponsible people were evidently, besides criminals, also those who use 
prosthetic devices—“crutches”—or are in other ways dependent. One advertisement 
admonished readers that “Eye-glasses Never Mar the Faces of Beauty Contest Winners” 
and reminded them, in skewed fonts, that “Glasses are only Eye-Crutches—anyway.” A 
coupon is offered so that (especially women) can “throw the glasses away” (1934, 8). The 
secret was training exercises for the eyes, which should be taken up in order to avoid 
dependence on a “crutch.” 
                                                          
32
 For contemporary treatment of the frequent conflation between being disabled and irresponsibility 
(specifically with regard to labor), see Frank 2000, 71. See also Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon’s 
genealogical investigation of “dependency” in the United States and its nuances with regard to debates over 
the provision of welfare (1994). 
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 So, while much was blamed on heritability, it was believed that exercise and 
vitamins were always restorative health measures and should be pursued under banner of 
independence. For example, the aforementioned father who worried over transmitting a 
“bad heart” to his newborn child, reportedly watched as the doctor “began swinging the 
baby up and down like a calisthenics drill,” a procedure which, combined with 
“smack[ing] him brutally” and dips in hot and cold water eventually produced a “heart-
gladdening little wail!” (1934, 13). Indeed, such calisthenics and discomfort were meant 
to be extended to infants and were considered extremely important at such a formative 
time; Macfadden published, with Marguerite Macfadden, a text entitled: Physical culture 
for babies (1904). Returning to the particular child in question, the rest of his life 
(according to his father) was a struggle between the food of Old Europe introduced by the 
child’s mother and the vitamins the father knew he needed. Notice the tight linkage here 
between women and unhealthy heredity, and the father with rational and healthy choice-
making. Any difficulties, however, were soon remedied by a return to the US from 
abroad and a practice of pressing his legs together and holding him upside down “by his 
heels” (13, 82). These rough calisthenics were enough to soothe the inherited “defective 
heart.” 
 In another example of “choosing health,” vitamins were suggested as an 
ameliorative tool to persons who were deaf in the April 1940 issue of Physical Culture 
magazine. Emanuel Josephson, M.D. argues, in “New Hope for the Deaf” that “one of the 
best methods of increasing the body’s resistance to ear infections and of restoring hearing 
to a high and efficient level is by means of a vitamin-rich diet” (10). And, in a move 
familiar from today’s “super-crip” stories of inspirational physical achievement (cf. Clare 
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1999, 2-9 and the treatment of Diane DeVries in Frank 2000), choosing exercise is 
recommended for infantile paralysis by the notable example of a beautiful young girl: 
“stricken with infantile paralysis at the age of eight, Nancy Merki is today the proud 
holder of three national swimming records, and one world’s championship. Here is the 
inspiring story of a courageous youngster who literally swam her way from invalidism to 
buoyant health and world fame” (14). Discipline, then, is transcendence – the 
transcendence and overcoming of the pains of embodiment. In this peculiar moment, to 
have a disability meant that one wasn’t taking one’s vitamins—one hadn’t chosen 
health.
33
 
 Throughout the turn of the century and the rise of physical culture, alongside a 
growing knowledge and attention paid to a proto-genetics, choosing vitamins and 
exercise played a prominent role in the public imagination with regard to health from the 
turn of the twentieth century. Sickness and weakness, as sin and as crime, could be 
blamed on an “irresponsible” parent who passes on inferior (read: dis-abled, raced, 
classed, sexed) traits, and someone who has not demonstrated the get-up-and-go 
necessary to overcome physical or mental difference or who refuses to avail themselves 
of the maximizing benefits of vitamins and sunlight. A variety of traits, both individual 
and social, were reduced to facts about the body. One could choose the correct marriage 
partner, thereby ensuring future happiness, and choose to enhance one’s body through 
                                                          
33
 Physical Culture magazine was not the first or last publication of its kind; in 1940, a magazine entitled 
Your Physique was launched by a young Joseph Weider, who is now referred to as the “father of 
bodybuilding” and is owner of a business empire based on physical fitness (Perine 2011). And the 
continuation of physical culture is, of course, not the only indication that we live in a culture obsessed with 
the biological and the look and powers of the body—consider the availability and pressure to use 
increasingly subtle plastic surgery and topical remedies meant to erase the look of age. 
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vitamins and exercise, thereby ensuring ability against the threat of disability and gaining 
access to a future of “buoyant health and world fame.” 
 The features of physical culture are continued in today’s enhancement debate, 
especially among transhumanist advocates of extreme enhancement. The valorization of 
certain bodies and circumstances is based in and justifies the rejection of other bodies; 
after all, one must protect one’s health against the menace others pose, especially if that 
menace is an entire community who refuses to make rational choices (e.g. Wiggam’s 
reaction to the Roma). Shared society in one’s community and in one’s home has become 
a shared gene pool, today, and we are warned that the danger is more insidious than 
ever—we cannot tolerate deviance, or we might go extinct (Savulescu 2009). 
Enhancement for one requires enhancement for everyone. I turn now to a second 
historical moment, another strategy of enhancement and separation of the deviant from 
the healthy. 
 
The Birth of Endocrinology 
 
This second historical moment of health and deviance is layered upon and 
deepens the first, the physical culture movement and its fetishism of appropriate 
marriages (especially to the right women), diet, and exercise. Here, we still have a 
reduction to the biological, but there is a renewed sense of the biological. This second 
moment is the birth and acceptance of the field of endocrinology and the entrance of a 
new conception of the human being as hormonal. For medical culture researchers David 
and Sheila Rothman, contemporary issues surrounding enhancement originate and are 
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“embraced” (chosen) “from below,” (by individuals) (2003, xvii; a fact which they 
believe establishes the unhelpfulness of pursuing conversation regarding coercive 
eugenics in a Germany past). Rothman and Rothman trace a history of eugenics from 
below, beginning with the field of endocrinology.  
Endocrinology gained traction as an established field in the 1910s and 20s 
(Rothman and Rothman 2003, 13). Because of their importance within the venture-
capitalist context of medicine at the time, new ventures in endocrinology, along with the 
promise of waging war against aging and infertility, created a situation in which 
hormones and endocrinology played a role now filled by genes and genetics (13). 
Hormones seemed to replace the vitamins and sunlight of the Physical Culture days and 
presaged the primacy of the role of genes in today’s medical climate. The discovery and 
exploration of the activity of hormones meant that “nature was elevated over nurture”—
another biological reduction (14). Reinforcing and reconstructing the category of the 
criminally weak and sinfully malnourished of physical culture, in this second moment 
“freaks” became “patients with glandular irregularities who required medical care” (18).  
Meanwhile, there again appeared the notion of suppression and transcendence of 
the influence of freakish hormonal outsiders, who, if they were not eliminated or 
somehow enhanced, threatened the progress of all. Enhancement for individuals required 
the enhancement of all. In other words, there was a desire to move beyond the existence 
of short freaks (today’s enhancement conversation is still rife with concern regarding 
achieving height) and some began to envision a world without defectively hormonal 
bodies. Writes Herbert George Wells in 1926:  
A time will come when littleness will have passed altogether out of the world of 
man. When giants shall go freely about this earth—their earth—doing continually 
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greater and more splendid things. But that – is to come. We are not even the first 
generation of that – we are the first experiment (21). 
 
In Wells’ thinking, the conceptual structure echoes the reaction of Wiggam to “gypsies” – 
defectives, outside the freshened and bolstered notion of the normal body, are unwelcome 
in a world where the norm can flourish. The defective is seen to clamp down upon and 
preclude the potential of the norm. This is deviance redux, an ever-present and updated 
notion of who fails to earn a place in the world and who should be pushed out of it. 
Again, we have a menace. 
The drive of endocrinology to isolate masculine and feminine “principles” and 
use these essences to stave off the unwanted effects of aging and remedy fertility issues 
was supported by profit-seeking pharmaceutical companies (Rothman and Rothman 
2003, Ch. 2 and 6). Companies like Eli Lilly, working closely in fateful collaboration 
with university researchers from institutions like the University of Toronto and Johns 
Hopkins (and slaughterhouses, from whence they procured animal corpses for use in their 
research), hawked largely untried and unproven remedies among physicians (2003, 13, 
32-34, 47). This was the venture capitalism of endocrinology. Physicians reported high 
levels of confidence in the pharmaceutical employees who visited them with new 
products, and these “detail men” cynically produced guidance pamphlets with 
instructions on socializing with medical professionals for profit (47). New institutional 
collaborations had major effects upon the diagnosis, treatment, and experience of 
patients. Diagnoses related to hormonal “deficiencies” abounded. New and updated 
versions of sickness became influential; for example, “shortness of stature” became a 
diagnosis and “the very short child” was suddenly seen by the medical establishment as 
“a sick child” (Rothman and Rothman 2003, 173-174). Rothman and Rothman relate this 
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to contemporary questions in bioethics regarding the line between cure and enhancement, 
worrying that new technologies define new disease states in the place of what was once 
considered normal (174). 
Physicians prescribed what became known as testosterone and estrogen to their 
patients, using negative techniques to determine the usefulness or necessity of the 
prescriptions. If the patient—having received these remedies—experienced improvement 
vis-à-vis their complaints, the patient had a deficiency of testosterone or estrogen 
(Rothman and Rothman 2003, 31). These patient-reported improvements justified the use 
of the treatment plan. The same strategy of diagnosis-by-trial was later used in the case of 
the development of human growth hormone (HGH) (180-181). Faced with the rhetoric of 
potential deficiency and the promise of a better life, patients were desperate for access to 
the drugs. This rhetoric is in parallel to the utopia of the transhumanist – who can say no 
to increased happiness? 
In this moment, hormone deficiency became the scapegoat for all manner of ills – 
including, most importantly, perceived issues in growth, puberty, fertility, and aging. In 
the case of growth and puberty, speed was desired; in the case of fertility, enhancement; 
and in the case of aging, deceleration. Hormonal influence received a cathexis of hope 
with regard to staving off age and maintaining health. Here we see that definitions of 
deviance and health are continually updated, shifting shape and “deepening” within the 
body over time.  
I turn now toward a third moment, the post-WWII attempt at rehabilitating 
eugenic ideas and the construction of a specifically genetic version of normality and 
abnormality. This moment is a significant element of my argument because, as 
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throughout the 20
th
 century, it takes for granted that the body is an appropriate location 
for intervention in order to alleviate some social ills—it performs yet another version of a 
biological reduction. Additionally, as we shall see, it is a direct pre-history of today’s 
transhumanist thinking (this moment includes the first definition of transhumanism) and 
indulges in the genetic visions that remain fundamentally powerful today.  
 
Post-War Rehabilitation of Eugenic Ideals 
 
 After WWII and the denounced Nazi regime’s focus on eugenics, philosophical 
and social-scientific moves were made to rehabilitate eugenics from its bad reputation. 
Julian Huxley, for example, denied that eugenics must fall to Nazi ills.
34
 Leon Kass, 
bioethicist and prominent member of George W. Bush’s presidential bioethics council, 
has given Aldous Huxley’s dystopian novel A Brave New World continual attention in his 
writings (strangely excluding, however, After Many a Summer Dies the Swan, which 
deals with an aging man’s push for immortality) (2002). Yet, perhaps not many are aware 
that Huxley’s brother, Julian, was also a writer and a social philosopher. A number of his 
essays, collected under the title Man in the Modern World, showcased scientific 
knowledge gained as a biologist and a desire to affect public policy to improve modern 
life (1948).  
In fact, it was Huxley who first coined the word “transhumanism” prior to the war 
(in 1927) and continued to be its advocate later. His definition relied on the idea that 
transcendence of typical human bounds was important–and such transcendence could and 
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 Recall, from above, that separating eugenic policies from the negative shadow of the Nazi regime is still 
a strategy for bioethicists in the 21
st
 century (Buchanan et al. 2000, 9-10, 12-13, 40-41). 
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should be achieved by members of the human species themselves (Huxley 1927, 195; cf. 
Hauskeller 2012, 39). For Huxley, then, transhumanism was about access to as-yet 
untouched possibilities (Hauskeller 2012, 39). 
 Julian Huxley strove to conceptually position the human being over and against 
animals in an initial essay entitled “The Uniqueness of Man.” This uniqueness was 
exactly what, for Huxley, made eugenics possible and appropriate: “Man has the 
possibility of making [progress] the main feature of his own future evolution, and of 
guiding its course in relation to a deliberate aim” (1948, 28). Recall that this is also the 
argument of today’s transhumanists Nick Bostrom and Anders Sandberg. Further, said 
Huxley,  
[Man] must not be afraid of his own uniqueness…so far as our knowledge goes, 
human mind and personality are unique and constitute the highest product yet 
achieved by the cosmos. Let us not put off our responsibilities onto the shoulders 
of mythical gods or philosophical absolutes… (1948, 28)  
 
So, for Huxley, evolutionary progress can be taken up as a tool, and should be taken up as 
a responsibility to the species. For him, superstitions regarding the importance of ceding 
to outside controls (playing God) should be put aside. 
 In another essay, “Eugenics and Society,” Huxley ventures the following 
regarding the obligation to eugenics:  
Once the full implications of evolutionary biology are grasped, eugenics will 
inevitably become part of the religion of the future, or of whatever complex of 
sentiments may in the future take the place of organized religion. It is not merely 
a sane outlet for human altruism, but is of all outlets for altruism that which is 
most comprehensive and of the longest range. (1948, 28) 
 
But, for Huxley, obstacles to the efficiency of eugenics must first be overcome if the 
eugenic ideal as future religion is to be realized (28). This meant that eugenics must be 
improved as a social science in order to improve its reputation (29). Along with an 
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increasingly careful study of inheritability (better genetics), eugenics must “use the 
results of this study for control” (32). He denounced Nazi Germany as precisely anti-
eugenic because of its nationalism, which would subvert social eugenic goals by leading 
to “over-population and war” (55). Huxley believed that eugenicists must understand the 
social system and also must transform it at the risk of otherwise failing in scientific 
eugenic goals in the same way (33, 54, and 61). In all, this essay represents an attempt to 
liberate eugenics from its bad reputation and from various biases, and align it with a 
renewed social outlook (33). This is of key importance for the future due to Huxley’s 
belief that there is an “inherent tendency” of the gene pool to degrade over time, an idea, 
as we have seen, later accepted by Ramsey (61). In other words, for individual 
enhancement, all must be enhanced; menaces must be destroyed from within if humans 
are to face menaces from without. 
 Generally, the importance of genetics alone, argued Huxley, should not be over or 
under-stated (41). As a factor, it was for him embedded among others. For example, 
although Huxley pushed for accessible birth-control facilities and “family allowances, 
providing for sterilization here and financial relief for children there” (54), he also argued 
that environmental conditions like vitamins and food have greater impact than normally 
believed and that researches into twins prove that genetics was only one factor among 
many that should be controlled (37-38). He also explicitly denied the “genetic or eugenic 
significance of” “so-called racial traits” (39). Yet, he seems to mean merely that their 
significance has not yet been (eugenically) scientifically established. For example, he still 
believed it “wholly probable that true Negroes have a slightly lower average intelligence 
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than the whites or yellows” (41). Recall also his call for better genetics in order to avoid 
past mistakes in eugenic thinking.  
Ultimately, despite his insistence on dethroning genetic factors, Huxley wanted to 
develop both social and genetic eugenic “patterns” that would improve the human being 
as a species. These could hold in “economic and communal life” and also “family and 
reproductive life” if group incentives were sought to make these patterns viable (55). 
Incentives could make it plausible for the individual to subordinate herself to the group 
(57). Enhancement for her means enhancement for everyone (57). Huxley argued that 
birth control, by splitting reproductive and sexual functions, could help with this removal 
of individualism (58-59). 
 The major elements of this post-WWII rehabilitation are still present, virtually 
unchanged, in bio-ethical conversation regarding the permissibility of human 
enhancement. Huxley felt the need to place the human uniquely within and among the 
evolution of species before arguing for the enhancement of human beings; today, we see 
that—for both proponents and opponents—the uniqueness of human nature (its 
inventiveness or its dignity, respectively) must still be insisted upon (e.g. Engelhardt 
1990, Habermas 2003, Fukuyama 2002, Kass 2002, Sandel 2004, Harris 2007,   2005b). 
This helps explain ubiquitous focus on threats to human nature from technology (e.g. 
Baille and Casey 2005, Buchanan et al. 2000, 86-103; Kevles 2004, Pinker 2004, Winner 
2003, 2005).  
 Also, for Huxley, it was important to set aside individualism through medical, 
scientific, or other means in order to seek the greater good of the species. Today, we see 
these same arguments echoed in the work of S. Matthew Liao et al. (2012), who argue 
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that one solution to the plaguing issue of environmental degeneration is to look to the 
physical body of the human being and make changes in our physiology which might 
allow us to make good environmental decisions. Specifically, new reproductive 
technologies combined with other medical strategies could be used to attempt to make 
human bodies smaller. Again, the body is a site for solving social problems. But—and 
here the parallel with Huxley becomes clearer—another option that Liao et al. advocate is 
attempting to select for traits known to contribute to altruism. Individuals who have been 
selected in this way could be counted on to set individualism aside more easily. 
 Most generally, each of the moments I have discussed so far in this chapter – the 
milieu of physical culture, the birth of the field of endocrinology, and post-war 
rehabilitation of eugenic strategies – is structurally linked with today’s genetic visions of 
the human being. First, each moment showcases a reduction to the biological. Second, 
each moment defines what is desirable at least partly by what the desirable is not—the 
rejected body lurks in the background, snarling a threat to individuals and the social 
order. Finally, a utopian promise of a better life through physical interventions is made in 
each moment. One can grasp happiness, be more moral, be more responsible, be taller, be 
more intelligent, enjoy fertility, and enjoy one’s children if only one exercises, takes 
vitamins, accepts a hormone supplement, or makes the right choice of marriage partner 
and child. A better, more moral, more beautiful and blissful life awaits you – and if you 
fail to choose this future, you do not deserve to enjoy it. Choosing to adjust one’s body is 
positioned as key to happiness and control over one’s future. 
 Further, enhancement strategies and transhumanism seems to depend on the 
elimination of difference—written as deviance—from the human community. Unless the 
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deviant other is eliminated or enhanced, individual enhancement is under threat. The 
transhumanist enhancer believes that there is a right to happiness (bliss), and that unless 
an entire community of enhanced persons (normal, abled persons) exists my enjoyment of 
this state will be stymied. One’s individual happiness and freedom will be blocked by the 
Roma (Wiggam), the short (Wells), or the deviant public who know nothing of the laws 
of inheritance and lack birth control (Huxley, the first transhumanist). This is a perverse 
reversal of the feminist claim regarding the relationality of persons; I can’t be excellent 
unless everyone is.
35
  
 I now turn to my concluding discussion of genetic determinism, the most recent 
variety of biological reduction, and its connection to enhancement and transhumanism. 
 
Genetic Visions 
 
The rhetorical movement from deviance to enhancement can be more deeply 
understood by exposing belief in genetic determinism as a variety of the biological 
reductions that structure enhancement debates throughout the 20
th
 century and into the 
21st. There is much recent critical research into the common vision of the human being as 
a thing with a genetic core and a genetic telos (Buchanan et al. 2000, 85; Brock 1992, 
Klitzman 2012, Nelkin and Lindee 1995, Siever 1997). Evelyn Fox Keller is the author of 
an exceptional philosophical history of what she calls the genetic century – the twentieth 
– and goes on to suggest that such an era should and will be superseded by other 
constructs (2000, cf. McNally and Glasner 2007). She argues that attention-grabbing 
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success in genetic research in the 20
th
 century actually demonstrate that the gene is not 
the primary unit of heredity; yet oversimplifications abound, especially because they are 
practical for researchers in attracting money and attention (Radick 2001). For her, 
understanding units within a system (the gene) is clearly less valuable than tracing the 
dynamism of a system (the organism) itself; in future we will need better vocabulary to 
describe the movement of biological heredity. But, as Keller realizes, the mid-century 
discovery of the structure of the double-helix, paired with the interpretation of the gene as 
a set of specific instructions (the gene’s “central dogma”), still has for now, unabated 
influence over the conversation regarding human enhancement, along with discussion 
regarding individual traits.  
I take for granted that the genetic vision of the human being is firmly entrenched, 
especially as a result of the Human Genome Project and the international scientific 
community’s continued work under that banner. Popular opinion considers genotype the 
directive fundamental core of the human being, and so, if we want to improve the human 
condition, genotype is a good place to begin. James Watson, Nobel Prize winner and part 
of the research team which first modeled DNA in 1953, is vocally in favor of utilizing 
genetic research in the hopes of transformation of social life, bodies, and minds. Watson 
advocates screening strategies and an updated version of eugenics. In 1998 he infamously 
remarked: 
I think it's complete nonsense…saying we're sacred and should not be 
changed…Evolution can be just damn cruel, and to say we've got a perfect 
genome and there's some sanctity? I'd like to know where that idea comes from 
because it's utter silliness…To try to give it any more meaning than it deserves in 
some quasi-mystical way is for Steven Spielberg or somebody like that. It's just 
plain aura, up in the sky -- I mean, it's crap (Brave 2003). 
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Notably, Watson’s critique of a supposedly perfect genome is shared in the reflections of 
disability scholars also critiquing genetic determinism (e.g. Scully 2008, discussed 
below). But there is a different route available from this shared critique; an alternative to 
the conclusion that genetics should be transformed via eugenics and that the supposedly 
perfect and therefore sacred genome should be debased by intervention in order to end 
suffering. Watson’s conclusion shores up the importance of the genotype in daily life by 
offering it as the site for interventions. Instead, one could conclude that the importance of 
deviance from genotype is overstated, and suggest other shared projects of 
“enhancement.”   
Most importantly for this discussion, significant genetic variations, most often 
simply referred to as defects, are today thought to constitute a wrongful birth or wrongful 
life (Buchanan et al. 2000, Roberts 2009, Rogers 1991, Savulescu 2008, Shiffrin 1999, 
cf. Ramsey 1970). At the very least, a-typical genetic structure is thought to trouble the 
decision to conceive or to continue with an existing pregnancy (cf. Parens and Asch 
2000). ).  
Many bioethicists who are currently involved in the debate regarding 
enhancement and its ethical permissibility accept as a fundamental premise the idea that 
the avoidance of disabilities or diseases through genetic means is acceptable and 
desirable. Indeed, at the extreme, they also argue that it is immoral to fail to avoid 
disability or diseases (Boyle and Savulescu 2003, Buchanan et al. 2000, e.g. 100-101; 
Savulescu 2001b and 2008, Rogers 1999). In fact, as I will argue in the next chapter, 
transhumanists take for granted that genetic improvement via selection (thus avoiding 
wrongful birth and wrongful life) would provide human beings with greater freedom, or 
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even perfect freedom, and multiply choice—thereby providing access to an enhanced life 
of great happiness and wellbeing. These ideas are as old as bioethics itself; forty years 
ago Ramsey concluded that it is consistent with both the genetic and religious visions of 
humanity to believe that serious genetic defects should preclude procreation (43-44). He 
worried about the proliferation of “hideous birth defects” and “monstrosities” and argued 
that a Christian ethic may actually require parents to exercise precautions against having 
children when they are the carriers of certain traits (1970, 8, 57-59). This, despite the fact 
that he felt that genetic interventions constituted playing God and should be avoided. 
Proposed means for the avoidance of disability and the pursuit of enhancement 
are thus rendered much the same if not identical (Savulescu 2001a). That is, positive and 
negative eugenics are twinned in this discourse. Relatedly, bioethicists have argued that it 
makes sense to accept many different kinds of human enhancements, because of the deep 
similarity between reasons for avoiding negative states and reasons for pursuing positive 
ones. Peter Singer writes:  
Many people say that they accept selection against serious diseases and 
disabilities, but not for enhancement beyond what is normal. There is, however, 
no bright line between selection against disabilities and selection for positive 
characteristics. From selecting against Huntington’s Disease it is no great step to 
selecting against genes that carry a significantly elevated risk of breast or colon 
cancer, and from there it is easy to move to giving one’s child a better than 
average genetic health profile (2011, p. 278). 
 
Singer uses the above, what he considers to be morally-approvable actions undertaken to 
avoid disability or disease states, against Michael Sandel’s argument that enhancement 
erodes a sense of life’s giftedness (2004). He claims that there must be limits on this idea, 
since even Sandel does not argue against  
current practices of prenatal diagnosis that are aimed at eliminating serious 
genetic disease and disabilities. The argument for taking life as a gift clearly has 
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limits. If it is outweighed by the importance of avoiding children with serious 
diseases or disabilities, it may also be outweighed by the positive characteristics 
that genetic selection can bring (2009, p. 279). 
 
Acceptance of the pursuit of enhancement, it seems, may conceptually and rhetorically 
rely on the rejection of the deviant body—this builds on my analysis of enhancement 
strategies in the 20
th
 century (cf. Parens 1995, 142).  
The genetic conception of the human being can be viewed as the ground of 
“genetic essentialism” or genetic determinism (Scully 2008, Nelkin and Lindee 1995, 38-
49). Genetic conceptions have also been called “gene-mania” which “encourage[s] 
unrealistic hopes for genetic solutions to all sorts of problems” (Buchanan et al. 2000, 23, 
24-25).
 36
 I will here describe genetic determinism and argue that some—even those who 
self-consciously disavow it
37—who advocate for various kinds of enhancements operate 
from an unfounded belief in genetic determinism – the idea that genotype can produce a 
predictable set of results and is susceptible to manipulation through pure “choice” and no 
“chance” (Buchanan et al. 2000, Glover 1984, 2006, cf. the critique in Oliver 2010). I 
argue that the impacts of genetic determinism include increased stigma with regard to 
disability and impairment as well as reductive thinking that ignores social and cultural 
influences upon how disability is constituted or conceived.  
 
Genetic Determinism 
Genetic determinism is a view about causes which assumes the sole or primary 
importance of genetic factors in individual outcome (for persons—i.e., with regard to 
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 E.g. Buchanan et al. 2000, 24-25. 
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phenotype, complex behaviors, and other traits). Often this view involves valuing gene 
action as autonomous cause or giving undue priority to genetic explanations over 
environmental or diverse multifactorial explanations (Buchanan et al. 2000, 23-24, 
Lippman 1991 and 1993, Lotz 2008, Nelkin and Lindee 1995, 2). Most scientists, 
especially geneticists, condemn genetic determinism as false or incorrect, and therefore 
scientific or philosophical beliefs and assertions that stem from it are considered highly 
problematic (e.g. de Melo-Martín 2005, 526, Sober 2000). Bioethicists furthermore often 
take care to explicitly reject genetic determinism (e.g. Buchanan et al. 2000, 24-25; de 
Melo-Martín 2005, 527; Scully 2008, e.g. 5-6). Yet, I argue, mistaken beliefs supporting 
genetic determinism still have an impact on bioethics, medicine, and conceptions of 
disability; for example, genetic determinism and related ideas support a strict binary 
between norm and deviance that variation in the human genome belies (Scully 2008, 24; 
cf. discussion of normalization in Tremain 2006). This is especially true of transhumanist 
discussion of enhancement technologies, which often utilize the promise of genetic 
enhancements.  
 Genetic determinism, then, as I have described it so far, would primarily influence 
descriptions of causation when it comes to individual outcomes. That is, mere genetic 
explanations are given to explain outcomes, or favor is given to genetic explanations over 
other possible explanations, including more complicated multi-factorial descriptions of 
causation. The explanatory power of genes and particular cases cited in the media often 
encourage what has been called the “one gene—one disease” concept, or the OGOD 
concept (Dar-Nimrod and Heine 2010, 12; cf. Conrad 1997 and 2002). Yet, very few 
outcomes are indicated by a single gene; “monogenic” conditions are in fact rare (an 
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example is cystic fibrosis
38
), and most relationships between genes and outcomes are 
quite complicated and mediated heavily by unpredictable factors (Dar Nimrod and Heine 
2010, 13). Many phenotypic outcomes are multi-factorial; this means that more than one 
gene impacts the phenotype of the individual, or that genes, environment, and individual 
behaviors together impact phenotype. Meanwhile, hype about isolating genes “for” 
behaviors and talents (e.g. “neatness”) are mostly that—hype. Despite the fact that the 
OGOD concept accurately expresses only the exception—not the rule—when it comes to 
genetic causation, it is still the basic picture of gene action as portrayed in popular media 
and that most often endorsed among laypersons (Dar-Nimrod and Heine 2010, 4;  Nelkin 
and Lindee 1995). 
 Relatedly, screening procedures for particular outcomes, even when “isolated,” 
are highly complex and uncertain. For example, the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes have 
been associated with hereditary ovarian and breast cancers. But, over 200 different 
mutations on these two genes have been described, and little is known about how 
context—both biological and environmental—impacts the relevance of these mutations 
(de Melo-Martín 2005, 528). Furthermore, the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes have only been 
associated with a very small slice of breast and ovarian cancers – between 5 and 10 
percent (Dar-Nimrod and Heine 2010, 13; de Melo-Martín 2005, 528). Touting the 
screening of these genes as a test “for” breast cancer is misleading. Meanwhile, available 
direct-to-consumer screening for the “FTO” (fat mass and obesity associated) gene has 
been scrutinized heavily for its “futility” and for its failure to contextualize genetic 
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Gene, Twenty Years” (2009). 
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information into dynamic gene-behavior relationships (e.g. Veerman 2011). According to 
JL Veerman, screening for the FTO gene has very little predictive power, does not add 
information about propensity to disease, and meanwhile can distract attention away from 
more efficacious health measures (Veerman 2011; see also Kolata 2012).
39
 
 The power to illicitly distract attention has been a special property of genetic 
science for decades, and descriptions of genetic action as deterministic structure 
attention-grabbing narratives (Nelkin and Lindee 1995). As geneticist and disability 
theorist Jackie Leach Scully remarks, the problem isn’t that “reductive” genetic 
explanations are never appropriate,  but rather that the ways in which reductive 
explanations are popularized and widely applied are problematic (2008, 6). Genetic 
determinism, at the very least, obfuscates accurate explanations of causality. Dar-Nimrod 
and Heine make a distinction between strong genetic explanations (OGOD explanations) 
and weak genetic explanations (2010, 4-5). The vast majority of genetic explanations are 
“weak” – that is, they describe genes as “altering risk assessments, modifying 
susceptibilities, [and] changing probabilities” (4). They are entered into a set of 
assessments regarding risk that are far from deterministic (I will return to the concept of 
risk assessment below in my discussion of disability and genetic screening). 
 Sensational media headlines are an easy scapegoat for the OGOD problem. For 
decades news reports have heralded “The Gay Gene,” “The Evolution Gene,” and genes 
for obsessive-compulsive disorder (Dar-Nimrod and Heine 2010, 13; Nelkin and Lindee 
1995, 93). Popular books, probably familiar to you, even describe the gene in agential 
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and even immortal terms, e.g. “The Selfish Gene” (Nelkin and Lindee 1995, 53). But, the 
responsibility for the ubiquity of the OGOD concept, and therefore mistaken belief in 
genetic determinism, does not belong to the media alone. The necessity of fundraising 
and attracting exciting coverage for those in the scientific community means scientists 
over-promise the explanatory potential of genetic research (Nelkin and Lindee 1995, 5-
7). Popular media often echo the language of the scientific studies they report.  
 A few notes regarding epigenetics should make clear how misleading genetic 
determinism is. Epigenetic factors mediate or act upon genes to impact outcomes. A 
common example of an epigenetic factor is cellular differentiation; when cells 
differentiate to become new cell types (e.g. brain cells or skin cells) they both inhibit 
genes and activate them (Reik 2007). Cell differentiation is a process of selective gene 
expression. The “epigenome” refers to the group of chemical compounds attached to 
DNA which impacts the expression of genes. Methyl groups (carbon and hydrogen), 
another epigenetic factor, can attach to genes and silence them (Khavari et al. 2010; U.S. 
National Library of Medicine 2013). Many other unpredictable epigenetic factors exist, 
including environment and diet. Epigenetics is a complicated and emerging field. Recent 
reports, for example, show that bacteria living in the intestine have an impact on cell 
development, including brain development (Martone 2011).   
 Moving forward, it is important to keep in mind that the presence of genes does 
not necessarily mean that those genes will be expressed. Incomplete penetrance and 
variable expressivity mean that persons with the same genotype can differ in phenotype. 
Gene penetrance is a statistical measure of the expression of a gene among individuals 
(70% penetrance indicates that 7 of every 10 people with a particular genotype express 
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the associated phenotype). Variable expressivity, meanwhile, is best explained using the 
example of polydactyly, a heritable condition which may result in extra toes or extra 
fingers. Polydactyly may “penetrate” (i.e., what we call polydactyly might be 
phenotypically apparent) but is variably expressive (Miko 2008). To return to my earlier 
example of hereditary breast and ovarian cancers, de Melo-Martín notes that rates of 
expressivity for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes in different contexts is unknown and 
varies among the 200 different mutations. This makes risk assessment difficult; mutations 
on either of these genes does not mean that one will get cancer (2005, 528).
40
 So-called 
genetic susceptibility must be contextualized by behavior, environment, and other factors 
(Lewontin 1992, 30).  
 So far I have discussed the causal complications which make strong genetic 
determinism fallacious. I contextualized gene action among chemical, environmental, 
behavioral, and other factors. I have described genetic determinism as a mistaken view 
about causes. But, the genetic reduction involved in a picture of gene action informed by 
genetic determinism has influence that goes beyond questions of causality, and simply 
correcting and adjusting popular understanding of gene action will not banish the ethical 
and political problems associated with a strong focus on or preference for genetic 
explanations. In fact, this more complex understanding of gene action does not banish 
scientific problems, either. According to philosopher Immaculada de Melo-Martín, 
focusing on “interactionist” variables, “far from debunking genetic determinism, simply 
reinforces it, because genes are still represented as containing information about how the 
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organism will develop” (2005, 526). She notes that some have suggested science needs a 
wholly new way to think about genes.
41
  
 I argue that the influence of genetic determinism also appears in insidious 1) 
essentialism and 2) naturalization of socially-defined and constructed categories of 
persons, such as those defined by sexual orientation, race, gender, and disability. In other 
words, genetic determinism is a biological reduction. I argue that essentialism and 
naturalization work together in a way that increases stigma (and therefore social 
alienation) and disguises the social and cultural factors that impact definitions of disease 
and disability. I highlight these two issues here. 
 I turn first to the problem of essentialism and its connection to genetic 
determinism, taking cues from philosophers of disability and survey research conducted 
in the field of social psychology. Scully links genetic reductionism with essentialism. She 
orients genetic determinism as one variety of biological reduction, and describes genetic 
determinism as the view that “DNA sequences” “encode instructions for proteins” which 
“determine” traits and health (2008, 5). She argues that reductive explanations of traits 
and behaviors that rely merely on DNA sequences establish a mistaken belief that there is 
a “canonical” genotype, which provides a blueprint for normal persons; this acts as an 
essentializing universal. Any deviation (mutations, deletions, additions) from this 
canonical genotype count as abnormal (2008, 6). Yet, she notes, there is no such 
blueprint—variation in human genotype is constant, and a strict and meaningful binary 
between normal and abnormal is simply not supported by genetic science. The 
importance accorded genetic “normalcy” is excessive; indeed, the newest chromosomal 
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microarray tests intended for use by potential parents indicate merely that a genome is 
“abnormal,” that is, that it deviates from the genome of a presumed healthy person, but 
not what deviation means.
42
 
 Social psychologists Ilan Dar-Nimrod and Steven Heine demonstrate that the gene 
serves as an “essence place-holder”; specifically, genetic determinism maps onto the 
essentialist thinking (2010, 2). According to these researchers, those surveyed and studied 
have a tendency to presume an underlying essence unique to social categories and groups, 
yet this essence is “abstract” and “undefined” (e.g., the essence of a cat, a person, an 
African-American person, a woman, a mentally ill person) (2). Dar-Nimrod and Heine 
identify the elements of an essence in terms of its “causal relationship between essence 
and expected characteristics,” its “stability,” and that it is “presumed to be immutable” 
(2). The gene can serve as a convenient and metaphorically descriptive place-holder for 
already-presumed yet abstract essences and carry forward the causal, immutable, and 
stable properties thought natural to an essence (see also similar work in social psychology 
regarding essentialism and genetic bias: Haslam 2011 and Keller 2005).  
 I turn now to a second problem connected to genetic determinism: naturalization. 
I consider naturalization to be the transformation of dynamic and historically contingent 
medical, social, and political categories and concepts into supposedly naturally-occurring, 
trans-historical and trans-cultural facts about the body (see Tremain 2001, 2002, 2006 
and Wendell 1996 on the social construction of disability, for example). Popular portraits 
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of genetic determinism view dynamic characteristics, behaviors, and socially-constructed 
traits through the presumed explanatory power of genes, thus naturalizing them and 
removing them from relevant contexts.  If there is a “gay gene,” for example, that means 
that queer identity is transformed into a fact about the body. The political nuances of 
identity formation, the public and private pressures which have, created a system of being 
“out” or “closeted”, and historical and geographical contexts of the meaning of queer 
identity is hidden via naturalization. Similarly, the political and social nuances of 
personal identification as or medical diagnosis of Asperger’s syndrome and autism are 
lost if these conditions are considered essential or genetically-determined properties of 
bodies.  
 The recent decision of the editors of the DSM-V (the latest edition of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual) to shift Asperger’s syndrome onto the autistic 
spectrum and cease to recognize it as a discrete category should showcase how important 
historically contextual diagnostic decisions can be with regard to disability (“Asperger’s” 
2012).
43
 In a memoir, John Elder Robison gave an account of how important the label of 
“Asperger’s” was to him as he constructed a disability identity (2008). Now, politically 
active “Aspies” find themselves rendered invisible by the very medical categorization 
schemes that previously served to (problematically) socially define them, and are newly 
considered autistic (a fact which will change prevalence statistics). Meanwhile, the CDC 
is revising its estimations of the prevalence of autism based on telephone surveys and 
new criteria, suggesting that 1 in 50 children are affected (Heasley 2013). Another 
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example of the importance of historical and political context to the question of disability 
and its construction is the category of learning disabilities and the diagnostic and 
statistical blossoming of a variety of these conditions as public educational strategies and 
policies change.
44
 
 As philosopher of disability Shelley Tremain puts it in a Foucauldian-inspired 
discussion of prenatal testing and screening procedures, naturalization can also be 
described as a problem of materialization; that is, the transformation of discursive 
categories into “real” categories (2006, 39). Similarly, the strategic analogy made by 
disability activists between sex/gender and impairment/disability in order to support 
disability rights campaigns for equal protection under the law problematically treats 
impairment (separated from disability) as natural or uninfluenced by medical, political, 
legal, and social forces. Tremain therefore interrogates the category of “fetal impairment” 
and seeks to deflate its status as a “real” category or a “natural kind” (Tremain 2006, 39 
and 49; see also Tremain 2001, 2002). I return to these issues and the social construction 
of disability in chapters two and three. Even if perfect genetic science were available, we 
would not have full “knowledge” of disability, because disability is a social and 
discursive category that bears upon bodies. 
 
Bioethics and Genetic Determinism 
 
 Popular media can contribute to mistaken beliefs supporting genetic determinism, 
especially when reporting scientific findings and research plans regarding genetics. These 
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findings and plans are often presented by scientists themselves in ways that 
problematically describe gene action. This is one issue to which bioethicists should attend 
and work against whenever possible. According to de Melo-Martín, bioethicists should 
also attend to an issue that penetrates a level deeper; that of communication about 
genetics within the field of bioethics itself. She argues that bioethicists, in making moral 
and ethical arguments, make significant mistakes in discussion which contribute to false 
beliefs among readers and interlocutors about gene action, which in turn support genetic 
determinism (2005). She identifies citing unrepresentative cases (such as OGOD cases or 
traits that are autosomal dominant, like Huntington’s disease) when discussing what 
parents owe children in moral debates regarding reproductive technology as one of these 
mistakes (2005, 527).  
 Another, different mistake is to use simplified cases, as in the case of discussing 
the ethical ramifications of genetic testing “when information about diseases with a 
genetic component and the predictably of genetic tests for these diseases is presented in 
simplistic ways” (2005, 528). I have already discussed the case of BRCA1 and BRCA2 
screening as de Melo-Martín describes it, but should note that de Melo-Martín also 
mentions genetic testing for Alzheimer’s disease as a case that is often represented 
simplistically (528).  
 But, I argue that complex beliefs related to genetic determinism are an even more 
significant problem in the field of bioethics than is typically recognized. Genetic 
determinism poses threats within bioethics beyond threats precipitated by 
miscommunications between experts and laypersons, bioethicists and readers. Genetic 
determinism strongly influences philosophical discussion in bioethics regarding genetic 
39 
 
screening, genetic selection of embryos, and genetic enhancement, especially when it 
comes to utopian transhumanist desires for enhanced genetic futures. In fact, 
philosophical views promulgated by bioethicists on these topics, on different sides of the 
issues, appear to be rooted in genetic determinism, as already discussed in the 
Introduction. Genetic determinism therefore shapes significant arguments in bioethics, 
and is more than a mere regrettable byproduct of some modes of discussion. This 
situation holds despite the fact that “practically every geneticist alive” (de Melo-Martín 
2005, 526) and plenty of bioethicists reject genetic determinism.  
Genetic determinism does not only affect bioethics as a field by delimiting 
advances in ethical thinking or obscuring important scientific knowledge, it also 
significantly contributes to the twinned force of stigma and synecdoche (I return to this in 
chapters two and three). Many recognize that supports for genetic determinism in the 
media and in communicative efforts with the public should be combated. But, the 
problem runs deeper than that; it is time to recognize how entrenched genetic and other 
biological reductions are in discussions of illness and health. 
To sum up, although the gene now largely determines ideas about human health in 
a way which vitamins and exercise – or even hormones – once did, there is no clarity 
with regard to how helpful genetic indications are when predicting future disease or 
predicting function (Gupta 2012, Kolata 2012). These are contested issues, and, again, 
some argue that there is no reason to believe that the “genetic era” or the view of the 
human as determined by genes will last or is the best explanatory mechanism for 
phenotype or function (Keller 2000, McNally and Glasner 2007).  
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Conclusion 
 
In the preceding pages, in order to deepen understanding regarding 
transhumanism and today’s general bioethical conversation regarding enhancement, I 
turned to historical notions of health and sickness at the locations of past strategies of 
bodily enhancement. The alternative eugenic history I traced in this chapter allows me to 
point to and track locations of: the reduction of human life, morality, and meaning to the 
level of the biological or the physical; the rejection of the deviant body; and the lasting 
romantic, utopian thinking undergirding the quest for enhancement, even as that quest 
grew and changed. Just as in the case of transhumanism today, justifications of 
enhancement strategies in the 20
th
 century operated by responding to and exploiting 
desires to increase happiness and freedom, and at the same time played upon fears of 
deviant others.  
Biological reductions made it plausible to view discipline of the body, along with 
choosing health (the right marriage partner, or diet, exercise, and hormone supplements), 
as a route to happiness and bliss. In other words, physical and mental health, along with 
choice-making, were equated with morality, happiness, and sociability; the primary 
operating assumption is that the body is the site for any intervention aimed toward 
improving human life. This puts to the side any discussion regarding political and social 
impacts on the construction or maintenance of health and sickness, disability and ability. 
Yet, in fact, disability and deviance were continually referenced and reconstructed as a 
variety of ways to understand health came in and out of vogue. Rejected bodies are 
repeatedly painted as too dependent or as irresponsible and dangerous (sickness as sin; 
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weakness as crime) in order to justify their exclusion or even their extermination through 
sterilization or other means.  They have failed to choose health, and therefore their 
deviance must be rejected as a menace to the health of the community. From the Roma 
identified by Wiggam to short individuals threatening the primacy of the tall in the 
imagination of H. G. Wells, the deviant body is seen not only as an outlier, but an “other” 
with the ability to preclude the possibility of the norm’s flourishing. Everyone must 
enhance—the community itself must be normalized—for individual enhancement to 
occur.  
Today, just as in the heyday of physical culture, the immorality and 
irresponsibility of sickness and weakness has yet to disappear from the public 
imaginary
45
 and belief in the heritability of moral traits and social happiness is still 
apparent in bioethical debates regarding enhancement. Central to all of this, then, is a 
double-edged weapon for use against persons positioned as disabled or experiencing 
disability: either disability can and therefore should be overcome through medical or non-
medical discipline, or disability must be removed from the general population by way of 
segregation so as to dissipate the threat to health and freedom more generally, among 
unmarked others in the population. Disabled lives are not worth living, and if they cannot 
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be transformed, they must be rejected—or, perhaps, stifled from the beginning. 
Meanwhile, certain bodies are valorized as free and healthy in opposition to the disabled 
body, while a cost-and-benefit analysis of the value of expending resources on rejected 
lives becomes possible. These largely unexamined assumptions are still operative, and 
their perceived plausibility is used to cut off questions regarding the desirability of 
enhancement.  
Transhumanism is rooted in the rejection of deviant embodiment; the view repeats 
the biological reductions necessary to support both the destructive belief that morality 
and appropriate sociability increase and decrease along with physical fitness and mental 
acuity and the attempt to solve social problems through intervention upon the body. 
There is an ironic paradox here; transhumanists make the body central to problem-solving 
while at the same time endeavoring to transcend it completely—thus rejecting any 
embodiment at all. While enhancement once focused on the discipline of the body and its 
perfection through technology, as in “physical culture” at the turn of the 20th century, 
enhancement in the 21
st
 century promoted by transhumanism is focused on leaving the 
body behind altogether. Popular internet discourse concerning human enhancement often 
expresses a hatred or disgust for fleshly embodiment. Consider this comment in response 
to an article entitled “How to Build the Perfect Human” on popular futuristic website i09, 
which suggested splicing animal traits in order to gain their capabilities (Ingus-Arkell 
2012). The critic wrote: “To make a better human, I'd scrap the protein and meat 
altogether” (Feb 15, 2012). A posthuman will transcend the neediness and vulnerability 
of the flesh, trading up to replaceable and strong non-organic parts. Bostrom writes: 
“What is Body in Utopia? Body is a pair of legs, a pair of arms, a trunk and a head, all 
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made of flesh. Or not, as the case may be” (2010, 8). An intoxicated Ray Kurzweil argues 
that soon sex will be virtual, and if we are unfortunate enough to have sex with a fleshly 
partner we can take comfort in a techno-overlay which will project the image of a desired 
individual or celebrity upon that partner (with Grossman 2010, 96). Sex is not desirable 
unless we can have sex in the realm of wishes and fantasy. Kurzweil writes:  
virtual sex will be better in some ways and certainly safer. Virtual sex will 
provide sensations that are more intense and pleasurable than conventional sex, as 
well as physical experiences that currently do not exist. Virtual sex is also the 
ultimate in safe sex, as there is no risk of pregnancy or transmission of disease 
(2000, 747). 
 
Kurzweil rejects the body as limiting pleasure and as the site of risk. I return explicitly to 
the rejection of embodiment at the end of the next chapter, when I consider Anne 
Waldschmidt’s analysis of the concept of risk in genetic counseling encounters.  
 In chapter two, I explore another aspect of the transhuman fantasy—the child of 
choice, for whom freedom and happiness are unlocked. I consider Savulescu’s argument 
that there is a moral obligation to create the best children possible—an enhancement 
strategy and obligation he calls “Procreative Beneficence.” This idea relies upon the 
notion of the “right to an open future”—a bundle of rights thought to ensure future 
autonomy—and genetic harm or wrongful birth in order to operate (Feinberg 1980, cf. 
Mills 2003). The aims of procreative beneficence again call to mind Sharon Snyder and 
David Mitchell’s promise of a world without bodies, uncontaminated by deviance and 
needs. This promise is the backdrop of the genetic obligation to provide future children 
with perfect health and an “open future.” The “open future” construct should call to mind 
the use of a realm of “pure choice” in debates over enhancement (cf. Oliver 2010). In the 
next chapter, I consider the “impaired fetus,” diagnosable in the womb, as the threatening 
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and reject-able body. I argue that objections to genetic selection from disability theorists 
can help us understand what is objectionable about valorizing the abled body in the arena 
of reproductive technology, and that this valorization depends on an undergirding genetic 
determinism. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
NEGATIVE GENETIC SELECTION: ENHANCING RISK, ENHANCING 
DISABILITY 
 
“…discourses of truth that provoke laughter and 
have the institutional power to kill are, after all, in a 
society like ours, discourses that deserve some 
attention.” 
 
Michel Foucault, Abnormal (2003) 
 
 In this chapter, I bring transhumanist utopian thinking into sharp focus through 
the case study of negative genetic selection, which is suggested as an enhancement 
strategy by transhumanist theorists (e.g. Savulescu 2001, 2008, and Kahane 2009; 
Buchanan et al. 2000, Liao et al. 2012).
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 While enhancement often conjures images of 
superhero strength, or Kurzweil’s suggestion that humans “upload” thoughts and 
Bostrom’s suggestion that grey matter be “copied” in silicon, the transhumanist strategy 
of genetic selection is of great import for transhumanist visions of the future. I 
specifically discuss Julian Savulescu’s proposed moral duty of procreative beneficence, a 
strong version of reproductive responsibility (2001b, 2008, see the Introduction above). 
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 Genetic selection is also sometimes framed as preventative treatment. For instance, Bonnie Steinbock 
considers whether or not negative genetic selection is different from preventative measures such as 
vaccination against polio or encouraging pregnant women to take folic acid in order to avoid spina bifida 
(2000, 108). She concludes that while the two sets of activities have differences, they are both therapeutic 
and are not different with regard to commenting on the value of the lives of persons with disabilities—i.e., 
neither need reflect a negative evaluation of these lives (121). She also argues that the termination of any 
pregnancy is usually undertaken in order to avoid unwanted burdens, and that the avoidance of the 
undeniable burden of caring for a child with a disability is no different (119). In this chapter, I aim to show 
that the two sets of activities are different because of the influence of genetic determinism in the former 
case and the institutionalized injustices which follow from it. 
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Procreative beneficence morally urges those considering reproduction to apply evolving 
technologies as they emerge to create the “best” child possible with the greatest future 
options. Transhumanism, here, would preclude the existence of certain unwanted types of 
individuals based on genetic profiles taken before birth. This is, perhaps, the first step of 
the total rejection of the body—that is, carrying out a consistent and (it is believed) 
justifiable rejection of the “impaired fetus.” The enhancement strategy of genetic 
selection asks and answers the question: who will live? 
 Genetic selection is represented as the choice of particular, “better” embryos or 
fetuses which can then lead to the enhancement of quality of life for those who are living 
and ensure the shared resource of an enhanced genetic pool for future generations. 
Genetic selection occurs regularly in the United States; for example, 19 studies conducted 
in 1988 show that 87 percent of fetuses identified as having Trisomy 21 (indicating Down 
syndrome) were aborted (Mansfield et al. 1999, 810). More recent estimates place this 
number above 90 percent (James 2009). While some believe such “risks” as Down 
syndrome are best avoided at any cost, I aim to show in what follows that support for 
genetic selection relies on genetic bias and the untenable belief that a body “marked” 
with a particular trait reliably enjoys a lessened quality of life in comparison to an 
unmarked body because of genotype. The logic of genetic selection relies on naturalized 
and materialized versions of disability that ignore their discursive, historical, and social 
settings.  
For example, genetic markers for Down syndrome indicate a wide range of 
potential phenotypic characteristics, the meaning of which depends on reception in 
society, but genetic indications of Down syndrome are often represented as an all-or-
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nothing biological affair that reveals a “Down’s baby” whose life will be bad. Genetic 
selection participates in an unjust hierarchy of value that fails to interrogate the social and 
political forces which construct it in the first place. As Shelley Tremain puts it, “in terms 
of this conception of risks in pregnancy...an increasing number of variations between 
humans are attributed to allegedly prediscursive genetic structures” (2006, 47). In other 
words, a systematic disregard for stigmatizing and unjust discursive, political, and social 
conditions and factors feeds and is fed by an over-emphasis on genetics. This discussion 
continues and builds upon the discussion of biological reduction and genetic determinism 
in chapter one. 
 The most effective critique of genetic selection developed by disability theorists 
and advocates of the disability community is the disability critique. In this chapter I 
outline this critique of genetic selection and defend it against common objections; first, 
the objection that it threatens reproductive liberty, and second, the objection that genetic 
selection fails to produce a coherent and sustained “hurtful message” to persons with 
disabilities (I will in fact argue that it does more than send a hurtful message). I go on to 
utilize the disability critique and its insights to question transhumanist future. I ultimately 
strengthen the disability critique by pointing to the construction of the impaired fetus and 
by re-directing the target of the critique to society at large and its exclusions and value 
hierarchies. 
My promotion of the disability critique is animated by the conviction that feminist 
advocates of disability rights and feminist critics of ableism should not be forced to walk 
a tightrope between supposedly competing interests—disability advocacy and a pro-
choice stance. This conflict, between reproductive liberty and critiques of genetic 
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selection, has appeared in disability studies for decades (e.g. Morris 1991, I return to this 
problem in my discussion of conservative politics in the Conclusion). What follows 
should demonstrate that the disability critique and its accompanying expressivist view of 
negative genetic selection can be consistent with, and even enhance, reproductive liberty 
(a term I bring under pressure in the following pages). 
 I argue, with others, that disability theorists and feminist theorists must work in 
tandem to pursue richer theorizing and fuller analyses of the complexity of embodiment, 
subjectivity, and interdependence. Judy Rohrer and Rosemarie Garland-Thomson make 
the case for the importance of disability theory and analysis to feminist theory; each 
highlights a variety of ways this work can challenge and deepen feminism (2005 and 
2002, respectively). Both Susan Wendell and Garland-Thomson stress, conversely, the 
necessity of a feminist theory of disability (1997, quoted Rohrer 2005, and Wendell 
1996). Rohrer’s essay lays out, with great clarity, many areas of application which can 
benefit from this collaboration. She includes consideration of the simultaneity of identity, 
interdependence, body politics and choice (2005, 35). 
 With regard to my specific focus here, genetic selection against fetuses 
symbolically structured as disabled, there is a strong conflict between “choice” as it is 
commonly understood and the justice claims forwarded by disability activists who see 
societal endorsement of genetic selection as akin to eugenics. Rohrer writes: “The 
intersection of ‘choice’ with the valuation of a disabled life provokes a clash that rocks 
our rhetoric and takes us back into active theorizing about whose humanity is supported 
and valued and under what circumstances” (2005, 58, emphasis mine). In order to 
accomplish this active theorizing, awake to systematic oppression, I argue that feminist 
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disability theorists need to meet transhumanists head-on regarding selection. Ableism is 
linked tightly to “marked bodies” of all kinds and the reasoning of sexism, racism, 
classism, and heteronormativity, all of which rely on a stigmatized Other whose 
difference is often rendered as biological (cf. Mitchell and Snyder 2000, ix). The 
accusation that the disability critique is anti-choice drives an unnecessary wedge between 
feminist theorists and disability theorists and obscures the ways in which ableism and 
sexism are fused together. 
 After exploring the disability critique, I argue that fields of risk posed by genetic 
selection practices and genetic counseling participate in a system of actuarial thinking (a 
term I borrow from Dorothy Nelkin and Susan Lindee, 1995) and decision-making that 
calls upon potential parents to perform autonomy defined by risk-aversion. Meanwhile, 
the potentially impaired fetus becomes a site of risk in this system. To conclude the 
chapter, I describe transhumanism’s techno-liberal47 subject constructed as the disabled 
or deviant body’s opposite. If biology is figured as destiny, it is easy to maintain a false 
binary between abled and disabled, or between a realm of pure choice and a scary and 
dangerous realm of pure chance or risk (here, genetic chance and fetal risk). 
Transhumanist logic rejects the disabled body as limiting choice and describes a selected 
or enhanced body as enjoying access to a realm of pure choice. On this view, choosing to 
utilize evolving technology in the arena of genetic selection can multiply freedom and 
choice and therefore unlock better futures. I argue that genetic selection, as an 
enhancement technique, merely serves to enhance the conceptual impact and meaning of 
risk and disability. 
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 I owe this neologism to Lisa Guenther. 
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Explanation of Terms 
 
Before moving to the main arguments of the chapter, I here lay out more clearly 
the terms I will use. The phrase genetic selection can be used to refer to a host of 
activities surrounding reproductive decision-making. The roughest distinction often made 
among these activities is between positive and negative genetic selection, or, in simpler 
terms, genetic selection for particular traits or against particular traits. I largely maintain 
this distinction here for the sake of clarity and responding to the work of others, although 
I argue it problematically resonates with negative evaluations of disability traits and so 
naturalizes negative evaluations. In order to achieve genetic selection, screening 
procedures can be undertaken and are advised at many different times before or during 
pregnancy. Genetic selection can also be said to occur through the choice of a partner 
with whom one might reproduce, or the timing of a pregnancy, insofar as both of these 
things impact the fetus and the eventual child. But, this is not the sense in which I use it 
here. The disability critique usually focuses upon selecting against particular traits, which 
can be achieved through the choice of one embryo rather than another for implantation or 
through the termination of a pregnancy upon the discovery of a particular trait, genetic 
markers or genetic susceptibility. 
Pre-implantation diagnosis combined with in-vitro fertilization allows potential 
parents to test embryos for markers and indications of both disease and non-disease traits 
(a commonly used distinction) prior to implantation. This testing can lead to the decision 
of which embryo to implant, or, perhaps, to implant no embryo at all. Prior, even, to that 
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early stage, potential parents can undergo their own set of genetic tests to determine 
probabilities for carrying forward traits or risk of certain conditions to future children. 
For example, little people can visit a genetic counselor to discover if their dwarfism is 
hereditary – i.e., hereditary Achondroplasia – and take steps to have children who share 
this trait with them or who do not (Davis 2010, 2).
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 Finally, prenatal genetic testing can 
be carried out after a pregnancy is initiated. For example, amniocentesis can be 
conducted after a woman becomes pregnant and can lead to the termination of the 
pregnancy if the parent so chooses. The same is true of maternal serum screening, testing 
via ultrasound and chorionic villus sampling (CVS) (Parens and Asch 2000, 45-7; Davis 
2010, 2). This is not an exhaustive list of the testing and screening options available to 
potential parents, and new tests are being developed. Recently a new test for Down 
syndrome was announced, called MaterniT21. This test can be used at 10 weeks into 
pregnancy and, unlike its predecessor, amniocentesis, does not increase the risk of 
miscarriage. It tests a blood sample taken from the mother’s arm (Hill 2012). 
Additionally, new chromosomal microarray testing—said to be better than karyotyping at 
detecting “fetal abnormality”—is now available. Chromosomal microarray compares 
fetal DNA and DNA from a presumed “healthy person” to identify (mere) deviation. This 
way of identifying deviation from a clearly arbitrary “normal” genotype is highly suspect 
(see note 38 above).  
For the purposes of this discussion, I treat screening procedures generally (such as 
those briefly introduced above) as significantly similar. Any screening procedure 
undertaken to assess the health of a potential child prior to its birth can lead potential 
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 If both parents carry the gene for dwarfism there is a chance of infant fatality (Davis 2010, 2). 
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parents to a choice constructed by the current medical climate: that is, the choice of 
whether to bring a particular, diagnosed or named, fetus to term. Some potential parents 
may desire a child, but for a variety of reasons might object to going forward with a 
pregnancy. I take for granted in this discussion that cases of interest are those in which a 
child is desired, but screening or genetic counseling is undertaken so that potential 
parents can gather genetic knowledge about a specific fetus that they have the option of 
bringing to term. I will not consider cases in which no pregnancy is desired at all.  
Recall that genetic determinism is the elevation of genetic factors to the level of 
autonomous causation; in other words, simple genetic determinism is the view that 
individual traits and behaviors and, often, social circumstances or problems can be 
explained solely through genetic factors (Buchanan et al. 2000, 23-24). This mistaken 
view is roundly dismissed by philosophers and scientists alike. But, as I argue, it retains 
influence, and that influence is full-blown in the arena of genetic selection. Mianna Lotz 
has referred to “geneticism” and “essentialism”, both of which are ways of over-stating 
the impact of genetic factors or engaging in biologically-reductive thinking (2008). She 
defines geneticism as the “morally arbitrary valorization of genetic factors in the 
understanding of human nature, selfhood and relationships” and also notes undue 
significance attributed to “biological and/or genetic functions” in some arguments 
regarding reproductive technologies (137). Abby Lippman uses the term geneticization, 
meaning “the ongoing process by which priority is given to differences between 
individuals based on their DNA codes” (1993, 178). I take geneticization to mean much 
the same phenomenon as geneticism. These ways of thinking can be destructive in 
conversation regarding genetic selection in two senses: one is empirical, when the 
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predictive power of genetic testing is over-stated, and the second is evaluative, when 
genetic factors are considered good or bad in ways unsupported by genetics itself (cf. 
Lotz 2008, 137). I consider both types of impact here.  
 
Procreative Beneficence 
 
I turn now to an introduction and critical discussion of Savulescu’s moral 
principle of procreative beneficence. Savulescu argues that that “eugenic” genetic 
selection is the best way to achieve human enhancement—for him, it is superior to 
genetic engineering (with Hemsley et al. 2006). His principle of procreative beneficence 
requires any available technology to be used to pursue the creation of the best child 
possible (2001b, 414; but as aforementioned, Savulescu believes that the use of IVF and 
the choice of one embryo over another has the least “psychological” consequences of all 
options for genetic selection). He believes parents have a moral duty to ensure children 
have the best chance at the best life (2001b). Despite the fact that Savulescu claims 
reproductive choices ultimately belong to parents, he also argues that in the case of 
prenatal genetic diagnosis doctors should not be prevented from trying to persuade 
parents with regard to procreative beneficence (425). He argues that individuals must 
weigh procreative liberty against procreative beneficence (2001b, 425, cf. Savulescu 
2002).  
Yet, Savulescu insists that if tests for non-disease genes become available, parents 
have a moral obligation to use them in making decisions about reproduction (recall here 
Buchanan et al.’s scheme of the colonization of justice). For him, parents should do what 
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they have the most reason to do in response to testing results (2001b, 415). Absent any 
other reasons for choosing a particular embryo, one should choose the embryo with the 
best chances for the best life (416-417). He makes clear that genetic markers linked with 
disability are among the traits targeted as worse and to be avoided by those who are 
morally conscientious (Savulescu 2008). According to the principle of procreative 
beneficence, one must select against disease-causing genes or disability traits. But on 
must also select against any other genes that might obstruct the good life, like a “bad 
temper” or “asthma” (2001b, 414-15, see also Savulescu 2001a). Meanwhile, he argues, 
intelligence and memory are multi-purpose and can always enhance one’s quality of life, 
no matter what one’s individual goals (2001b, 420). This is because on any theory of 
well-being (he gives three examples: “hedonistic”, “desire-fulfillment” and “objective 
list” theories), capacities such as “choosing means to satisfy ends,” and “imagining 
alternative pleasures” are important (2001b, 419-421). One must be able to make social 
connections and absorb information about the world, both of which Savulescu believes 
are increased by individual intelligence. 
Savulescu defines the best life as “the life of the most well-being” (2001b, 419). 
This hoped-for best life of heightened well-being is the justification for the use of 
prenatal genetic diagnosis and the moral obligation to procreative beneficence. According 
to Savulescu, any trait can impact the best life. For him, reproduction is like “playing the 
Wheel of Fortune. You should use all available information and choose the option must 
likely to bring about the best outcome” (414).  
 Savulescu admits that if procreative beneficence as he conceives it is followed, 
common prejudices will come into play in reproductive decision-making. But his 
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response to the problem is unsatisfactory. He argues that if society favors men, for 
example, then parents have good moral reason to select embryos based on their sex 
(male) (2001b, 23). But he does not think that these decisions impact equality or justice 
issues, because before any impact is felt on the level of the population, emergent factors 
(i.e. intense gender disparity) would change the direction of moral obligation (423). For 
example, in a society which has produced too many males, but still relies on traditional 
sexual reproduction, a female child becomes the favored outcome of a pregnancy under 
the dictates of procreative beneficence. 
 But persons with disabilities and women, people of color,
49
 and others who face 
societal prejudice, still have reasons to be suspicious of Savulescu’s procreative 
beneficence. I argue here that he does not deal adequately with ableism (prejudice against 
persons with disabilities) and sexism. I will address the issue of ableism first. Savulescu’s 
focus on eliminating undesirable traits biologically obscures the ways in which disability 
involves a lack of fit to or lack of responsiveness in a particular social world, which is 
malleable, or is socially constructed by way of stigma. Marking disability is historically a 
process of labeling; labels in turn come to refer to the whole person in a disparaging way: 
“the amputee” or the Down’s child—a “defect” becomes a “defective” (cf. Zola 1993, 
169). This process of labeling and marking is the social construction of disability identity. 
(I discuss the social construction of disability and stigma at greater length in chapter 
three.) In calling for the elimination or mitigation of disability through negative genetic 
selection, Savulescu’s principle of procreative beneficence naturalizes the meaning of 
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 It is clear people of color experience significantly worse societal reception and conditions than those 
positioned as white, so of course Savulescu is forced to also argue that one should select for whiteness 
(against a raced fetus). 
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disability and suggests that making the body malleable according to the dictates of the 
social is more important than the political and social goal of achieving accessibility for a 
variety of bodies and minds. Disability, viewed through procreative beneficence, is 
reduced to a genetic feature or prenatally visible trait which can be screened out or turned 
off by way of reproductive decision-making. Savulescu is thus performing a biological 
reduction, one that is specifically reminiscent of the disputed “medical model” of 
disability, which poses disability as purely biological and misses a critical reading of 
society’s norms.  
 The visible features of the fetus are thus limited to genetic anomalies and 
encourage the creation of classes among fetuses, arrayed along a range of normality that 
corresponds roughly to the traits we tolerate among already-existing persons, already 
classed and, in many cases, heavily stigmatized on the basis of class (cf. Carlson 2002, 
207-209). An example of such a class is Down syndrome, the “prenatal prototype” for 
which is selected against after detection of genetic markers in the fetus at rates over 90 
percent in the United States (ibid. and James 2009). By way of genetic profiles and fetal 
diagnoses (naming), a link is forged between a fetus and existing communities that are 
not valued; thus, the potential child is deemed not desirable. According to Savulescu’s 
principle of procreative beneficence, such a pregnancy should be ended or avoided as a 
matter of moral obligation. Unlike the gender disparity that might become a new factor in 
reproductive decision-making as the result of sex selection, it seems that there are no 
emergent reasons to curb this type of selection (or selection “against” persons of color). I 
return to this point, below. 
57 
 
Savulescu never even mentions the women who would be receiving the IVF 
treatments necessary to enact the principle of procreative beneficence (even in passing he 
refers to “reproducers” rather than “women”). Speaking to this concern, bioethicist 
Christine Overall argues that procreative beneficence is a burden for women, not men 
because procreative beneficence requires “every potential mother” to use IVF (Overall 
2012, 125).  But IVF involves major surgeries and is very risky, so procreative 
beneficence is in actuality a high-risk medical experiment for both the mother and the 
child. Risks to the fetus stem from the likelihood of multiples brought by the IVF 
procedure, and so when IVF is combined with pre-implantation diagnosis, an improved 
life for a potential child cannot be guaranteed. These issues are all beside the point, 
however, for the heavy majority of women globally; we should not forget that IVF is 
extremely cost-prohibitive and its efficacy depends on the age of the woman who uses it 
(Overall 2012, 125-127). Procreative beneficence is meant to be an ethical principle – on 
Savulescu’s view, the only ethical way to reproduce – but it fails with regard to bettering 
the lives of precisely those whose participation it requires (cf. Overall 2012, 127).   
 Those who would critique negative genetic selection or procreative beneficence as 
a societal practice or moral obligation, or who would express unease regarding its various 
intents are often accused of attempting to restrict or restricting choice (Brock 2009, 
Nelson 2011, Savulescu 2001b). If it is ethically permissible to terminate a pregnancy, it 
is permissible to terminate any pregnancy for any reason (Brock 2009, 258; Steinbock 
2000). Therefore, worries about one set of reasoning for termination should not be given 
credence if reproductive liberty is to be upheld. In order to rebut this prevailing objection, 
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I turn here to a discussion of the central contentions of the disability critique, point to 
some ways it can be strengthened as I proceed, and discuss reproductive liberty.  
 
The Disability Critique 
 
Disability theorist Adrienne Asch criticizes the practice of negative genetic 
selection and, thus, the principle of procreative beneficence by suggesting that selecting 
against traits deemed characteristic of already-existing persons with disabilities is deeply 
stigmatizing and sends a hurtful message to those in the disability community – viz., their 
lives aren’t worth living (Asch 2003). On Asch’s view, procreative beneficence is 
immoral. 
 In this section, I describe Asch’s disability critique of genetic selection while 
navigating claims that launching such a critique threatens reproductive liberty or is 
unavoidably anti-choice. I should note that disability critique should not be taken as 
representative of the views of all persons who experience widely varying disabilities. It is 
important to avoid the common mistake of treating persons with disabilities and those in 
their communities as a homogeneous group with a monolithic set of interests, beliefs or 
circumstances. Instead, the disability critique is the term for a specific argument. 
Adrienne Asch uses this terminology and I do so here in order to pick up on the 
conversation she began (e.g. 1989, 2000, 2003, Asch and Wasserman 2005).  
 The disability critique calls into question social motivations for pre-natal genetic 
testing, diagnosis, and subsequent selective abortion. It can also be used to critique the 
overall practice of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis and the pressure to choose one 
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embryo over another. The disability critique argues that these reproductive decisions 
devalue and threaten the disability community and its existing members, but it can also 
be extended to show that all are devalued by this practice. Essentially, the disability 
critique suggests that negative genetic selection is regularly undertaken based on 
misinformation ultimately related to ableism, is unduly swayed by the medical model of 
disability, and expresses a hurtful message to persons already existing with targeted 
disability traits—namely, that these lives are not worth living. For supporters of the 
critique, “prenatal genetic testing followed by selective abortion is morally problematic, 
and…driven by misinformation” (Parens and Asch 2000, 13). Asch further suggests that 
if disability is seen to detract from “what most people seek in child rearing,” which she 
specifies as a process “to give ourselves a new being who starts out with the best we can 
give, and who will enrich us, gladden others, contribute to the world, and make us 
proud,” then this is a result of misinformation (Parens and Asch 2000, 13 quoting Asch 
1989, 86). So, the misinformation that Asch has in mind is connected to evaluations 
about the character of the child that might be created and, additionally, the way in which 
rearing that child would be different or unique from rearing any child (cf. Kittay 2010c).  
 The misinformation identified by the disability critique can take a number of 
different forms, but is ultimately driven by a disregard for the value of the lives of 
persons with disabilities or the quality of those lives. One “mistaken assumption” 
discussed at length by Asch is the notion that if having a capacity is good, then lacking it 
is inherently bad. Asch argues that one can concede a capacity is valuable without 
conceding that to live without it is bad, or lacking in value. Equivocation between these 
two beliefs makes the “quality of life” of those with disabilities seem unduly low or 
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perhaps non-existent. Asch concludes that this misleading equivocation “is due in part to 
the failure to distinguish the absence from the loss of a skill, capacity, or type of 
experience, and in part from the overly-narrow description of what is good or valuable” 
(2003, 318). The overly-narrow description Asch gestures toward is repeated in the 
reasoning of proponents of enhancement, who zero in on cognitive capacity as perhaps 
the most important key to valuable life (e.g. Savulescu 2001).
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 The importance of 
cognitive capacity is bolstered by the idea expressed by Buchanan et al. that such a 
capacity is “all-purpose” and so does not define a particular life of value, but is rather 
necessary to all (2000, 49). Many arguments for intellectual enhancement define 
intellectual life as necessarily valuable and implicitly claim that greater cognitive 
capacity is always better. This means higher IQ is of vital importance (Savulescu 2001b, 
414). In this vein they may also overstate the importance of genetic impact factors for 
cognition. 
 Two other elements of misinformation identified by Asch are as follows. First, 
discriminatory attitudes toward persons with disabilities are driven by the medical model 
of disability (2003, 318-19). Insofar as negative genetic selection is explicitly encouraged 
by medical professionals as a way of avoiding a life of hardship, Asch argues a medical 
model is likely being employed, which exaggerates the extent to which negative 
experiences often undergone by persons with disabilities are due inherently to their 
physical traits. The medical model of disability, on its strongest version, orients all 
limitation due to disability in biological facts; discomforts and lack of freedoms and 
limited capabilities are all, on this model, due solely to disability’s character as a medical 
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or health problem (Brownlee and Cureton 2009, 75-76; Saxton 2000, 149). Rejecting this 
emphasis, as proponents of disability rights do, can take the form of assuming a largely 
social model of disability or simply rejecting the medical model. Contrary to the medical 
model, the social model argues that difficulties or differences in quality of life 
experienced by persons with disabilities are due to a lack of social accommodation rather 
than inherent individual or biological qualities (Abberley 1987). Disability, on this view, 
most closely refers to a set of social circumstances that are discriminatory rather than a 
trait or traits of an individual or the individual herself (Brownlee and Cureton 2009, 21).
 
51
 This does not mean that the traits in question must be seen as neutral; this shift in 
emphasis can still consider certain traits limiting when it comes to some activities and at 
the same time maintain that available alternative modes of activity can ensure a high 
quality of life (Parens and Asch 2000, 25-26). The disability critique suggests, then, that a 
disability trait need not have the “tragic” impact it is regularly believed to have as viewed 
through the medical model.
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 Second, negative genetic selection “place[s] unwarranted emphasis on the size of 
one’s opportunity range rather than the possibility for meaningful choice and rewarding 
outcomes within that range” (Asch 2003, 318; recall here Bostrom’s image of concentric 
circles). Using the language of the species-typical, Asch points out that variation from 
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 In chapter three I argue that the most helpful model of disability is the cultural model, which refers to and 
investigates the context and construction of disability without assuming that these contexts and 
constructions are merely or only tragic or negative. This model does not assume that locations of disability 
are always blameworthy instances of failure on the part of the social (Snyder and Mitchell 2006). It also 
does not separate impairment and disability, as the social model does, claiming that the former is merely 
biological (i.e., resistant to social construction) while the latter is social. Chapter three is dedicated to 
discussing models of disability and outlining the Foucauldian inspiration of the cultural model. 
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 “Clinicians and bioethicists often discount data indicating that people with disabilities and their families 
do not view their lives in solely or even predominantly negative terms; instead, they may insist that such 
data reflect a denial of reality or an exceptional ability to cope with problems” (Parens and Asch 2000, 6, 
cf. Riis et al. 2005 and Goering 2008). 
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this norm does not mean that “meaningful choice and rewarding outcomes” are lost. In 
fact, “virtually everyone with a disability can participate in many everyday activities, 
experience relationships, discover the world beyond themselves, and contribute to 
familial, social, political, and economic life” (320).  
I add here to the disability critique: emphasis on opportunity range ensconces 
“meaningful choice and rewarding outcomes” as inherent to or inevitable for life of an 
individual who enjoys a body considered more species-typical, or a specific kind of 
genotype. This emphasis over-valuates the opportunity range of the (socially) abled body, 
while simultaneously denying the opportunity range of the (socially) disabled body. Any 
individual may face hospital stays, obstacles, chronic illness, disease, or permanent 
limitation. Yet, society is not responsive to all needs and creates circumstances in which 
some persons are more accepted and cared for than others. Opportunity ranges can 
enforce a misleading binary between the disabled and the abled and, in the context of 
prenatal testing, encourage predictions impossible to make. Because quality of life is 
dependent upon social circumstances, prenatal testing cannot predict it. 
 One final issue related to misinformation is synecdoche, the identification of one 
trait with the whole, i.e. the whole fetus or the entirety of the prospects of the future child 
(Parens and Asch 2000, 14 and 27-28; Asch and Wasserman 2005). The original 
disability critique calls synecdoche into question. It sees synecdoche as a conceptual 
mistake which ties the value of an entire fetus or future child to the presence of a trait that 
has been socially-identified as problematic or unwelcome. The rejection of a fetus, then, 
is by way of synecdoche predicated on the presence of one trait. Through the lens of 
synecdoche, Savulescu assumes that the presence of one trait thought to impact quality of 
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life is enough to make an embryo undesirable. Rich possibilities regarding potential 
persons are obscured.
53
  
To add to the disability critique, I further argue that synecdoche connects with 
geneticism and is influenced by the mistaken reasoning of genetic determinism. Genetic 
determinism, again, is a version of biological reductionism, the idea that wide swaths of 
behavior and social phenomena can be explained solely through biological factors. 
Synecdoche insists that future quality of life can be measured, at least in the present time, 
through the presence or absence of certain genetic traits, markers or indicators. So, the 
biological reduction occurring in the arena of prenatal testing and negative genetic 
selection is a specifically genetic reduction. In this arena, it is believed that future 
phenomena, including perceived ills and problems on the level of the individual, can be 
predicted reliably by reference to genetic data, and these predictions should be actionable. 
This is part of a strategy of actuarial thinking. Perhaps most troubling is the notion, 
attendant upon the practice of genetic selection, that one might “choose” quality of life 
for a future child; this clearly over-emphasizes the importance of genetic factors. It 
showcases a bias, geneticism, toward genetic impact factors over those of environment 
and society. 
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 There is slight overlap between 1) the view of proponents of the disability critique and 2) the view that 
parents have a significant ethical burden of reproductive responsibility including the duty to test for certain 
traits. For example, on both views, it would be wrong to knowingly take action during pregnancy that 
would harm the fetus, such as conceiving while one has rubella (Savulescu 2001, 417). This overlap exists 
because, I argue, there is a distinction between preventing harm for a particular child and preventing a 
particular child in order to avoid the existence of a disability. To put it yet another way, there is a 
distinction preventing harm (through the use of folic acid, for example) on behalf of a child or a potential 
child, and preventing a potential child because of an unwanted trait (cf. Parens and Asch 2000, 16). The 
difference is one of emphasis, which hearkens back to the concept of synecdoche. Preventing a potential 
child because of an unwanted trait can showcase an undue belief in the influence of that trait, which in turn 
may be inflated by undercurrents of genetic determinism. It is also a thoroughly marginalizing practice, one 
which presumes what types of lives are worth living and fixates on preventing specific bodies rather than 
adjusting social institutions. 
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 To put these issues a slightly different way: genetic determinism positions genetic 
cause as ruling over individual outcome. Synecdoche, likewise, positions a “disability” 
trait as absolute or autonomous limitation upon individual quality of life. Synecdoche 
identifies one trait of the fetus as of utmost importance. It makes this partial information 
about genotype appear to enable the choice for or against a particular kind of a child, seen 
primarily through the lens of genetic traits. Using only the lens of genetic traits belies the 
known influences of environment, the complicated relationship between genotype and 
phenotype, and the fallibility of genetic predictors (Gupta 2012, Kolata 2012). Genetic 
selection, seen as the choice of outcomes in quality of life rather than intervention upon 
mere traits, would provide a potential parent with a child who is chosen as opposed to 
one that is the product of chance.  
 The other elements of misinformation I drew out from Asch’s work, above, are 
also linked to biological reductionism. First, the notion that lack is always negative or 
that the size of one’s predicted opportunity range is of primary importance relies on the 
idea that biology is destiny—certain physical facts about one’s body will always be 
determinative for the type of life one leads. This resonates with the history of 
enhancement I drew in the previous chapter. Second, the medical model attributes 
primary importance to the physical facts of one’s body, while disregarding the extent to 
which accessibility, stigma and bias in the social world can contribute to, or work against, 
one’s quality of life.  
 The original disability critique also involves a version of a parental ethic or an 
ethic of parental acceptance. Erik Parens and Asch write: “In rejecting an otherwise 
desired child because they believe that the child’s disability will diminish their parental 
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experience, parents suggest that they are unwilling to accept any significant departure 
from the parental dreams that a child’s characteristics may occasion” (2000, 13). 
Parenthood, on this view, should involve acceptance of a child’s traits, whatever they 
may be, at the risk of otherwise suggesting a commitment to an ideal that a child may 
have difficulty reaching. This point has been critiqued by Bonnie Steinbock as unrealistic 
and is similar to the thick parental ethic promulgated elsewhere by Michael Sandel 
(Steinbock 2000, 122; Sandel 2004).
54
 Some might argue that it is inappropriate to 
evaluate an individual’s parental potential from the outside, based on a perceived 
willingness or unwillingness to accept a future child. Yet, there is a significant insight 
buried here which can be employed to critique troublesome social circumstances and 
ideals, not individual parents. 
 I argue that first, individual women may make an assessment of their 
circumstances in light of the results of prenatal testing and determine that they do not 
have the resources, social support or otherwise have access to the tools necessary to raise 
a particular child. This should not be read as a failure of an individual woman, as some 
versions of the disability critique might suggest. Instead it should be a jumping-off point 
for a searching investigation of what forms of life society welcomes and a motivation to 
begin working politically to make the distribution of medical care, housing, and other 
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 For Sandel, parenthood is the lynchpin for humility, a hard-won character trait in a social world bent on 
domination (2004, 56-57). Sandel argues that within the scope of parenthood, unlike in other areas of life, 
we cannot make explicit choices (56-7). Sandel also argues that genetic enhancement and selection “would 
disfigure the relation between parent and child, and deprive the parent of the humility and enlarged human 
sympathies that an openness to the unbidden can cultivate” (57). The enlarged sympathies he refers to are 
connected to a universal susceptibility to chance. By way of this argument, Sandel seems to suggest that 
genetic selection or human enhancement operate in a realm of unmitigated choice, and that chance and 
choice are opposed to one another rather than existing side-by-side (cf. Oliver 2010). This problematically 
inflates the power of genetic selection or genetic interventions. 
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social goods more just and equitable. While the disability critique is not usually used to 
inspire this conversation, I argue that it can and should be.  
 Second, on my view (and to further Parens and Asch’s discussion of a parental 
ethic), any child will fail to reach normalized societal ideals. A selected genotype, taken 
as a guarantor of a better child (one closer to society’s vision), lends support to the 
discredited idea that genetic factors uniquely determine phenotype, opportunity range, 
and quality of life. Taken as a kind of guarantee—the “selection” of a child or a life—a 
genotype selected for or against appears to stave off unpredictability and chance. Where a 
selection is made, chance does not rule, and quality of life will improve. Savulescu, in 
articulating procreative beneficence, does not claim that selection is a guarantor of 
success and happiness for a child. But the impression that this practice is a guarantee is a 
troubling and predictable implication of arguments for selection. Support for my view is 
available in the case of wrongful life suits; if it were not for the notion of a guarantee 
when testing does not uncover a trait that parents wish to avoid, these suits would not be 
successful in court (cf. Shiffrin 1999).
55
 Parents may feel that through genetic selection 
they are choosing a life of unbounded possibility as opposed to known or absolute 
limitation. But this is an illusion—selecting against specific traits does not guarantee 
future happiness or an untroubled life. 
 I argue that the gulf between the norm (“species-typical”) and deviant 
embodiment creates impossible standards. Disability theorist Rosemarie Garland-
Thomson refers to the opposite of the abnormal as the normate, an empty point of 
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 In a recent case in the state of Oregon, parents launched a multi-million dollar lawsuit against a hospital 
for failing to detect Down syndrome in their 4-year-old daughter. The parents claim that they were 
“assured” that the results of tests for the condition were negative (Heasley 2012). 
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reference that no one embodies. Again, here, attention to the workings of genetic 
determinism can deepen this discussion. “Normal” genotypes also function as empty 
points of reference; there is no person with a genotypic “blueprint for normal phenotype” 
(Scully 2008, 6, see my discussion of genetic determinism in chapter one). Negative 
genetic selection, as a cultural practice today, re-enforces the normate and corresponds 
this construct with individual happiness or quality of life. ”Canonical genotypes” are 
conceptual constructs built by social and cultural values, and deviance is filled out by 
way of what society tolerates. The basis for “normality” is imaginative—it connects 
biological causes to what are considered to be desirable outcomes, which in turn 
represent desirable characteristics. These desirable characteristics always have reference 
to the social world and its delineation between normal and abnormal, acceptable and 
stigmatized.
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 Like the “normate” (the “unblushing,” abled, heterosexual, educated male 
who is Christian, plays sports – the list goes on, Garland-Thomson 1996, 9) – the 
canonical genotype is empty. No one person is owner of the “canonical genotype” – 
variation is constant (cf. Scheer and Groce 1998).  
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that widespread use of enhancements, 
even genetic selection, would create an orderly Gattacan world of unbounded successes, 
happiness, and pure opportunity.
57
 Hope that it might, expressed by enhancement 
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 Cf. Margaret Olivia Little’s essay regarding medical practice and the importance of refusing “cultural 
complicity” in stigmatizing practices (1998). Of course, also important here is Foucault’s guiding work 
collected in his lectures under the title of Abnormal; see my Introduction (2003). Bioethicist Eric Juengst 
notes that some enhancements can improve a recipient’s social standing but only by perpetuating the stigma 
involved—the problem is deeper than he realizes (1998, 41). 
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 Gattaca, DVD, directed by Andrew Niccol (1997; Culver City, CA: Columbia TriStar Home Video, 
1998). In the world of this sci-fi film, there is near-universal use of genetic selection technology via IVF 
and selection of one embryo from among many. The hero, however, is un-enhanced, and is able to perform 
and excel in his space program. A second hero, enhanced, suffers under the “burden of perfection” 
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proponents, expresses at least genetic bias if not unwitting support for genetic 
determinism. Lurking in the background is the idea that an identified and selected 
genotype can produce a predictable set of results and is susceptible to manipulation 
through pure choice and no chance (cf. Oliver 2010). Hope that genetic intervention can 
at least guarantee lives of fewer obstacles, burdens, or less suffering, also expresses 
genetic bias. Savulescu is working from genetic bias when he advocates selection for 
traits connected to enhanced cognition, no matter how weak the link between genotype 
and phenotype, or how “accurate” the tests for intelligence (2001, 414). Genetic 
interventions are costly and time-consuming, both for individuals and for societies that 
invest in their use. If, for Savulescu, they are important enough to advocate for and invest 
in even when the linkage between genes and quality of life is weak, he positions these 
interventions among many other possible social and medical investment strategies as 
primarily important. Perhaps, then, these strategies are useful as a result of the bodies 
they reject, not the bodies they create. 
 I will loop back now to the original disability critique. On a final line of 
argumentation generally referred to as the expressivist view, the disability critique 
contends that prenatal testing and genetic selection, as attitude and practice, send a 
hurtful message to already-existing persons with the traits in question (Saxton 2000, 148; 
Asch 2000b, 236). Asch clarifies: 
As with discrimination more generally, with prenatal diagnosis, a single trait 
stands in for the whole, the trait obliterates the whole. With both discrimination 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(Shapshay 2009, 89); he struggles with depression and the after-effects of a suicide attempt. The contrast 
between these two lives and the presentation of these characters on screen is meant to belie belief in genetic 
determinism. Yet, many other elements of the film, such as the successful space program with its uncanny 
multitude of near-identical astronauts who excel physically and mentally, complicate this goal (cf. Holden 
1997). 
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and prenatal diagnosis, nobody finds out about the rest. The tests send the 
message that there’s no need to find out about the rest (Parens and Asch 2000, 13; 
emphasis mine).  
 
The hurtful message tells already-existing persons that their lives are not worth living. 
Ultimately, Asch suggests that “trying to screen for and prevent the birth of babies” with 
certain traits “disparage[s] the lives of existing and future disabled people” who share 
these traits (Parens and Asch 2000, 13). It also misconstrues their lives. Synecdoche 
upholds this message by prioritizing single traits over future wholes. Asch and David 
Wasserman suggest that synecdoche is a moral “failing” (notice that they do not mean the 
act of negative genetic selection itself, although they might mean a parental ethic or 
attitude behind an act) (2005, 173).  
Asch and Wasserman, along with others who articulate or adhere to the disability 
critique, recognize that not all instances of selective abortion must be interpreted as 
ableist or motivated by stereotyping and stigma. Asch and Parens write: “Parents may 
examine themselves and conclude that they are not choosing against a child’s specific 
traits; they may be making an honest and informed acceptance of their own character and 
goals” (Parens and Asch 2000, 22; cf. Asch and Wasserman 2005).  
 
Reproductive Liberty and Genetic Determinism 
 I turn now to the specific rejection of the disability critique on the basis of its 
supposed threat to reproductive liberty. Savulescu posits that claims like the disability 
critique require parents unwilling to raise disabled children to create and support such 
children (2001, 423). He assumes that proponents of the disability discrimination claim 
(as he calls it) support a ban on genetic selection procedures and selective abortion in 
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response to the presence of certain traits (423). In fact, as I will show, this support cannot 
be found among the major proponents of the disability critique.  
 Like Savulescu, James Nelson views the disability critique as inimical to 
reproductive liberty and rejects the idea that any amount of stigma suffered by existing 
persons could be sufficient reason to force an unwanted pregnancy (2010). Daniel Brock 
has argued that even if one assumes the expressivist view is correct in that negative 
genetic selection involves a hurtful message sent to already-existing persons, the 
disability critique would involve a threat to reproductive liberty (2009, 258). Steinbock 
situates the decision to selectively abort on the basis of a disability trait as acceptable for 
the same reasons any abortion is acceptable: so the woman is not forced to take on 
unwanted burdens (2000, 119). On my view, the above objections aiming to protect 
reproductive liberty are all at least partly based on a misunderstanding of the locus of the 
efforts of the disability critique and a dismissal of its potential insights regarding 
synecdoche and potential connections with genetic determinism.  
 Disability advocates interested in promoting a version of the disability critique 
need not subscribe to a view that precludes reproductive liberty in individual cases (i.e., 
advocating forced pregnancies) to voice concern regarding the marginalization, 
stigmatization, and prejudicial attitudes developed and expressed through the social 
practice of genetic selection on the basis of disability traits (Parens and Asch 2000, 12). 
In fact, Asch holds that potential parent(s) should be the primary decision-makers 
regarding their reproductive liberty (Parens and Asch 2000, 22; cf. Asch 2003, 317 n. 6 
and 332-34). She writes: “I, and nearly all others sharing a disability rights critique of 
prenatal testing, maintain an ardent pro-choice stance and assert that women should be 
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free to make any decision they wish about maintaining a pregnancy or having an 
abortion” (Asch 2003, 317 n. 6). As Parens and Asch articulate the critique:  
The disability community arguments are not intended to justify wholesale 
restrictions on prenatal testing for genetic disability. Rather, they are intended to 
make prospective parents pause and think about what they are doing and to 
challenge professionals to help parents better examine their decisions. They 
[should] help make our decisions thoughtful and informed, not thoughtless and 
automatic (2000, 28-29, emphasis mine).
58
 
 
The best outcome, from the standpoint of the disability critique, is that potential parents, 
having resolved to have children, reflect carefully on what testing can reveal about their 
future child.  For proponents of the disability critique, reflection should not be burdened 
by undue coercion from medical professionals, which can devolve into a shaming process 
and contribute to systemic marginalization and prejudice (recall Savulescu’s contention 
that persuasion is acceptable when doctors seek to protect procreative beneficence). I am 
thinking specifically of situations like one in which a genetic counselor reportedly asked 
an expectant mother, “What are you going to say to people when they ask you how you 
could bring a child like this into the world?” (reported in Parens and Asch 2000, 7). Or, in 
another example, an obstetrician remarked to a woman that “the quickest, cheapest way 
to solve this problem is to terminate the pregnancy” (reported in Piepmeier 2013). 
Instead, medical professionals should encourage reflection and take care not to overstate 
the predictive power of genetic testing.  
I argue that the potential impact of particular traits should be downplayed; as 
Steinbock rightly argues, this does potential parents, potential children, and the disability 
community no favors (2000, 119). It is, however, of utmost importance to neither 
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 This is reminiscent of Kelly Oliver’s Derridean approach to ethics, which emphasizes the importance of 
interrupting the “answering machines” which we rely upon to automatically respond to others (Oliver 
2013). 
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overstate the importance of genetic factors among others when it comes to quality of life 
nor accept and amplify the effects of prejudice and stigma against persons with 
disabilities by treating these as inherent to certain traits without reference to the social 
institutions and circumstances which actually create them. 
 
On Whom Does the Onus Rest? 
 
I now call on my own version of the disability critique—and continued reference 
to the influence of genetic determinism—to argue for specific locations of application of 
the disability critique. On my view, the appropriate loci of the disability critique are: 
discourse in medical and scientific realms which exacerbates geneticism or the influence 
of genetic determinism or takes recourse to an unmitigated medical mode of disability; 
and lack of reflection upon synecdoche in social and institutional encouragement to 
select. Finally, the disability critique should be used to help us recognize the need to pair 
critique of these issues with activism aimed toward social and political changes in 
medical care, insurance, public policy, transportation, accommodation, and schools. We 
need to create a more just system to alleviate marginalization of and discrimination 
against persons with disabilities. So many social institutions effectively “hide” persons 
with disabilities from view—sheltered workshops, relegation to nursing homes, extreme 
lack of public transportation.  
 Here again, a model of disability which can attend to social constructions of 
disability and stigmas against persons with disabilities is a requirement. Unfair 
stereotyping of disability occurs when one naturalizes or materializes disability—that is, 
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conflates social constructions regarding persons and groups, and stigmas connected with 
these, with facts about the body. I take synecdoche to be the most significant insight of 
the original disability critique; synecdoche works as a naturalizing pattern by focusing 
merely on rejected traits themselves, as materializations of disability, and so prioritizes 
isolated traits over social circumstances as primarily important. Synecdoche hides what is 
in plain sight from view. 
 Synecdoche is constitutive of what the original disability critique refers to as the 
“hurtful message” sent by the practice of negative genetic selection (that the lives of 
those with the trait in question are not worth living), and so is a key element of the 
disability critique. But, as it stands in the original critique, “the hurtful message” feature 
of the disability critique seems to require that one argues that individual reproductive 
decisions send consistent, intentional messages which fail to significantly vary (Nelson 
2011).
59
 Furthermore, synecdoche is not only inaccurate and hurtful, it contributes to 
material social conditions that render those who experience disability a heavily 
stigmatized and marginalized minority which cannot significantly access public life. 
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 Nelson writes: “people’s motivations and reasons, their understandings and aims, are so various as to 
preclude our being able to say ‘this behavior can only be understood as sending a resentment-worthy 
message.’ Abortions after genetic screenings are not sentences, nor are they even symbols—and even if 
they were, of course, what people mean in using sentences, or in running flags up poles, is various and 
contestable” (2011, 66). Nelson goes on to argue that motivations for terminating a fetus with a disability 
trait “will typically be less hateful” than those motivations that proponents of the disability critique might 
argue are behind genetic selection (67). Yet, as I have argued thus far, I think that the focus of the disability 
critique is better rested upon the aggregate social impact of negative genetic selection than upon women or 
individuals making decisions. I concede that it would be unfair and very likely incorrect to insist on arguing 
that particular individuals are driven by hateful motivations when they decide to terminate particular 
pregnancies. Instead, it seems most helpful and best to argue, especially in the context of the transhumanist 
utopias I am discussing, that the social practice of genetic selection and the particular urgings of the 
medical community have the effect of large-scale commentary on which lives are worth living and which 
bodies society wishes to produce. While “abortions after genetic screenings are not sentences,” genetic 
counselors and medical professionals speak sentences, internet resources post sentences (“running flags up 
poles”), and in most cases these and other sentences are both uniformly ableist and have tangible effects on 
individual decision-making. 
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Recognizing the pervasiveness of synecdoche should encourage us to enact social 
changes. Some have questioned the strength of a critique based on hurt feelings (e.g. 
Nelson 2011). But, as we have seen, hurt feelings are not the extent of what is at stake for 
either persons with disabilities or women as they make reproductive decisions in a milieu 
influenced by ableism and genetic bias.   
 Women should not be required, at the moment they are faced with the results of 
prenatal testing, to recognize and weed out the impact of the unfair and false binary 
between abled and disabled with regard to life opportunities, as well as the influence of 
genetic determinism. At the beginning of this chapter I indicated that the disability 
critique had both benefits and drawbacks; the key drawback, on my view, is the focus in 
some articulations of the critique on messages sent by individual women’s decision-
making rather than institutions as a whole (cf. Asch and Gellner 1996, 339 and Hershey 
1994, 30 as quoted in Nelson 2007, 478). My expansion of the disability critique to 
include the notion of genetic determinism as a common fallacy with an impact on 
medical discourse and the provision of care is meant to adjust this claim beyond 
individual reproducers and the decisions they may make. I argue the decisions made by 
individual parents are currently unduly influenced by unsupported belief in the idea that 
genetic profiles taken before birth have measurable and certain impact on future quality 
of life as well as ableism in an unresponsive society.   
Reproductive liberty is considered dependent upon reliable information from 
medical professionals and a non-coercive setting in which to make reproductive 
decisions. Bias toward genetic definitions of opportunity range or the undue belief in 
genetic determinism can thwart these conditions. Both can complicate the transmission of 
75 
 
good information, foster misinformation, and put undue pressure on potential parents. 
But, importantly, there is no reliable medical information about quality of life. No matter 
how good or predictive prenatal testing becomes, no matter how perfect the transmission 
of information between a medical professional and a woman, predictions like this are 
inaccessible. This is because the richness of one’s life, the access one enjoys to others 
and to the world, is dependent upon social and political responsiveness, just conditions, 
and the acceptance of diverse embodiment.  
 
Sterilization Abuse and Institutional Practices 
 I here consider further the importance of focusing on the social world, institutions, 
and discourse rather than individual decision-making. Angela Davis and other feminists 
of color concerned about the rhetoric of choice in abortion politics raise an important 
distinction between reproductive liberty and reproductive justice, which calls into 
question precisely this issue: the failure to extend questions about reproductive choices 
beyond the sphere of individual liberty (Davis 1981; see also Smith 2005). Davis notes: 
The failure of the abortion rights campaign to conduct a historical self-evaluation 
led to a dangerously superficial appraisal of Black people’s suspicious attitudes 
toward birth control in general. Granted, when some Black people unhesitatingly 
equated birth control with genocide, it did appear to be an exaggerated – even 
paranoiac – reaction (1981, 203). 
 
But Davis goes on to note that “white abortion rights activists” had missed available 
“clues about the history of the birth control movement” in the strong reactions of the 
black community (1981, 203-204). Historically, the birth control movement advocated 
racist, involuntary sterilization; this advocacy extended to Margaret Sanger, the engine of 
the movement in the 1900s, and Theodore Roosevelt, U.S. President at the turn of the 
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century (204, 209, 210). For Davis—writing in the 1980s—until involuntary sterilization 
and racism were substantially addressed and rejected in the abortion rights movement, 
reproductive liberty was non-existent for many women. She argued: “if ever women 
would enjoy the right to plan their pregnancies, legal and easily accessible birth control 
measures and abortions would have to be complemented by an end to sterilization abuse” 
(204). 
 The sterilization abuse to which Davis refers was sanctioned and enjoyed broad 
support both within and beyond the birth control movement in recent history. Involuntary 
sterilization laws were in effect in many states in the 1930s; “By 1932….at least twenty-
six states had passed compulsory sterilization laws and…thousands of ‘unfit’ persons had 
already been surgically prevented from reproducing” (1981, 214, cf. Snyder and Mitchell 
2006, 98). Margaret Sanger affirmed this state of affairs when she announced that the 
sterilization was right for: “Morons, mental defectives, epileptics, illiterates, paupers, 
unemployables, criminals, prostitutes and dope fiends” (as quoted in Davis 1981, 214). 
Davis adds that Sanger believed that if sterilization were refused, these persons “should 
be able to choose a lifelong segregated existence in labor camps” (214). 
 Sterilization abuse has an analogue in the history of slavery; for black women 
under slave conditions, abortion was not a solution, but a way to ensure that no children 
of their own would be brought into slavery, physical abuse, and sexual abuse (1981, 204). 
At that time,  
abortions and infanticides were acts of desperation, motivated not by the 
biological birth process but by the oppressive conditions of slavery. Most of these 
women, no doubt, would have expressed their deepest resentment had someone 
hailed their abortions as a stepping stone toward freedom (205). 
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For Davis, in order to succeed and unite women, the abortion rights movement needed to 
critically examine the historical conditions of forced abortions and sterilizations and 
acknowledge the impact of these conditions on attitudes among people of color toward 
abortion rights. Including a condemnation of sterilization abuse would have saved the 
movement in the 1970s, Davis argues (1981, 215). 
 Davis introduces a distinction between birth control and population control; the 
latter was an outgrowth of eugenic thinking and defeated the “progressive potential” of 
the birth control movement, which should have “[advocated] for people of color...the 
individual right to birth control” but instead refused to address the historical complexities 
that made people of color the intended victims of eugenic birth control (1981, 215).  
 Persons with disabilities, like people of color, are historically the victims of 
compulsory sterilization laws in the U.S. and elsewhere around the world (Snyder and 
Mitchell 2006, 30, 86, 91, 127, 186). By the year 1963, it is estimated that 63,000 
individuals considered disabled had been “forcibly sterilized” in state institutions (86). 
Additionally, those with disabilities have fallen victim (and still fall victim) to a system 
of marginalizing institutionalization in sheltered workshops, nursing homes, and group 
homes that packs a triple threat of segregation, oppression, and underpaid labor (Diament 
2012a, 2012b). The sexuality of these individuals is today still controlled as part of their 
isolation in nursing homes and institutions. Snyder and Mitchell comment that, starting in 
the late 1890s through the turn of the century,  
Institutional practices explicitly sought to extract defective citizens from 
participation in the social mainstream. In this regard, institutions for the 
feebleminded … in conjunction with the passage of marriage and state 
sterilization laws, eugenics institutions participated in erasing disabled citizens 
from public view with the full sanction of state and federal governments” (2006, 
91). 
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The institutional practices in question also involved a type of incarceration which made 
“public intimacy” impossible, and “posed as safe, humane places for the ‘treatment’ of 
disabilities while operating essentially as research warehouses” (2006, 91). The continued 
history of forced and permanent institutionalization of persons with disabilities, working 
along with the compulsory sterilization laws that were common in the first half of the 
twentieth century, parallel the experience of people of color with sterilization and slavery. 
Both additionally experienced, and in the case of persons with disabilities, still 
experience restrictions on marriage as a result of these institutions and oppressive laws 
(cf. Snyder and Mitchell 2006, 127; see also the story of the soon-to-be-wed Paul 
Forziano and Hava Samuels, who are currently suing the federal government to live 
together after being refused that right by their separate group homes, in Heasley 2013). 
 The distinction between birth control and population control is very helpful in the 
case of disability rights; some disability rights activists and scholars now claim, just as 
people of color claimed in the 1970s, that what some view as the simple exercise of 
reproductive rights (genetic selection) is akin to genocide (e.g. Marca Bristo as quoted in 
Montgomery 1999). Just like in the former case, a full account of reproductive justice 
requires awareness and rejection of injustice, historical and current, perpetrated against 
persons with disabilities. A further parallel between the two: one justification for the 
racist application of what Davis refers to as “mass ‘birth control’” (1981, 204) was the 
supposed hyper-fertility and simultaneous poverty of people of color (209-210, 213-214). 
Similarly, those with assumed cognitive disability were long considered more fertile—
and thus in need of containment—than others: “the feebleminded woman who marries is 
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twice as prolific as the normal woman” (1912 document, as quoted in Snyder and 
Mitchell 2006, 186). 
 In personal correspondence, Sanger admitted that an ultimate goal of the birth 
control movement was to “exterminate the Negro population” (as quoted in Davis 19821, 
125). To draw my comparison to a close, I would like to note here Sharon Snyder and 
David Mitchell’s interpretation of the intent of marriage restriction, sterilization and 
segregation in the case of persons with disabilities. They write:  
The legacy of eugenics was sweeping, systematic, and violently pathologizing 
because it founded its interventions on the mistaken faith in the ability to 
eradicate what is believed to be undesirable degrees of physical and cognitive 
differences from the biological record (2006, 86). 
 
I argue that today’s societal push for genetic selection is based on the same mistaken 
faith, and that the faith involved relies on genetic determinism for its strength. Human 
enhancement through genetic selection is bent on the eradication of difference. On my 
view, any critique of or intervention upon only individuals who plan to reproduce will be 
insufficient and also highly problematic. Instead, powerful and effective critiques must be 
institutional. They must focus on the discourse and rhetoric that poses genetic selection as 
a choice for better future humans, framing it within reproductive liberty. This is parallel 
to the framing of involuntary sterilization within the abortion rights movement of the 
previous century. We must also focus on making our world more accessible to and 
accepting of diverse forms of embodiment.  
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A Restatement of the Disability Critique 
 
 Laura Hershey reminds us that the “idea that disability might someday be 
permanently eradicated—whether through prenatal screening and abortion [or 
otherwise]…has strong appeal for a society wary of spending resources on human needs” 
(as quoted in Saxton 2000, 153-4). Just as in the original disability critique, my version of 
the disability critique argues that misinformation and bias perpetuated by the influence of 
genetic determinism is one locus of concern and activism, and another is the assumption 
that one can control the opportunity range or quality of life of a child solely through 
genetic selection. I further argue that we must attend to social and political circumstances 
to bear out the promise of the disability critique. 
 For Sandra Shapshay, in an echo of Christine Overall’s distinction between 
preferences and practices, the only way to evaluate the practice as a social phenomenon is 
to step away from individual decision-making and examine the “collective irrationality” 
that can occur as a result of the unconsidered use of new genetic screening technologies 
and genetic abortion (2009, 92). Examining the character of the testing and screening as a 
social and medical practice is an exercise of utmost importance for the disability 
community, but it is also of utmost importance for reproductive liberty insofar as it can 
impact the quality of the information available to potential parents (even if this can never 
be perfect). Increasing the quality of conversations between doctors and potential parents 
on these topics is of vital importance for informed consent. 
 Here I identify the collective irrationality Shapshay points to as a facet or 
expression of genetic bias or belief in genetic determinism. Genetic indications for traits 
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are in reality part of a complex network that impact traits. A constant barrage of news 
reports about isolated genes for a variety of conditions and behaviors may cause the 
belief that a treatment, cure, or solution to a problem or perceived problem is at hand 
without evidence for this belief (cf. Asch 2003, 335-37; Buchanan et al. 2000, 23). For 
conversations between medical professionals and potential parents to succeed in building 
a space of informed consent, tendencies toward genetic determinism in the larger social 
world should be combated.  
The disability critique can expose pervasive injustices facing those in the 
disability community on the basis of belief in genetic determinism or geneticism and the 
pressure on potential parents to test for and select for, or selectively abort in response to, 
disability traits. As disability activist Laura Hershey writes, “We struggle for integration, 
access, and support services, yet our existence remains an unresolved question. Under the 
circumstances, we cannot expect society to guarantee and fund our full citizenship” (as 
quoted in Saxton 2000, 153-4). Social support of and investment in research regarding 
testing and selecting procedures for disability traits seems to preclude or at least 
complicate investment in accessible social spaces and needed services for existing 
persons with disabilities (cf. Asch 2003). 
 
Prenatal Prototypes and the Spreading Effect 
 I now employ two other related concepts helpful to my version of the disability 
critique. These complement the notion of synecdoche and its linkage with genetic 
determinism. First, Licia Carlson argues that the genetic profiles taken of an embryo or 
fetus encourage the development of “prenatal prototypes” (2002, 207-209). I introduced 
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prenatal prototypes in the Introduction. Carlson notes that some bioethicists, including 
Allan Buchanan and Laura Purdy, argue that the disability critique’s expressivist view—
the idea that selection against certain traits sends a harmful message—fails because of the 
“conceptual separation between traits and persons” (207). But, she argues, these critics 
have not done enough when they merely assert this separation, “given the complex 
relationship between disabling conditions and self-identity described by persons with 
disabilities” (207). Further, she argues, “this distinction between qualities and persons 
cannot be made at the prenatal level” (207, emphasis mine). She clarifies: “the separation 
between qualities and persons is impossible when the only means of eliminating the trait 
is abortion” (207). According to Carlson:  
The etiologic paradox of this new screening technology is that the genotype or 
chromosomal anomaly is visible prenatally, yet its phenotypic manifestation 
remains invisible until the child is born or years later (depending on the 
condition). I maintain that this indeterminacy creates the possibility of what I call 
prenatal prototypes: cases which are applied prenatally but are taken as 
representative of an entire class of future persons (208). 
 
Carlson’s prenatal prototypes dovetails with the concept of synecdoche; here, what is 
highlighted is partial but is taken as whole.  
Second, researchers in the social sciences have investigated the operation of 
“impact bias”, that is, “a tendency to overestimate the influence that events will have on 
one’s QOL [quality of life].” (Smith et al. 2008, 653). They found that in the case of 
kidney transplants, those who undergo the surgery overestimate the impact that the 
surgery will have on their quality of life (2008). In fact, they found that patients succumb 
to a “spreading effect”, that is,  
People may over generalize the improvement that would occur in health status to 
other areas. Indeed, we found that some of the most optimistic predictions for 
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improvements were in areas that did not change at all after transplant, such as 
employment and travel (657).  
 
The researchers suggest that it would be interesting to see how this “spreading effect” 
impacts quality of life prediction when it comes to perceived negative events, like 
disability – they wonder, will individuals “believe that disability will negatively affect 
areas of life that will actually be relatively unaffected?” (658). I argue that this is 
precisely what lies behind the encouragement of negative genetic selection; there is 
conceptual slippage between choosing against a particular, socially-stigmatized trait and 
choosing for a happy and free child.  
 Viewing genetic selection as a choice for a child unburdened by determination is 
an inflation of the power of the method. Endorsing synecdoche, employing “prenatal 
prototypes,” or succumbing to the spreading effect supports this view. Implicitly, these 
conceptual schemas link a genotype unmarked by disability directly to increased quality 
of life while de-prioritizing other factors. Contra Savulescu, medical doctors should take 
care not to contribute to or encourage existing social inequalities and stigma by explicitly 
advocating negative genetic selection in cases of disvalued differences (cf. Little 1998 on 
cultural complicity).  
 Screening methods and fetal diagnostics are a naming process, by which a fetus is 
connected to an already-existing group. A medical professional may explain to a potential 
parent that their baby will have Down syndrome, for example, which will call forward the 
figures of already-existing persons as a set of references. Marsha Saxton suggests that 
“When we refer to the fetus as a ‘disabled fetus’…the fetus is named as a member of our 
[disability] community” (2000, 159). If this calling forward were literal, involving 
meeting and getting to know actual members of the disability community, perhaps 
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progress could be made. The calling forward, however, is merely symbolic; medical 
professionals name by way of diagnosis, which involves medicalizing the predicted 
condition of the potential person.
60
 Saxton, referring to the work of Hershey, notes that 
“medical language reinforces negativity.” Hershey claims: “Terms like ‘fetal deformity’ 
and ‘defective fetus’ are deeply stigmatizing, carrying connotations of inadequacy and 
shame.” Medical practice, she contends, also tends to unfairly view the disabled as 
permanent patients who are “subject to the definitions and control of the medical 
profession” (as quoted and discussed in Saxton 2000, 149, cf. Scheer and Groce 1998, 
34). Again, critique of the medical model is helpful. Persons with disabilities are patients 
sometimes, as are persons who are abled. Viewing the disabled as permanent patients 
ignores universal vulnerability and contributes to a fundamental binary between the abled 
and disabled. Most importantly, it is marginalizing and inaccurate. 
 Saxton further argues that testing “demands that the mother or couple face the 
moral task of identifying a potentially and justifiably rejectable ‘other,’ the ‘defective 
fetus’” (2000, 158, emphasis mine). It is difficult to interpret Saxton’s argument with 
regard to the identification of an “other” without reference to genetic determinism or bias. 
Genetic determinism leaves out and covers over ableist culture by naturalizing it as 
biological and genetic—biological reductionism. Instead of recognizing the conceptual 
roots of abnormality in a restrictive view of species-typical functioning or an unjust 
commitment to genetic ideals, the medical model refers to genetic mutation and birth 
injuries. The construction of the other seems natural, a specific consequence of variation 
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 Parents whose newborn or infant children have a fatal condition request strongly that on-site medical 
professionals call their children by their given names (personal correspondence in April 2012 with Donna 
Patno, a nurse at the Cleveland Clinic Fetal Care Center in Ohio). I argue that this may be a reaction to 
naming via diagnosis. 
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from the normal genotype. But, once the normate and its varieties, including the genetic, 
are uncovered, work can begin to recognize its social construction. 
 Social and political goods for already-existing persons are at stake here, and are 
tied in an inverse relationship to the construction of a justifiably rejectable other. Overall, 
the practice of prenatal diagnosis and testing for disability traits can systematically 
perpetuate misinformation about disability (Parens and Asch 2000, 20-22; Saxton 2000, 
149). The combined effects of the practice, as described above, can curb the distribution 
of social and political goods to perceived members of disability communities.
61
 This is 
especially true in the current social and political context, in which persons with 
disabilities already experience marginalization and prejudice.  
 Without the guarantee that society will fund the citizenship of the disability 
community, there is a constant worry that already extremely scarce political and social 
goods (like appropriate housing, medical insurance, transportation and other goods and 
necessities) will disappear (cf. Hershey, above). It is with this worry at the forefront of 
my mind that I argue against the pernicious social and medical attitudes related to genetic 
determinism and synecdoche, which serve to uphold ableism and a false binary between 
the abled and disabled body. In this sense, members of the disability community demand 
respect that can only be expressed through a strategy of acceptance: embracing or 
celebrating disability as only one part of persons whose “lives—impairments and all—
are respectable, acceptable ways to live” (Asch 2000b, 243; cf. Silvers 2009). The 
disability critique need not seek to ban certain reproductive decisions. Instead, it critiques 
the misinformation and bias of an ableist culture. 
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 As James Charlton notes, individuals do not get to choose whether or not they are disabled—the choice is 
made for them in the social world (Riley 2005, 8-9). 
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Closing Thoughts on the Disability Critique 
The transhumanist utopias with which we began have specific goals (futures) in 
mind, and Savulescu makes these explicit in his argument promoting the principle of 
procreative beneficence. For him, reproduction is like playing the Wheel of Fortune 
(2001, 414) – and genetic profiles of embryos and fetuses can provide us with the 
information necessary to discover what future child has the best chance at the best life. 
The disability critique, ultimately, is a path toward questioning the leap that 
transhumanists and Savulescu make when they consider genetic selection a route to a 
better life. Savulescu supports genetic determinism when they claim that selecting 
embryos is a key move (and a morally obligatory move) in providing one’s children with 
the best chance at the best life (e.g. Savulescu 2001a). Savulescu’s moral principle of 
“procreative beneficence” requires pre-implantation genetic diagnosis combined with 
IVF or, alternatively, the (for him) less psychologically attractive for parents but still 
compliant procedure of prenatal testing and selective abortion (Savulescu 2001a, 2001b, 
2008). These are costly procedures that afford no guarantees. Again, Savulescu does not 
claim that embryo or fetus selection is a guarantor of happiness and health for an 
eventual child, rather, he claims that the procedure is like playing the Wheel of Fortune, 
in which unwanted traits like “bad tempers” and “asthma” are avoided by making the 
most of available information (Savulescu 2001a, 414, 417, 420). So, his focus with regard 
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to the aims of procreative beneficence is certainly a case of privileging genetic factors 
over others.
62
  
The encouragement of selection à la Savulescu has stigmatizing effects because it 
mimics the way stigma itself operates; that is, Savulescu disregards other factors 
impacting quality of life by focusing attention on particular, unwanted traits identifiable 
by genotype prior to birth. Stigma operates by fixating on the presence of a single trait, a 
trait then used to justify or provide a basis for social rejection. This is sociology’s 
“spreading effect” – an inversion of value which makes parts more important than 
wholes, mimicking synecdoche. The part or trait commands attention and makes it 
possible to ignore the claims of the whole (Goffman 1963, 5). Put briefly: stigma is 
operative when communities draw conclusions about the imperfection of wholes on the 
basis of the single traits (ibid., I return to stigma in chapter three). In the next and final 
section, I discuss how genetic counseling provides the framework for the transhumanist 
leap to genetic determinism and discuss the issue of choice in more detail.  
 
Enhancing Risk, Enhancing Disability 
 
 In this section, I introduce genetic counseling and analyze how it presents genetic 
information and makes this information operational. Genetic counseling is a key part of 
the medical and cultural context of genetic selection. In the United States, genetic 
counselors can be genetic experts, physicians or other medical professionals (Davis 2010, 
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 Given the more accurate “interactionist picture” of gene action (still influenced, de Melo-Martín notes, 
by genetic determinism—recall my discussion of genetic determinism in chapter one), even from a 
scientific point of view it is worse than myopic to focus on providing children with the best genes. Such a 
view focuses on genetic factors in a non-contextualized mode. 
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5). Or, they can be specifically trained through graduate study in accessing, presenting 
and interpreting genetic testing, earning a Master’s degree and certification by the 
American Board of Genetic Counseling (“KidsHealth” 2012). Genetic counselors assist 
individuals curious about their own genotype and family history or who seek information 
during the reproductive decision-making process.  
 Genetic counseling may also occur much less formally, as through the data 
provided by private companies like 23andMe which offer at-home testing kits. According 
to 23andMe’s website, “23andMe can help you manage risk and make informed 
decisions” (23andMe 2013). This service, in addition to its $99 at-home tests, offers an 
online “collection of education materials to guide you on your personal journey of 
genetic discovery. Explore our learning resources and discover the world of genetics” 
(“Genetics 101”). Sonia Gawel, a satisfied customer whose endorsement recently 
appeared on 23andMe’s homepage, writes that the company is “seriously amazing! 
Learning so much about my genetics/disease risk/traits, etc. Now I can design my 
lifestyle for prevention!” (review posted to website June 26, 2012). In other words, the 
genetic data Gawel received from the company may allow her to interpret the risk posed 
by certain activities on an individual level (a healthy diet and exercise may help alleviate 
the genetic predisposition to cardiovascular disease) and bring information about her 
traits to the table when it comes time to reproduce. As I mentioned at the beginning of the 
chapter, genetic counselors can help those with known conditions (like hereditary 
dwarfism) understand how these traits may appear among future children.  
  Genetic counseling in formal settings is ruled by multiple strong norms of 
professional conduct. I will discuss two of the most important norms here. First, genetic 
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counselors reportedly value and seek to maintain the autonomy of their clients above all 
else, a fact which Dena Davis claims is easily explained by a handful of factors, including 
awareness of the threat of coercion (informed by cultural knowledge of eugenic history) 
and the fact that many consider reproductive decision-making to be an extremely private 
affair (1997, 7 and 2010, 13-17). Second, genetic counselors are committed to 
nondirective counseling, as stated in the Code of Ethics of the National Society of 
Genetic Counselors (quoted Davis 1997, 8). Nondirective counseling is articulated by the 
profession as the presentation of facts and the exploration and realization of parental 
values without interference or input stemming from counselor values or outside influence 
(quoted Davis 1997, 8). 
 There are two ways to read the concept of choice (and, therefore, autonomy) in 
the arena of genetic counseling. First, through the work of Anne Waldschmidt, I will 
consider the production of an autonomous subject who can choose to avoid risk (“Now I 
can design my lifestyle for prevention!”). Second, I will consider Dena Davis’ argument 
that the choice parents enjoy with regard to reproduction is at times trumped by a child’s 
own right to a future autonomy, an “open future.” Exploring the play of choice in these 
two ways will allow us to uncover the mythos of the disabled body as a site of risk, and 
the unmarked or abled body as a site of choice. This leads me to the conclusion that in the 
logic of biology as destiny, the disabled and abled bodies are figured as opposites. I will 
also describe the way in which the fetus is presented as a site of risk—an “impaired 
fetus” to women or partner reproducers. I conclude that the milieu of prenatal testing and 
genetic counseling is a realm that “enhances” the concepts of risk and disability. 
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 Anne Waldschmidt’s essay “Who is Normal? Who is Deviant?” brings the 
practice and influence of genetic counseling into view through a Foucauldian framework 
of governmentality (Waldschmidt 2005). Foucault’s work, again, is meant to capture the 
operation of normalizing influences in the creation of the subject and the boundaries and 
character of subjectivity. In the case of genetic counseling, “risk management” becomes 
the management of the subject and the development of the roles of parent, impaired fetus, 
and “value-free” counseling in a network of actuarial thinking. 
Waldschmidt insists on a distinction between “normativity” and “normality”, 
arguing that normativity “refers to the power of social and legal norms that are imposed 
upon people” while normality “involves comparing people with each other in light of a 
standard” (2005, 193). While the former no longer has great purchase in neoliberal 
societies which focus upon autonomy, the latter appears and operates in “data-oriented 
societies” (194). Statistical data comparing subjects has a tight relationship with norms; 
“evaluations and expectations” (notice: not “value judgments”) tag along after statistics 
themselves are crunched and publicized (194). 
 As we have seen, the contemporary field of genetic counseling relies 
fundamentally upon the principle of client (parent) autonomy, which is upheld through 
nondirective counseling (Davis 1997, 8). According to Waldschmidt, the practice 
maintains governing force over clients through normality. Genetic counseling presents 
medical, hereditary, and age-related statistics along with risk of deviation and associated 
costs to the potential parents and requires decisive action in response to those statistics. 
“Evaluations and expectations” are communicated and comparisons within the population 
are produced, but no value judgments are expressed by the counselor. The counselor 
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expects the potential or actual reproducer to express their autonomy by taking action, and 
the expected action which best expresses autonomy in this context necessarily involves 
removing oneself from a field of perceived risk or protecting oneself against risk in some 
way (Waldschmidt 2005, 205). Not acting upon received genetic information can be seen 
as a refusal to exercise autonomy. Risk transforms the counseled individuals into specific 
subjects: autonomous subjects who can choose against “misfortune” by utilizing the 
platform of “statistical calculation” (204-205, cf. Morrison 2008). 
 In a hypothetical situation built from counseling experience, genetic counselor 
Dena Davis presents a case of risk communication and decision-making carried out 
between counselors and an older, relatively uninformed couple, Missie and Hank. 
Medical experts had determined from ultrasounds that the fetus Missie was carrying 
likely had spina bifida, a condition encompassing a range of impacts (2010, 9). While the 
experts were unsure whether the fetus would have spina bifida and were also unsure 
about how severe such the impact of this condition would be, Missie sought certainty. 
Remember, here, Carlson’s prenatal prototypes, which are taken as guiding even when 
fundamentally indeterminant. 
Davis reports that “the counselors, among themselves, had agreed that it was 
probably in Missie’s best interest to abort. They had a ‘gut sense’ that the fetus was 
damaged, despite the slight chance that it was healthy” (2010, 10). After asking without 
success for more information, Missie told them: “Okay, I’ll do whatever you tell me. Tell 
me what to do” (10). In response, “the counselors gently but firmly declined” to give 
Missie direction, and so eventually she made an appointment for an abortion, which the 
counselors considered provisional until Missie confirmed it from home (10). Despite 
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Missie’s repeatedly expressed desperation for advice, the counselors refused to provide it, 
instead communicating only statistics and the prenatal prototype. Missie used this 
information to make her “autonomous” decision, which the counselors believed they had 
safeguarded by way of the communication of statistics only in compliance with their 
norm of non-directive counseling. 
 To analyze the context of Missie’s decision, note that Missie was to absorb the 
possibility of risk and respond to it in an expression of (highly individualized) autonomy. 
She sought to connect personally with others in the context of her decision-making but 
was refused for fear of interrupting her autonomy. Waldschmidt evaluates the role of risk 
in communication between genetic counselors and potential mothers. She argues that the 
concept and deployment of risk establishes a gloss of neutrality and objectivity in genetic 
counseling, thus obviating the need for counselors to give “explicit advice” to mothers 
but still communicating a specific message about appropriate action (204). She argues 
that contrary to common perceptions of objectivity, statistical data developed regarding 
risks are constructed in highly contingent ways and can be expressed in a variety of forms 
which have predictable affective impacts on the individual to whom they are 
communicated (199-203). Her argument is supported by the narratives of women who are 
given or who have sought genetic counseling (Parens and Asch, 2000, 7; see also Saxton 
2000).  
 Further, according to Waldschmidt, “risk” attaches itself to bodies (fetuses and 
mothers) through the practice of prenatal diagnostics which have been the subject of this 
chapter so far (197). She calls this the “individualization of risk” and argues that it 
operates as a “normalizing technique” in the case of decision-making (198). Autonomous 
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and individualized decision-making, the goal of genetic counseling, is a complex process 
of situating oneself alongside or within a range of statistical normality and participating 
in the avoidance or management of risk. She writes: “In the past, experts could give 
direct advice; in the days of neoliberal government, however, they may only help clients 
to identify their own positions in the broad terrain of normality and deviation” (198). 
Sonia Gawel’s endorsement of 23andMe testifies to this focus on risk when Gawel 
equates risk with genetic data itself, enthusing that she is: “Learning so much about my 
genetics/disease risk/traits, etc.” Gawel takes up the role of risk management when she 
writes: “Now I can design my lifestyle for prevention!” 
 So, the body is a site of risk, and risk is most often interpreted as dangerous threat 
by those who encounter it or are told they may be susceptible to it. Any predisposition or 
tested trait deviating from a norm within a population becomes a risk and marks the body 
through prenatal diagnostics. Disabled embodiment—and even the bodies of mothers 
themselves, who should undergo genetic counseling even without any prior indications—
becomes inherently risky, a dangerous threat. Recall that the newest diagnostic testing 
procedures merely compare fetal DNA to DNA from a presumptively normal person who 
stands in for a canonical genotype. Any deviance is risk—tracking individual linkages 
between genotype and trait becomes unnecessary. 
Increasingly, at-home genetic testing kits (direct-to-consumer, or DTC kits) are 
being made available. The availability and marketing of these kits highlights the focus on 
autonomy and privacy that is made so paramount within the field of genetic counseling. It 
also represents an effort to provide individuals with as much data as possible so they can 
participate in autonomous decision-making, especially with regard to reproduction. But, 
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to the contrary, Waldschmidt shows that the communication of statistical risk governs 
and normalizes the subject, which means that this increasing individualization and 
privacy promotes autonomy only on the surface.  Continuing emphasis on individual 
choice and the proliferation of individualized data regarding genetics obscures the 
pointed goals of testing and screening. Genetic data is meant to provide individuals with 
tools toward ends already specified in medical and popular culture. These ends are the 
avoidance or elimination of certain conditions, seen through the imperfect (partial) lens 
of genotype.  
Prototypes are here made operational. Writes Waldschmidt: 
statistics and prognoses are presented to real people, people who face real 
decisions and constraints - women who must quickly decide whether they wish to 
carry an unborn child to term, or abort it. And, of course, the normality-risk 
concept and the entire (insurance) setting within which the risk is presented do not 
allow any doubt about what kind of decision is expected from the individual 
woman: the decision not to have a child with a congenital impairment (2005, 
205).  
 
Waldschmidt exposes the value system at the root of the “facts” of heredity and genetic 
statistical risk. Employing the norms of genetic counseling requires a strong distinction 
between facts and values, but this distinction is unfounded. Remember the gut instincts 
held by the genetic counselors in Missie’s case. Genetic data as presented in counseling 
sessions is anything but value-free and nondirective. Risk, used to communicate complex 
statistics, is a concept with affective resonance. It presents the probable or potential end 
state as a dangerous threat to be avoided, even when this characterization is unjustified.    
 Beyond acceptance that deviance is to be avoided, there is little significant 
reflection about what conditions should be targeted and what tests are important to 
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develop and invest in.
63
 The most frequently screened condition, Down syndrome, is 
targeted again and again as an undesirable condition, yet is not fatal or painful. Nemours, 
a pediatric medical system with hospitals in several states, maintains a website focused 
on children’s health which provides information regarding genetic counseling for curious 
parents. This resource has the following advice to offer potential parents: “Experts 
recommend that all pregnant women, regardless of age or circumstance, be offered 
genetic counseling and testing to screen for Down syndrome” (“KidsHealth” 2012). 
Justification for this recommendation is not provided. And misleading statistics and 
outdated information regarding the cost of raising a child with Down syndrome have 
been used in recent years. For example, potential parents have been advised that their 
child may be either relatively typical cognitively or severely cognitively limited. This 
poses the chances of severe cognitive limitation as if it were 50 percent. But, in reality, 
the chances of severe cognitive limitation for a person with genetic indication for Down 
syndrome are below 5 percent (Elkins and Brown 1995, 18 cited Carlson 2002, 209). In 
fact, according to Carlson, “seventy-five to ninety percent of persons with Down 
syndrome are capable of living independently of their families and are employable as 
adults” (2002, 209). 
 Procreative beneficence à la Julian Savulescu could be brought forward as one 
strategy useful for reflection about what conditions to target and the avoidance of 
repeated prejudices. But, as I have already argued, this principle is laced with genetic bias 
                                                          
63
 In a separate register, testing can be undertaken on behalf of the fetus. For example, in the case of fetal 
diagnosis of PKU, dietary changes alone can almost erase the impact that this metabolic disorder can have 
on bodily function. These dietary changes cannot be made unless doctors and parents are aware of the 
diagnosis.  A second example is Rh negative disease, which refers to the conditions in the womb when the 
mother has a negative blood type and the fetus has a positive blood type. The mother’s body has an auto-
immune reaction to the fetus’s blood and begins to destroy the fetus’s red blood cells (Gale 2012). Lacking 
this information gleaned through amniocentesis, the condition is fatal immediately after birth. 
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and also fails to remedy the issue of repeated and reinforced existing prejudice. 
Procreative beneficence will consistently recommend to a potential reproducer that the 
best choice is to have a child who will be favored in existing society. Savulescu fully 
admits this result, but denies that such choices would likely produce significant inequality 
(defined, it seems, by population count) and if the choices did do so, procreative 
beneficence would require that new choices be made (2001b, 423). 
 Savulescu uses sex selection as an example, stating that a culture favoring males 
and selecting for males would eventually need to select for females, otherwise the 
privileged position of masculinity would actually be undesirable (because there would be 
no females to copulate with) (2001b, 423). But this is an unhelpful response to critics, 
because if Savulescu had used a different example (like race or disability) he would not 
be able to come to the same conclusions. In the case of persons with disabilities, because 
they experience societal stigma, their existence is not desirable on Savulescu’s view and 
should be avoided as a matter of moral obligation. There are no emergent reasons to 
reverse course in the most cases decided by stigma.  
 Savulescu further argues that improving social life through tackling social 
inequalities and prejudices should not be attempted by way of reproductive decision-
making, but this statement probably contradicts his view given that he attempts to 
improve individual lives through reproductive decision-making (2001b, 423). Surely it 
begs credulity for Savulescu to argue that he means this “improvement” to have no effect 
beyond the individual level. And, if his interest in individual improvement is not 
informed by social conditions, then it is cause for even greater concern—he fails to 
recognize the importance of social conditions for happiness.  
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 Another conceptual option that might assist in the determination of what tests and 
screening procedures should be developed is the aforementioned “right to an open future” 
first promulgated by Joel Feinberg in 1980. The “right to an open future” is a bundle of 
rights that includes rights held “in trust” – those that a child cannot yet exercise, but 
which should be protected for future use (1980, 125). Examples include the exercise of 
religion, thought to be the arena of adults, or reproductive rights. This bundle of rights 
meant to ensure future autonomy and, therefore, an adult life with the most options or 
opportunities to articulate and pursue various versions of the good life. Translated into a 
genetic sense, violations of the right to an open future could include refusing to test for 
certain disease or non-disease traits, or choosing to create a child with what might be 
considered a limitation or risk. Savulescu’s procreative beneficence is meant to preclude 
precisely these assumed violations, among others. 
Dena Davis picks up on this concept; she believes that genetic counselors and 
doctors should continue to respect parental autonomy in counseling settings, but also 
asserts that respect and protection of autonomy must not stop there (1997 e.g. 7-8, and 
2010). Davis argues that a child’s future autonomy must also be respected and protected, 
and that sometimes concerns for the child must trump the strong norms of value-free 
information and nondirective counseling. Davis asserts that genetic counselors are rightly 
troubled when potential parents may deliberately seek what most consider the risks of 
reproduction: deafness, for example, or hereditary Achondroplasia (1997, 8).  
Specifically, she considers the dilemma posed to genetic counselors in the case of Deaf
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 Deaf with a capital “D” denotes members of Deaf culture who see their status as deaf as neutral and 
consider themselves part of a political minority. 
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parents who wish to select for a deaf child and would potentially reject a “healthy” 
child.
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Davis worries that “elevating respect for patient autonomy above all other values” 
may make it “difficult to give proper weight to other factors, such as human suffering” 
and would perhaps be misleading in this case (1997, 7). She wants to reintroduce “space 
in which to give proper attention to the moral claims of the future child” (7).  Davis re-
frames the issue at hand, whether or not it is wrong to deliberately create a deaf child, as 
pitting “parental autonomy” against the “child’s future autonomy” (8). In this case, she 
believes that the child’s future autonomy is the most important factor and the value-free 
counseling that genetic counselors usually employ should be abandoned. The genetic 
counselor should refuse to help the Deaf parents. 
Yet, in line with what I have argued so far, this assumes that “the right to an open 
future” is the purview of the abled body, a body which becomes the imagined site of 
undetermined choice. It is as if the open future is chosen and the closed future is 
discarded when one chooses negative genetic selection. This logic works only if one 
indulges heavily in genetic determinism and believes that prenatal prototypes, or single 
traits, give fully flowered information regarding a future child. This logic of the 
“spreading effect” also operates on the basis of a hierarchy between abled and disabled 
bodies – the marked body will always have a “more closed” future on this view, a 
presumption that is untenable. Some may venture that a child with Down syndrome will 
have fewer opportunities than a neurotypical child; but, even this assertion meets with 
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note that I think the desire common among parents in Deaf culture to have deaf children can be expressive 
of the troubling aspects of synecdoche. 
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difficulty. Any particular child with Down syndrome could have more opportunities and 
pleasures than any particular “neurotypical” child, because opportunities and pleasures 
are structured by social reception, which can be hostile or welcoming. The “right to an 
open future,” translated in the genetic sense while turning one’s back on social factors, 
leads one to behave as though disability is equal to limitation and unmarked or abled 
bodies are the privileged site of choice.
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The woman or potential parent is constructed by the field of genetic counseling 
and the availability of prenatal diagnostics as a “risk manager”—an autonomous agent 
who responds to and manages risk. But I argue along with Waldschmidt that in these 
processes and practices risk attaches to bodies themselves. For instance, the woman’s 
body becomes risky when she undergoes testing for genetic traits she may pass on to 
offspring. Furthermore, the fetus is the primary site of risk in these schemes. A new 
discursive category—the “impaired fetus” (the defective fetus) is brought into focus and 
augmented by these practices and innovations in these practices. While strong social 
models of disability tend to separate impairment and disability (in an echo of the 
construction of sex and gender) in order to argue that disability is socially constructed 
while impairment is not, it is important to notice that here impairment is socially-
constructed via the establishment of the fetus as a site of risk and deviance (Tremain 
2006).
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 For an excellent feminist critique of the right to an open future, see Claudia Mills’ “The Child’s Right to 
an Open Future?” (2003). 
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 For more on the topic of risks, pregnancy and biopolitics from feminist perspectives see the work of 
Catherine Mills (2011) and Lorna Weir (1996, 2006). 
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Prenatal testing and selection strategies are not an enhancement strategy for 
individuals, as transhumanists imagine. Instead, these practices merely “enhance” notions 
of risk and notions of disability—that is, they amp them up, attach them with increased 
meaning, and link their management to the expression of reproductive autonomy in 
medical contexts. Extensive modes of normalization attend these practices. Autonomy is 
expressed by asking the question: what makes a livable life? And answering: a life 
without risk.  
 
Rationing 
 
Actuarial thinking in genetic counseling settings is heightened by systems of 
medical resource rationing. Stigma against persons with disabilities in the context of 
genetic determinism is especially important to discuss because of increased certainty, 
especially in the United States, that rationing health care is necessary, and because of 
various proposed means by which this rationing would be carried out (e.g. Fleck 2009). 
The technical meaning of “quality of life,” along with its measure, QALYs (Quality-
Adjusted Life Years), was developed in the context of rationing and questions regarding 
the efficiency of health care. These quantitative concepts have nothing to do with 
subjective satisfaction; they are deployed to measure health care efficacy. A system of 
objective measures estimating quality of life calls into question, especially, the provision 
of expensive health care measures to ill, disabled, and elderly persons (Amundson 2006). 
Savulescu has explicitly called into question the appeal of equality of access when he 
considers cardiac care for persons with Down syndrome (2001c). Meanwhile, a recent 
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“secret shopper” style study shows that persons using wheelchairs are already denied 
access to subspecialty medical care (gynecology and psychiatry, among others), although 
no strong rationing procedures currently exist (Lagu et al. 2013). This is true despite the 
legal provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act meant to protect equal access. 
The study found:  
Of 256 practices, 56 (22%) reported that they could not accommodate the patient, 
9 (4%) reported that the building was inaccessible, 47 (18%) reported inability to 
transfer a patient from a wheelchair to an examination table, and 22 (9%) reported 
use of height-adjustable tables or a lift for transfer. Gynecology was the 
subspecialty with the highest rate of inaccessible practices (44%). (Lagu et al. 
2013, 441) 
 
Today’s rationing conversations occur in an environment which already excludes and 
therefore stigmatizes persons with disabilities.  
 With regard to genetic enhancement and selection, bald cost-benefit analyses are 
often made. For instance, bioethicist Daniel Brock, in a talk regarding the prevention of 
“severe disabilities,” argued that “it’s a mistake to think that the social and economic 
costs are not a legitimate concern in this context” (quoted in Tremain 2006, n. 3).
 Genetic screening for Fragile-X, a genetic indication that can cause cognitive 
impairment but does not always cause it, was undertaken in the 90s under explicitly 
economic terms. Proponents in Colorado noted that “the savings for the state” resulting 
from testing and selective abortion would be tremendous” compared to the cost of caring 
for those with cognitive impairment connected to the presence of Fragile-X (Nelson and 
Lindee 1995, 162-163). Alison Piepmeier, who interviewed women choosing to continue 
carrying a fetus which tested positively for indications connected to Down syndrome, 
writes: “One mother I interviewed was told by her obstetrician, “the quickest, cheapest 
way to solve this problem is to terminate the pregnancy” (Piepmeier 2013, emphasis 
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mine). In 1989, an insurance company refused to cover the child resulting from a fetus 
which tested positively for cystic fibrosis (a monogenetic disease), citing the fact that the 
child would have a pre-existing condition (Thompson 1989).  
 The certainty of particular conditions and related characteristics for potential 
children varies according to what condition one considers and the specific tests and 
screening procedures applied. But, the influence of genetic determinism undergirds the 
cost-benefit analysis and rationing philosophy that drives and motivates testing and 
screening in public policy arenas. Genetic information must be taken very seriously as 
compared to environmental, behavioral, and other factors in order for the conclusions of 
such cost-benefit analyses to make sense. One must be reasonably certain that costs will 
decrease as a result of testing and selection and must downplay the costs of health care 
for “unmarked” fetuses (those that pass testing and selection procedures). This type of 
actuarial thinking is highly suspect and, as I have argued in these pages, is structured by 
the idea that disability is a genetic concept that can be rooted out. Its everyday usage and 
acceptability structures disability as a risk (of pregnancy, of genetic deviance) and so 
persons with disabilities become the inhabitants of risky and preventable bodies, the 
blame for which lies outside of social and political institutions. 
 
Conclusion 
 
A sustained critique of the promotion of genetic selection as a strategy of 
enhancement is necessary for feminist disability scholarship. It can expand issues of 
reproductive choice to those of reproductive justice and attend to the normalization 
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attendant upon prenatal testing practices. In the preceding pages, I continued my 
consideration of the role of genetic determinism in discourse regarding medical 
interventions. I used the notion of genetic determinism in a restatement of the Adrienne 
Asch’s disability critique. I also strengthened the critique through a renewed focus on 
institutions and social conditions. In the course of my discussion, I also defended the 
original disability critique against the objection that it aims to curtail reproductive liberty.  
In conclusion, I name a central feature of utopian transhumanist futures: a chosen 
subject, selected because it is not marked by disability and so is thought to be impervious 
to chance. According to Mannheim, utopian thinking is focused on objects that do not 
exist. In the general case, utopian thinking obscures the present state of affairs by wishing 
fervently for a non-existing state of affairs. Transhumanist utopian thinking, I argue, 
focuses on a subject that is not real, a fantastic subject; that is, what I will now call the 
techno-liberal subject. The most pernicious feature of transhumanist utopian thinking is 
that the non-existent subject obscures and devalues the lives of all embodied persons. It 
wishes fervently for a subject whose absolute autonomy is ensured via choice-making 
mediated through technology. Through the lens of this wish, embodiment becomes 
inherently risky and undesirable. The limitations of embodiment are dramatized and 
villainized in transhumanist thinking.  
One method used by Dena Davis, a genetic counselor, to justify choosing children 
in prenatal diagnostic or selection contexts is the concept of a “right to an open future,” 
which I introduced above. I argue that this conceptual structure is key to understanding 
the specific utopianism of transhumanism. No person can have an unencumbered and 
individual right to an open future, because such a thing would imply that chance plays no 
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role and an absolute proliferation of choice is available to that individual. Inhabiting an 
open future is the underlying goal of enhancement, and the vision is created without 
reference to holding a future in common, open because we can be in control of it together. 
The transhumanist version of utopia is peopled by subjects autonomous in that they are 
undetermined by others—but mediated by technology, that is, techno-liberal subjects. 
Transhumanists seek a kind of absolute freedom, chosen and controlled individually. 
In this vein, parents are urged to make choices in order to ensure the choice-
making capability of their future children—i.e., unencumbered space for individual 
autonomy. In other words, they are asked to determine what child they will have so that 
the child will be undetermined. Popular focus in bioethics on “designer children” 
obfuscates the point, since focusing on the “designed” character of progeny cannot 
capture the overarching quest for non-determination. There is a move here from urging 
reproducers to seek comparatively enhanced choice-making capabilities in future children 
(better, more, greater, most opportunity) to urging reproducers to seek an absolute 
choice-making character for their future child ensuring that child will experience no 
interference from chance. For the transhumanist, in order to achieve this end, the risks of 
embodiment must be subverted through reproductive choice-making. Choice-making is 
both the goal and the means of enhancement. To control the future and force it “open,” 
the transhumanist must absolutely determine it and attempt to preclude determination 
from any other source (anything or anyone else). The future is open to me when it is 
chosen by me. 
Disability traits are risks – possible limitations on future freedoms. The 
transhumanist subject, by contrast, must be one that engenders no risks. A body carrying 
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a disability trait, then, is this subject’s opposite; it is viewed purely as risk through 
genetic counseling and figured as avoidable determination. Traits that can be screened in 
utero are seen as limiting; the future for the “impaired fetus” is imagined as a history 
already written—the transhumanists close this future.  Un-enhanced bodies, then, seem to 
be locked in a field of risk. In sum, transhumanists seek to improve life through 
biotechnology. But the notion transhumanists have of improvement is rooted in utopia, 
specifically a utopian subject: the techno-liberal individual. This is, of course, an overly 
narrow and exacting version of what a good and fulfilling life looks like. The choice for 
the techno-liberal subject is a choice against certain kinds of bodies in the hope of 
improving life—positive and negative eugenics are here paired together. The 
transhumanists make a biological reduction while at the same time attempting to 
transcend the physical. 
My discussion throughout this chapter, especially my presentation of the 
disability critique, leads to a more in-depth discussion of disability and a variety of 
models of disability, which I pursue in chapter three. I will consider a variety of models 
used to describe disability. I include the social model, employed in this chapter as part of 
the original disability critique, and the medical model, which I have argued is closely 
related to the fallacy of genetic determinism and which naturalizes the stigma of 
disability. I will argue that the “cultural model” of disability, with its Foucauldian roots, 
is the most helpful available model of disability. I also describe social constructions of 
disability and end with a focus on the issue of stigma.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
MODELS OF DISABILITY: MEDICAL, SOCIAL, POLITICAL 
 
“I am constantly asked, after I have argued that disability is simply part of the human 
condition and intrinsically no better or worse than other aspects of that condition, if we 
shouldn’t work to prevent disability. The expected coup de grâce is usually, shouldn’t we 
do everything we can to prevent the birth of babies with disabilities? I answer quite 
seriously that this is an abstract question to me. What preconceptions do we start with, I 
ask in return? What particular social conditions will these particular kids grow up in? 
Then I pose a question in return. If we can prove statistically, I ask, that most baby girls 
born in certain districts of New York, Los Angeles, or Chicago or in any number of 
places throughout the Third World will have difficult lives, do we then start trying to 
prevent baby girls from being born? Of course not. We work to change the social reality 
those children live in. The fact that most children with disabilities face difficult lives has 
much more to do with the social environments they live in than their intrinsic physical or 
mental qualities. So the question of prevention always remains a question abstracted out 
of real life.”  
James Charlton, Nothing About Us Without Us (1998) 
 
“We also know that what is a severe impairment and a mild impairment, what is a 
disability and what is not, is frequently determined by the way in which the persons with 
impairments are viewed.”  
 
Eva Kittay, “The Ethics of Philosophizing” (2009) 
 
“The risk of basing identity in biology is that supposed biological difference has often 
been used to justify inferiority, whether in the case of black people, women, lesbians and 
gays, or disabled people.” 
 
Tom Shakespeare and Mark Erickson, “Different Strokes” (2001) 
 
 In this chapter, I consider many competing models of disability. In the previous 
chapter, I troubled transhumanist promotion of genetic selection as a moral obligation 
and discussed prenatal testing and screening procedures. I take the transhumanist fantasy 
to be centered upon a chosen subject that is opposed to the risky disabled subject, so it is 
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important now to linger on who counts as a disabled subject and what I mean by 
disability. I use the cultural model of disability and the concept of stigma in order to 
navigate these issues and argue that disability is deeply socially constructed, especially 
insofar as those marked as disabled are subject to systematic exclusions. The disability 
community can be traced by tracking stigma. While the disability community can be 
viewed politically as a minority community, like other groups that have sought civil 
rights and equal treatment, it is important to avoid the ways that a pervasive “minority 
model” might contribute to the marginalization of persons with disabilities and positions 
them as a competing group that participates in policing the border between disability and 
ability.
68
 In what follows, I discuss this and other issues in order to explore the 
consequences of different ways of thinking “disability” and its social construction.  
   
Thinking Disability 
 
 To further motivate the problem of defining disability, I will analyze Dena Davis’ 
work on genetic counseling, particularly her latest book, Genetic Dilemmas (2010). In it, 
she slips between different ways of conceiving disability in a way that will help us get 
clear on what some of the main difficulties are in conceiving disability.  
 As discussed in the previous chapter, Davis makes explicit what kind of harm she 
believes can be connected to disability when disability is chosen by parents; specifically, 
a futural harm of narrowed possibilities, a closing-off of the so-called right to an open 
future (e.g. 2010, 59-60; 1997, 14). But she also seems to peg harm as an endemic part of 
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her definition of disability, especially when she talks about her primary case study: 
deafness. For instance, as a response to the Deaf community’s self-identification as a 
cultural minority, Davis writes: “On the other side of the argument is the evidence that 
deafness is a very serious disability. Deaf people have incomes thirty to forty percent 
below the national average. The state of education for the deaf is unacceptable by 
anyone’s standards; the typical deaf student graduates from high school unable to read a 
newspaper” (1997, 12-13). But how are these statistics evidence of disability? Given a 
context in which most deaf students are not provided with an interpreter in the 
classroom,
69
 it seems that the statistics Davis lays out here are merely evidence of 
prejudice and stigma and do not signal something inherent that one might call 
“disability.” We could parallel these statistics with statistics regarding, for example, the 
low-income status or imprisonment rates of racial and ethnic minorities—these numbers 
are evidence of prejudice, not direct results of features such as the color of one’s skin, 
one’s lineage, or one’s birthplace. Similarly, it is not the fact of deafness that leads to the 
educational difficulties Davis mentions; instead, it is a lack of accommodation. Also, note 
that Davis is opposing “cultural minority” with “disability”—she assumes that the two 
concepts cannot overlap, without interrogating them. 
 Another example of the way Davis slips between the notion of disability and harm 
is apparent in the following passage: “Ethically, we would certainly include destroying 
someone’s hearing as being a ‘harm’; legally, one would undoubtedly receive 
compensation if one were rendered deaf due to someone else’s negligence. Many deaf 
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people, however, have recently been arguing that deafness is not a disability at all, but a 
linguistic and cultural identity” (2010, 65, emphasis mine). So, if deafness is not a 
disability for the Deaf community, Davis seems to be saying, they would not consider it 
harmful – therefore, disability and harm are employed here as one and the same thing. 
 Finally, Davis considers the famous Gallaudet University movement in 1988, 
when University students and faculty demanded a Deaf president for Gallaudet, 
protesting the appointment of a hearing president made by the board of trustees (The 
“Deaf President Now” campaign). Of it, she writes: “Looking at photographs taken 
during those tumultuous weeks, it is clear that the Gallaudet students regarded themselves 
as one more oppressed minority, not as a disabled group” (2010, 65). Here, Davis 
opposes the concepts of “oppressed minority” and “disabled group” as if it were 
impossible for one collective to be both at the same time. This is another slippage: if 
Davis believes these two ways of describing a group are mutually exclusive, she fails to 
make her reasons explicit. 
 Because Davis focuses on Deaf culture, it’s important to note that Davis is correct 
when she asserts that “many deaf people, however, have recently been arguing that 
deafness is a not a disability at all, but a linguistic and cultural identity” (2010, 65). In 
other words, at least some deaf persons, who identify as part of the Deaf community, 
reject the label of disability. The questions we are left with include: what is disability? Is 
it embodied “harm”? Does it make protest impossible? If disability culture exists, does 
that make it necessary to shed the label of “disability,” as some in the Deaf community 
and Davis seem to believe? Why does identifying as “disabled” seem to eclipse and 
delimit other identities which a person might take up? 
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 As we have seen, one of the reasons defining disability and working with 
disability as a political identity is a difficult task is that current and historical prejudice 
must be taken into account (cf. Parens and Asch 2000, 5). For many in the disability 
rights community, “discrimination results when people in one group fail to imagine that 
people in some ‘other’ group lead lives as rich and complex as their own” (8). Activist 
William J. Peace has argued that the confines of the current euthanasia debate, which 
tends to assume that death is preferable to living a life with disability, expresses this 
failure of the imagination (2012). Surely, however, as he also argues elsewhere, dismal 
institutional failures and a lack of social responsiveness are also to blame and can be 
sources for these imaginative failures (2013a, 2013b). At the very least, it is clear that the 
notion of disability is fraught with value judgments and subject to deep and multiple 
exclusions; I drew an alternative eugenic history of a group of these judgments in the first 
chapter. To call someone disabled involves just as much an evaluative judgment as a 
description. Imported into the concept are complex and shifting stereotypes that are 
difficult to reverse. And, politically, the negativity connected to illness and limitations 
connected to disability makes politically ironic “reversal” moves open to other groups, 
like people of color, much harder to accomplish. Disability theorist Irving Zola writes of 
disabled activists: “Could they yell, ‘Long live cancer’ ‘Up with multiple sclerosis’ ‘I’m 
glad I had polio!’ ‘Don’t you wish you were blind?’” (1993, 168).  
 Further, isolation issues among persons with disabilities make it difficult for 
individuals to organize together. A person may be integrated with family or friends who 
may not and likely do not share their disability, and so, writes Zola, “they are socialized 
into the world of the ‘normal’ with all its values, prejudices and vocabulary” (1993, 167). 
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This particular kind of isolation is somewhat unique to the case of disability, although 
others—including those who identify or are identified with excluded sexual identity—
will share in the problem of isolation. 
 Another reason discussion of disability generally is so difficult is that, if disability 
as a phenomenon at least somehow begins in traits borne by the body, there are no 
uncontested frameworks for which traits count as disabilities—what about mental illness 
and alcoholism? Furthermore, many tend to think of disability traits as existing along a 
spectrum from more to less serious or debilitating, an inherited tendency of looking at 
disability through a medical lens (I discuss the “medical model” in detail below). So, 
layered on top of the difficulty of saying whether someone with diabetes, for example, 
has a disability, we also encounter the difficulty of describing which, among a variety of 
traits, are considered “serious” disabilities. And, of course, professionals with power to 
impact the shape of discourse, like the genetic counselors I discussed in the previous 
chapter, cannot agree, and the very act of creating these types of hierarchies and 
taxonomies shapes the contours of disability, creating gradations of stigma and a variety 
of responses. According to Parens and Asch, “genetics professionals have very different 
ideas of what is and what is not” a trait that is significantly disabling (2000, 9, cf. 261). 
Specific examples of contested traits for geneticists include: “cleft lip/palate, 
neurofibromatosis, hereditary deafness, insulin-dependent diabetes, Huntington disease, 
cystic fibrosis, sickle cell anemia, Down syndrome, and manic depression.” These traits 
“were deemed serious by some professionals and not serious by others” (9). Serious 
presumably means that such traits should be medically intervened upon—i.e., that they 
are in need of correction. And, of course, in addition to inherited traits that have taken 
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center stage in my project so far, illness or accident is also commonly considered 
disabling; examples include blindness, deafness, paraplegia or limb loss, along with 
traumatic brain injury and myriad other conditions.  
 Uneven allegiance to disability identity among persons who might fall under these 
categories contributes to the complications of the political question of disability identity. 
Some will object that there is no disability community—that such a thing is too inchoate 
to be discussed in practical terms because of the heterogeneity of the potential members 
of the community.  
As for more thoroughgoing schemes, the World Health Organization (WHO) 
distinguishes among impairment, disability and handicap in a way helpfully summarized 
by Bonnie Steinbock:  
Paralysis of the legs (perhaps resulting from polio or spina bifida) is the 
impairment; the inability to walk is the disability; but it is ‘the social 
consequences of that disability—the refusal of employers to hire a disabled 
person…that renders him or her handicapped.’ A disability becomes a handicap 
due to the choices of individuals and organizations. Handicaps are the result of 
social choices; they are not part of the ‘fabric of the moral universe.’ Because 
they are chosen, they can be changed (Steinbock 2000, 113-114, quoting from 
Scheer and Groce 1998, 24).  
 
It seems clear from this tripartite scheme that at least some people would agree that 
disability is both physical and social. In other words, perhaps we could tentatively say 
that collective political action can relieve a “handicap” or “disability” through social 
measures, and medicine can relieve an “impairment,” both of which have bearing upon a 
person’s potential or actual disability. Yet, from here, the issue only gets more 
complicated. Consider the way that an impairment/handicap or impairment/disability 
distinction operates as an analog of the sex/gender distinction—are impairment and sex 
therefore “natural” categories that are not constructed symbolically or socially? 
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Furthermore, schemes like this serve to deny or hide positive aspects of disability 
identity. How do the biological and the social interact, and in what sense does medicine 
play a role in the lives of persons with disabilities? Should medicine play this role? How 
does this identity actually operate? To begin to answer these questions in a serious way, 
we must turn to diverse work in disability theory. 
 In the previous chapter, I briefly introduced the notion that there are different 
models of disability, and discussed two in particular: the social and the medical models. 
Here I re-introduce these models in their place among other ways of conceiving 
disability, and discuss the drawbacks and complicated reception each has received among 
theorists. These models set out to accomplish very different things, and so I orient models 
of disability not only conceptually but also in terms of the goals and motivations for their 
construction. Taking a birds’ eye view of models of disability in the pages that follow 
will help illuminate the way in which persons posed as “abled” and posed as “disabled” 
meet each other at the border between these two roles.
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Models of Disability 
 
 There are a number of models of disability, which are either posed as solutions to 
problems facing persons with disabilities or which have been constructed to approximate 
what is found to be problematic about existing conditions. That is, I argue, models of 
disability are typically meant to either symbolize or solve problems of exclusion and 
                                                          
70
 I am not exhaustive here in my consideration of models of disability; there are a few models I will not 
consider here, such as the “consumer” model, which would position persons with disabilities as an 
untapped market (cf. Riley 2005). Also, there are many variations on the models I consider here that are 
beyond the scope of this project. 
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stigma that come along with physical and mental difference. More rarely, methods are 
used to symbolize what it is like, experientially, to have a disability; for this, something 
like a phenomenological or materialist account is needed (for this type of work, see 
Iwakuma 2002 and Scully 2008; I return to these more fluid schemes, below, by way of 
the “cultural model”). In disability studies, experiential accounts are also expressed 
through non-fictional, first-personal vignettes (e.g. Finger 2007), life writing (e.g. Mintz 
2007), fiction (see Ragged Edge Online), and poetry (see Kuppers 2006 and Ragged 
Edge).  
 
The Moral Model and the Charity Model 
 The “moral model” and the “charity model” are primary examples of models 
elucidated principally to persuade those who consider them to reject them as 
inappropriately limiting. Both also serve the higher purpose of telling a nuanced 
disability history and building an understanding of the social influences that form 
disability experiences in the US and globally. The moral model has been described as the 
oldest model of disability, primarily because it appears in ancient theological texts such 
as the Bible, Koran and the Midrash. On this model, disability of any sort can be 
understood as the result of sin—perhaps generational sin which is passed down from 
one’s ancestors, or perhaps personal sin which has resulted in affliction from above (cf. 
Goffman 1963, 1-2). Disability historian Henri-Jacques Stiker writes: “This is illustrated 
in the Pharisees’ question to Jesus concerning a blind man: “Who sinned? Was it he or 
his family?” (1999, 27). This model figures disability as impurity, attached to a body 
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rendered therefore unfit to be in the presence of a higher power, and has been the basis 
for “ritual exclusion” in diverse religious contexts (Stiker 1999, 25).  
 The notion of moral desert when it comes to disability has not disappeared with 
time. This is evidenced in the rhetorical question “What have I done to deserve this?” It 
also appears in popular entertainment, which regularly uses markers of physical and 
mental differences as a way to indicate moral inferiority or the beginning of an immoral 
career to audiences (e.g. The Joker and Two-Face in The Dark Knight; and in thrillers, 
like Al Pacino’s iconic role as Tony Montana in Scarface and Ernst Blofeld in You Only 
Live Twice; see also note 30 above regarding the work of Paul Longmore and Susan 
Sontag; see also Zola 1993, 169). Disability theorists Sharon Snyder and David Mitchell 
develop a theoretical understanding of use of the disabled body as prosthesis for the 
movement of plots and as dramatic device in their work Narrative Prosthesis: Disability 
and the Dependencies of Discourse (2000). 
 The charity model is much newer if we use an ancient timeline, but also has deep 
historical roots that continue to reverberate today. This model captures a particular mode 
of response to persons who are considered disabled: the response of charity, which 
construes persons as objects of pity. Charity as a response determines the characteristics 
that persons experiencing disability are expected to have. These expectations, in turn, 
limit the opportunities of those with disabilities. A very recent example of the charity 
model is the oft-cited Jerry Lewis telethon (funded by the Muscular Dystrophy 
Association), an organization that actor Lewis has defended against objections from the 
Disability Rights Movement (DRM) claiming that the telethons and associated 
advertisements are degrading (“Jerry Lewis” 1991). Lewis has been accused of 
116 
 
infantilizing disability and obtaining income for his charity merely through generating 
pity among viewers, thereby frustrating the goals of disability rights activism (Stevenson, 
Harp, and Gernsbacher 2011). Lewis’ defense of the telethons and his own infantilizing 
attitude has been bitter; he once shot back: “If you don't want to be pitied because you're 
a cripple, stay in your house” (Ervin 2009, quoted in Stevenson, Harp, and Gernsbacher 
2011).  
 Snyder and Mitchell exhaustively detail the nuances of the charity model in the 
19
th
 century and forward. For example, they investigate classical literature, such as 
Herman Melville’s The Confidence-Man: His Masquerade (first published in 1857). 
They write:  
Charity organizations assured that “excessive” need could be met with stern 
disapproval, moral disapprobation, and patronizing religious instruction. At the 
same time charity also provided a public benefit in recognizing individual 
contribution as a sign of beneficence, generosity, and commitment to capitalist 
values of self-reliance. Charity’s provision of such an outlet for moralistic 
example demonstrates what disability historian Paul Longmore defines as the 
practice of conspicuous contribution: a cultural ritual in which the “economically 
able” garishly donate in public venues to help disabled people and bolster their 
own renown. Within these economic rituals, “disability” itself becomes a matter 
of performative interdependency as disabled bodies are made to appear unduly 
dependent and donors further solidify their own social value as able benefactors” 
(2006, 41, quoting Longmore 1997, 146). 
 
So, charity simultaneously sets up a role for the abled person and a role for the dis/abled 
person, and the model itself circumscribes a particular level of dependence for the 
disabled while also reinforcing some of the capitalistic values that oppose disability and 
ability in the first place. And, the charity model provides a moral education for persons 
who are abled by way of the disabled person and their body, the object of charity.
71
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 I return to moral education by way of disability in the next chapter’s response to philosopher Christie 
Hartley. 
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 Thus far we can see that both of these models, the moral and charity models, were 
constructed in order to say something about and protest historical treatment of persons 
with disabilities; in other words, to describe these models is to simultaneously protest 
their continued influence in the lives of those with disabilities. No part of either model is 
meant to isolate what disability “means’ or propose definitions of disability for the future. 
 
The Medical Model 
 Meanwhile, the medical model of disability is still supreme in mainstream culture 
but just as highly charged for disability theorists as the moral and charity models. In the 
previous chapter, I noted that the medical model of disability, on its strongest version, 
orients any limitations in biological particulars. Negative experiences encountered by a 
person with disability, including discomforts and lack of freedoms and capabilities, are 
all, on this model, due solely to disability’s character as a medical issue of the body—a 
problem of health, to be dealt with medically (Daniels, Rose, and Zide 2009, 75-76; 
Saxton 2000, 149). This model is built to describe what disability itself is. What the 
World Health Organization described as “impairment” (e.g. paraplegia, polio, loss of 
vision) becomes the entirety of the concept of disability. To put it more succinctly still, 
the medical model (broadly construed; it has many variations) orients disability as 
limitation located in or stemming from the body (see Smith 2009). So, on the one hand, 
the medical model is constructed in earnest in order to analyze and consider the effects of 
disability. 
  Yet, on the other hand, what some consider an earnest model, that is, a model 
meant to describe what disability actually is, has stimulated wide critique and is the 
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fountainhead of stigmatizing and marginalizing taxonomies, labels, and stereotypes. For 
the DRM, the medical model is “an inaccurate interpretation of disability forming the 
basis of oppressive and exploitative relationships between non-disabled and disabled 
people” (Smith 2009, 15). In the previous chapter, especially through the work of 
Adrienne Asch, I discussed good reasons for thinking the medical model is misleading 
and therefore inaccurate. But further, as aforementioned, the medical model views 
individuals through the lens of their role as a “patient”—as if everyone who has 
experienced limitation or been stigmatized for a trait is by that count a permanent patient 
(Saxton 2000, 149). This is a problematic framing that causes unnecessary social 
isolation and negative treatment.  
 Thus, the medical model and its categorization of disability as pathology and 
illness contribute to the isolation of persons with disabilities. As long as persons with 
disabilities are labeled “ill” and their identity as disabled is tied up in interactions with 
the medical establishment, they become part of a hidden minority which is accounted for 
statistically (cf. political theorist Talcott Parsons, quoted in Zola 1993, 168). The 
representation of disability through statistics leads to the circumscription of disability as a 
risk of embodiment, as discussed in the previous chapter.  
 Mainstream reliance on medical understandings of disability also leads to 
pervasive institutional abuses, because the medical model makes the clinical institution 
the appropriate home for persons with disabilities. In 2012, federal officials sent Florida 
Attorney General Pam Bondi a letter on behalf of more than 200 children (including 
infants) who have been living in nursing homes for (on average) three years; the 
regulators allege that the state is violating the Americans with Disabilities Act and the 
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children’s civil liberties by housing them there. Florida State University law professor 
Paolo Annino, along with other attorneys in Florida, has filed a suit in corroboration with 
the letter sent to Bondi. They note that more than 3,300 children will be rehoused in 
nursing homes because of state funding cuts eliminating the nursing services that would 
allow the children to remain at home. Nursing homes, meant to care for the aging, are ill-
equipped to deal with the young and present significant blocks to maturation, 
relationship-building and sexual development—the result of basic institutional restraints 
on schedules and rooming (Kennedy 2012). According to the press,  
the suit and federal regulators say children languish in facilities, sharing common 
areas with elderly patients and having few interactions with others, rarely leaving 
the nursing homes or going outside. After visiting children in six nursing homes, 
investigators noted that children are not exposed to social, education and 
recreational activities that are critical to child development. Educational 
opportunities are limited to as little as 45 minutes per day (Kennedy 2012). 
 
I argue that housing young children and infants in nursing homes is only intelligible 
through a medical model that considers disability a medical condition for which health 
services are the primary, or even only, concern.
72
 Because social sites for the responsive 
reception of persons with disabilities are sorely lacking, these individuals are 
marginalized and hidden by inappropriate placement in nursing homes. In impact, the 
move to institutionalize in nursing homes (as well as group homes, depending on the 
circumstances, and other types of institutions I have referred to in these pages) serves the 
same purpose as “ugly laws” or “unsightly beggar ordinances” in California, Chicago, 
Columbus, Ohio, and Omaha, Nebraska Chicago’s turn of the century “ugly laws” – 
which made it illegal to be in public spaces with many disabilities (Schweik 2010). Social 
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 For more on the long history of institutional abuses that persons with disabilities have been subjected to, 
see Jeff Moyer’s audio CD Lest we forget, an important piece of disability history, including interviews 
(2006), and Snyder and Mitchell 2006. 
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marginalization is socially constructed, and it is easy to “minoritize” groups that one 
cannot see. 
 Further problems exist. The medical model cannot accept social factors playing a 
role in disablement, and so necessarily ignores the stigmatized construction I consider in 
this project. It conflates the prejudicial treatment experienced by persons with disabilities 
or simply their social experiences generally with traits of the body—it naturalizes them. 
Philosophers Kristjana Kristiansin, Simo Vehmas, and Tom Shakespeare explain 
problems with the model in this way: 
This position views disability as the inevitable product of the individual’s 
biological defects, illnesses or characteristics. Disability becomes a personal 
tragedy that results from the individual’s pathological condition. … Disability has 
become, among other phenomena such as alcoholism, homosexuality and 
criminality, a paradigm case of medicalization (a term which refers to a process 
where people and societies are explained increasingly in medical terms). The 
expression medical model of disability has become a common nickname for a 
one-sided view that attributes the cause of individual’s deficits either to bad luck 
(accidents), to inadequate health practices (smoking, bad diet), or to genes (2009, 
2). 
 
The medical model, therefore, is a model which describes the causes of disability as 
individual, and divorced from social life, and is also a model which treats disability (even 
if disability has social aspects known to be negative) as naturalized and inevitable. There 
is no one to blame but the body, unless of course, one also chooses to blame an 
individual’s bad lifestyle and unhealthy decision-making. On this model, one can call 
disability “tragic” and yet evade responsibility for the tragedy of poor treatment (cf. 
Smith 2009, 16). 
 Disability theorist Steven Smith further argues that the medical model is 
essentialist. Disability under this model is necessarily a “fixed” and “permanent” 
condition, which “inevitably causes ‘dependency’ between disabled and non-disabled 
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people;” resulting dependency is likewise depicted as permanent (Smith 2009, 15, cf. 
Barnes 1991, 2). The medical model insists that disability cannot be separated from 
dependency, but under this model, dependency is a product of biology, not interpersonal 
relationships. Therefore, differences between non-disabled and disabled persons are 
essentialized (Smith 2009, 16-17). Meanwhile, normality is also naturalized under this 
model (17). Recall here my discussion of genetic determinism in chapter one and chapter 
two, which I argue also serves to naturalize and materialize disability. 
 
The Social Model 
 The social model, first articulated by British disability scholar and activist 
Michael Oliver
73
 in the early 1980s, is meant as a direct response to and rejection of the 
medical model. In that sense, it perhaps swings the pendulum back too far in the other 
direction, thus leaving itself open to inevitable revision. This model has served as a 
rallying cry and a very effective political tool for the DRM and disability activists 
globally. Unlike the charity and moral models, it is not articulated in order to be rejected, 
or to illuminate the past; instead, on a practical level, it could be called future-oriented. 
That is because it describes disability primarily as originating in social failures with 
regard to accommodation for difference, and to describe it this way is to strongly suggest 
radical social change at the same time.  
 As I stated in the second chapter, the social model argues that difficulties or 
differences in quality of life experienced by persons with disabilities are due to a lack of 
social accommodation rather than inherent qualities of the individual experiencing 
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 In the United Kingdom, the Union of Physical Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS) was a seminal part 
of the development of the social model (Kelly 2010, Scott-Hill 2004, Snyder and Mitchell 2006, 6). 
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disability (Abberley 1987). Steven Smith calls a very common version of the social 
model the “politics of disablement” interpretation, in which “attention is 
directed…toward changing the social and political environment” (2009, 18). He writes: 
This interpretation offers a structural, as distinct from an individual account of 
disability, in effect bracketing the personal experience of disability, other than 
what an impaired person might experience in relation to the social and political 
environment (2009, 18). 
 
Here, a distinction is made between impairment and disability: “Impairment is associated 
with a particular medical condition, which may (or may not) lead to a disability” and 
“disability [is] associated with various social and political restrictions often (but not 
always) imposed upon people with impairments” (Smith 2009, 18). This distinction is in 
radical contrast to the medical model’s conflation of impairment and disability, but fits 
with the WHO scheme (above). Importantly, many versions of the social model do not 
claim, as is sometimes supposed, that disabling traits are themselves neutral (e.g. Daniels, 
Rose and Zide 2009, 75). Rather, the more common claim is that the majority of 
regrettable aspects of disability can be neutralized as long as society understands and 
accommodates disability (e.g. Parens and Asch 2000, 24). This point has caused 
confusion. 
 The social model improves upon the medical model in a number of obvious ways. 
It places new responsibilities on society to make room for physical and mental 
differences, and rejects the idea that one’s body or “impairment” must necessarily lead to 
social and political restrictions. But, it also involves drawbacks which arise primarily 
from the framing of its rejection of the medical model. That is, in the social model’s 
definition of disability’s limitations as merely social, it throws a veil over the body and 
embodied first-person experiences in social contexts, a point anticipated in the excerpt 
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from Smith, above. It can invalidate pain, and serves to untether discussions about 
disability completely from the body, because on this model impairment relates to the 
body while disability relates to the social world. That is, impairment is naturalized. 
Strictly working from the social model, we can lose key elements of stories like that of 
poet, theorist and disability activist Eli Clare in his “Exile and Pride,” wherein Clare 
relates his painful and difficult experiences of mountain-climbing as a person with 
cerebral palsy and the way his unsteady step takes him through rocky terrain (1999). This 
story, for Clare, unlocks the door to the realization that he has internalized the 
“supercrip” trope of a person with limitations who overcomes the odds. (I return to this 
trope and to Clare’s response to it in my commentary on Christie Hartley’s political 
theory in chapter four.) 
 The pervasiveness of the social model among disability activists has made it 
difficult to revise or abandon. For instance, Mairian Scott-Hill
74
 encounters the social 
model as a “new orthodoxy” (2004, cf. Kelly 2010). Scott-Hill “proposes a postmodern, 
communicative paradigm which ‘takes the view that social relations between people are 
necessarily complex’” (Kelly 2010, quoting from Scott-Hill 2004, 163). But, she 
experiences strong backlash; she claims that her view “tends to be interpreted by 
‘orthodox’ social modellists as threatening the unity of disabled people’s political 
campaigns and accused of promoting a relativistic world in which the ‘fact’ or ‘reality’ of 
disability can no longer be assured” (Scott-Hill 2004, 169). In other words, for some who 
promote the social model, if disability is seen as fluid, contingent on social relationships, 
or to have shaky borders, political disability identity is threatened. This is a very 
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undesirable standoff, especially since the social model is ostensibly meant to capture the 
highly interpersonal nature of the “politics of disablement.”  
  But the social model has opened up very important discussions and historically 
made activist disability politics possible, helping highlight accommodation and justice 
issues. The social model breaks free of the medical model’s essentializing insistence that 
disability is, in its entirety, a quality natural to the body. But, the distinction that the 
social model makes between impairment and disability leaves impairment itself a 
naturalized category—i.e., immune to social construction—and deprioritizes discussion 
of the body, pain, and limitation that feminist philosophers of disability, like Liz Crow, 
Liz French, and Jenny Morris, seek. According to disability theorists Tom Shakespeare 
and Mark Erickson, these thinkers: “do not deny that society causes many problems, [but] 
they also feel that their bodies may cause difficulties, and they want any theory of 
disability to take account of the physical dimension to their lives. They suggest that in 
developing a social and structural analysis the disability movement has omitted a key 
facet of their experience” (Shakespeare and Erickson 2001, 195). The social model 
throws a veil over the body in its attempt to make an analogy with the distinction between 
sex and gender (cf. Tremain 2006). 
The social model presents one final problem. That is, the social model considers 
the concept of disability to be merely negative. On this model, “disability” 
conceptually marks a failing on the part of the social world and signals a lack of 
accommodation; when disability is discussed in this sense it falls into the trap of asserting 
that disability is inherently and also merely negative. For the DRM, which is focused on 
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the potential of persons with disabilities to be independent,
75
 this is not a good result. The 
social model, as an activist view, should be able to support the idea of disability as a 
banner and a positive identity that brings people together—disability should be more than 
simply a problem to be solved. But if disability is social failure, and accommodation 
problems are overcome, does the concept of disability disappear, along with disability 
identities themselves? It appears that for the social model the answer is yes: the social 
model valorizes “ordinary citizenship” insofar as it takes accomplishing this type of 
citizenship for all as the aim of ameliorating lack of access in the social world (Smith 
2009, 19, cf. Kelly 2010). In that sense, the social model will not represent a cultural 
critique of the complex relationship between norm and deviance, or negation or lack and 
social acceptance. Tanya Titchkosky writes:  
So common is it to map disability through a series of negations that it might be 
easy to miss the strangeness of such a process. This strangeness is revealed when 
we try to map others in a similar fashion, for example, a man is a person lacking a 
vagina. It would seem ridiculous today to conceive of gender in terms of negation. 
However, it is still common to regard the disabled body as a life constituted out of 
the negation of able-bodiedness and, thus, as nothing in and of itself. (2002, 103) 
 
Although perhaps the negativity of disability does not rise to the level of tragedy under 
the social model the way it does under the medical model, simply moving the concept of 
disability from the body to the social realm is not enough. Mairian Scott-Hill (Corker) 
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 Christine Kelly argues that disability activism has been unduly influenced by disabled white males, who 
focus on goals like independent living. According to Kelly, organizations like the US-based ADAPT retain 
the echoes of this hidden identity of disability activism; she writes: “reinforcing independence as the 
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community” (quoted in Rohrer 2005, 36). 
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received backlash for her “postmodern” view of disability, which calls into question 
disability as concrete fact; yet, the social model should be called into question for its 
characterization of disability as only a negative marker of social failure, while 
simultaneously failing to investigate the cultural constructs of deviance and disability. 
 
The Minority Model 
The minority model of disability overlaps tightly with the social model, but 
presents its own set of unique issues for advocacy. Taking the social model’s 
interpretation of disability as a basis, it primarily focuses on the attainment of civil rights 
(Dell Orto and Marinelli, 1995). But, unlike the social model, it seeks to neutralize the 
perceived negativity of disability traits. This is accomplished, for instance, by claiming 
that wheelchair use is variation rather than limitation, and calling into question the 
normalcy of walking as a mode of mobility. The Deaf community takes up a variety of 
this model by way of its claim that Deafness is the root of a culture, not a disability. But 
it is unclear why the label of disability or disability as an identity and minority claims of 
culture must oppose one another—it seems that in order to make a “minority” claim, 
some believe that a “disability” identity must be shed or shifted elsewhere. I will use the 
example of the controversy surrounding “direct funding” in order to begin describing 
more concrete problems connected to the minority model. 
 Direct funding refers to a situation in which persons with disabilities receive 
government funds to “hire and sometimes train” service (care) providers and thus 
“manage their own personal assistance” by disbursing payments for their own care (Kelly 
2010). This is a major goal of “personal assistance activism” and fits with a minority 
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model scheme of disability. Personal assistance activism, however, puts to the side 
concerns about minimum wage, labor standards, and working conditions for those 
providing the care work. Because funds available to persons with disabilities are limited 
and often far too low, part of “personal assistance activism” will be the attempt to keep 
payments for care work as low as possible in order to manage one’s budget. In other 
words, minority politics advocacy around “direct funding” pits persons with disabilities 
against care workers in a struggle over scarce resources. It places those with disabilities 
in a position of power over those workers who provide their care because little to no 
oversight is built in to the system (Kelly 2010). Paying higher amounts for care work 
means that those who need the care have less money in their already severely limited 
bank accounts. 
 Playing one’s part in minority politics will exacerbate and multiple problems like 
the one represented by the direct funding controversy. Christine Kelly argues that models 
for advocacy must shift and expand: “Advocacy around direct funding must expand in 
ways that understand personal assistance as ‘disabled work’, that is, work that is 
inherently devalued in our society, just as disabled bodies are” (2010). Kelly argues: 
One of the ways to transform the cultural meanings of disability is to improve the 
social status of attendants and the value attributed to their work. There is 
incredible potential for disabled people to work alongside attendants for the 
improvement of direct funding programs, but this would require a broadening of 
identities and mandates endorsed by advocacy groups.” (2010)76 
 
This echoes Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s call to consider “disability” a “pervasive 
cultural category” (2001, 18). When “disability” is taken up in the context of identity 
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 This connects with Eva Kittay’s call for “doulia”: “Just as we have required care to survive and thrive, so 
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cared-for, and both are locked together until a critique of this devaluation can pull them apart. 
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politics that pits one “minority” (marginalized) group against another, opportunities to 
ferret out places that certain lives and labors are devalued are lost.  
Foucault’s work provides further theoretical resources to critique minority 
“disability politics.” Adopting roles within the scheme of the minority model involves 
disabled advocates directly in the management of their own disability “identity” and 
policing the border between disability and ability.
77
 Seeing “disability” as another 
minority community pits this group against others in a struggle for rights and access, and 
further minoritizes and marginalizes persons with disabilities, emphasizing deviance from 
a norm. In an essay written from a Foucauldian point of view, Helen Liggett notes that 
“the minority group approach is double-edged because it means enlarging the discursive 
practices which participate in the constitution of disability….in order to participate in 
their own management disabled people have had to participate as disabled” (Liggett 
1988, 271). Shakespeare, meanwhile, argues that “disability politics, by its very nature, 
often rests on a fairly unreflective acceptance of the disabled/non-disabled distinction. 
Disabled people are those who identify as such. Disabled leadership is seen as vital” 
(2006, 78).   
 
The Cultural Model  
 I turn now to a Foucauldian-inspired model that will be able to avoid some of the 
problems embedded in the models I have reviewed so far. The cultural model, 
exemplified by the work of Sharon Snyder and David Mitchell, seeks “locations” 
(constructions, including historical constructions) of disability and deviance. It responds 
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subjectification and subjection” (Riley 1988, 17, quoted in Shakespeare 2006, 78.) 
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critically to the false choice of either the social world or the body as an explanatory 
mechanism (cf. Shakespeare and Erickson’s desire to find a third way, 2001). On the one 
hand, it claims that we can investigate the context and construction of disability without 
assuming that these contexts and constructions are merely or only tragic or negative, 
marking “discriminatory encounters” (2006, 10). On the other hand, the cultural model 
attempts to understand locations of disability as complex interplays between both 
embodiment and the social world, and so does not want to exclude individual (negative) 
experiences of stereotyping and problematic models like the medical model from an 
understanding of the way that individuals have built their identities (Snyder and Mitchell 
2006, 6-7). This means that the cultural model does not assume that disability is negative, 
but it can incorporate the workings of stigma and prejudice where they occur into an 
understanding of what disability, and disability identity, involves in a variety of contexts. 
Snyder and Mitchell write: 
“Disability” … in keeping with current formulations informed by cultural and 
identity studies—is largely, but not strictly synonymous with sites of cultural 
oppression. It does not solely represent the social coordinates, as Liz Crow puts it, 
of restraints “that we must escape” (2006, 6, emphasis mine). 
 
Snyder and Mitchell go on to clarify that they do not wish to “hide the degree to which 
social obstacles and biological capacities may impinge upon our lives” (2006, 206).78 
Their work, instead, recognizes that “environment and bodily variation (especially those 
traits experienced as socially stigmatized differences) inevitably impinge upon each 
other” (207).  
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 In other words, they speak to the following concern articulated by Susan Wendell: “I do not think that my 
body is a cultural representation, although I recognize that my experience of it is both highly interpreted 
and very influenced by cultural (including medical) interpretations” (1996, 62). 
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To reiterate, for Snyder and Mitchell, defining disability will necessarily involve 
“a combination of profoundly social and biological forces”—a recipe that neither the 
medical model nor the social model is able to accommodate (2006, 7). Activist and 
disabled scholar Zola writes: “biology may not determine our destiny; but, as with 
women, our political, mental and biological differences are certainly part of that destiny” 
(1993, 170). Lifting the veil that the social model has thrown over the body is immensely 
important. In this vein, Shakespeare and Erickson write:  
biological and social and cultural processes weave together in complex ways to 
produce the phenomena which we experience. Just as the best versions of the 
biological story stress the dynamic processes in nature, the inextricable 
involvement in the environment with the expression of genes and the crucial role 
of development, so an adequate social science must acknowledge the bodily and 
ecological parameters within which humans operate. (2001, 203)  
 
Most importantly, the cultural model is informed by philosophy which can highlight 
discursive constructions of disability—such as that of Michel Foucault—and therefore 
can interrogate impairment itself as socially constructed, as I attempted to do in the 
previous chapter’s discussion of genetic counseling, prenatal prototypes, and risk 
(Tremain 2006).  
At the outset of this chapter, I mentioned Irving Zola’s worry that the reversal 
strategy of political identity—finding pride in precisely the traits that are stigmatized—
was largely unavailable to persons with disabilities. But, the insights of feminist theory, 
which I argue are in accordance with the cultural model, demonstrate that this kind of 
reversal is not impossible. Feminist theorist Judy Rohrer, in articulating the entwined 
interests of feminism and disability theory, points to the strategy of political ironism, 
precisely the type of reversal to which Zola refers.  
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 For Rohrer, irony as a political strategy stems from the work of feminist political 
theorists, including Donna Haraway and Kathy Ferguson (2005, 43). This strategy allows 
one to “live with ambiguity” and, in the words of Ferguson, provides “a way to keep 
oneself within a situation that resists resolution in order to act politically without 
pretending that resolution has come” (43). Of disability, Rohrer writes:  
The disabled subject position generates irony through the inescapable friction 
between living in a disqualified body and living at all. Disability is easily 
understood as a contingent, ambiguous, and multiple category…it reminds us of 
our incompleteness, of the fluidity of our subjectivity, and of the disciplinary 
practices that shape our bodies and our thinking (44). 
 
Irony can “call attention to imposed (mis)representations and new self-definitions while 
at the same time acknowledging the contingency and fluidity of their identity claims” 
(44). Rohrer uses “OH” as an example, an acronym which originally refers to 
“orthopedically handicapped” (a passive verb; cf. Zola’s grammar, above). But the use of 
“OH” by persons with disabilities can become a “double gesture”: “Expressing them both 
at once highlights the fluidity, contingency, and multiplicity of identity claims” (2005, 
44). Ironism is a route to reclaim and stigmatized identities without negating original 
meanings; rather, it allows the original meaning to be expressed at the same time as a 
new meaning. 
 Throughout this project, and especially in my discussion of “fetal impairment” 
and risk, I have implicitly and explicitly referred to the “social construction” of disability. 
Keeping one’s eyes open to social construction is an important part of the cultural model 
even though the cultural model does not affirm a strong social model of disability. In the 
next section, I describe the social construction of disability in more depth through a 
return to my focus on genetic determinism.  
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Social Constructions of Disability 
 
 I have argued that genetic determinism serves as a support for the stigmatizing 
essentialism and naturalism regularly faced by persons with disabilities. To elucidate my 
point, I here expand on the argument that disability is socially constructed. I did not 
introduce complications into the portrait of gene action (in chapter one) in order to argue 
that a more accurate scientific picture of gene action, or better scientific understanding in 
general, will provide more reliable or complete information about disability and thereby 
render it a problem science is finally ready to solve. As already indicated, I consider the 
meaning of disability, and even impairment (as mentioned above, these are often 
distinguished in an analogy with gender and sex) to be socially conditioned and 
constructed. This means that strict biological or genetic descriptions of disability will 
miss the opportunity to critique and analyze the social, political, and other factors that 
brought them into discourse.  
 Susan Wendell points out that there are multiple ways to view the social 
construction of disability, and the discussion need not be limited to “disability” as a 
social category while leaving to the side “impairment” as a set of biological categories; in 
fact, she does not think it is easy to disentangle the two (Wendell 1996, see esp. Ch. 2). 
She writes:  
I see disability as socially constructed in ways ranging from social conditions that 
straightforwardly create illnesses, injuries, and poor physical functioning, to 
subtle cultural factors that determine standards of normality and exclude those 
who do not meet them from full participation in their societies. (1996, 58) 
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For example, political decisions regarding war, the prevention (specifically: the lack of) 
of violent crime, and differential access to health care can create illness, injury, and 
therefore have disabling impact (1996, 58-59). Simple architectural decisions regarding 
stairs and elevators can also construct disability: 
poor architectural planning creates physical obstacles for people who use 
wheelchairs, but also for people who can walk but cannot walk far or cannot 
climb stairs, for people who cannot open doors, or for people who can do all these 
things but only at the cost of pain or an expenditure of energy they can ill afford. 
(1996, 60-61) 
 
Wendell explains that as a professional academic, she stands on shifting sands with 
regard to her status as a disabled worker at her university; at the time of her essay, she 
took one-quarter time disability leave and worked three-quarters time. Increased teaching 
loads due to changing institutional standards may, she noted, require her to take more 
disability leave in the future, up to half-time; but nothing about her physical status will 
have changed (1996, 60). Wendell refers to this constructive phenomenon as “the pace of 
life,”—that is, changes in standards and expectations which leave persons more or less 
disabled (59). 
 Obesity is another example of the social construction of disability and its 
meanings. Food deserts, poverty, and social inequalities of all types impact rates of 
“obesity,” which most people consider a disability trait. But definitions of “obesity” and 
its social meanings are also determined discursively. Certain foods are considered “bad” 
or “good” (fats and dairy are good examples) according to evolving standards and 
changing ideas about what constitutes a healthy diet. Access issues contribute to the idea 
that persons with disabilities make bad food choices. The need for shopping assistants 
and prepared foods makes it difficult to obtain and enjoy one’s preferred foods, and for 
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those who are able to prepare their own meals, it remains difficult to fulfill the 
expectations of an increasingly “gourmet” food-centered society and keep up with what 
some have called “the gentrification of taste” (Gerber 2007). As Elaine Gerber notes, 
“foods that are easy to prepare or acquire are also often the same ones that deserve 
criticism for their nutritional shortcomings. Fast foods and pre-prepared foods…are the 
foods that are commonly consumed by disabled people” (Gerber 2007). Meanwhile, food 
that is considered healthy, green and organic is precisely the type of food often made 
inaccessible by contingent social and political factors (poverty, poor urban planning, and 
“poor architectural planning”).  
 Recall the FTO “fat” gene, introduced in chapter one, and references in the media 
to other “fat genes” (Miles 2013). Genetic determinism, among other mistaken beliefs, 
makes it easy to treat being “fat” as an essential property or a natural kind.  Speaking of 
sickness and health strictly in terms of biology, and especially strictly in terms of 
genetics, hides social and political factors structuring ideals of sickness and health; the 
influence of genetic determinism and other reductions to biology jettisons the 
philosophically critical chance to analyze and assess these factors and their differential 
impacts. Conceptions of disability and impairment 
 For the purposes of this project, the binary between normal and abnormal created 
by portraits of canonical genotypes and genetic deviance is a key example of the 
construction of disability and impairment. In other words, genetic determinism also 
constructs disability, especially insofar as it is considered natural, essential, immutable, 
or adjustable via genetic intervention. Testing procedures which approach testing for 
genetic deviance itself, deviance of a particular fetus from the genotype of a presumed 
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healthy person, encourage the wrongheaded connection of a type of statistical 
abnormality to risky embodiment, disability, or illness (see Kelly 2012 and Wapner et al. 
2012). And quality of life predictions based on genetic information taken in utero 
(genetic profiles revealing “prenatal prototypes” à la Carlson) discount or ignore myriad 
social, political, and environmental impacts on quality of life and so foreclose potential 
alternative measures of this concept. All of these processes contribute to the construction 
of the “impaired fetus” (Tremain 2006). 
  As I argue in the second chapter, synecdoche parallels the logic of genetic 
determinism, and both of these also have significant conceptual resonance with stigma. In 
the next section, I further express my affirmation of the cultural model by tracing more 
directly the concept of “stigma,” which Snyder and Mitchell reference and which I have 
already briefly discussed several times. I seek “locations” of disability. Bodily variation 
comes to the foreground when it involves stigma, and so investigating this concept is 
necessary to arrive at a clearer picture of what disability (in both its social and biological 
senses) is about in various contexts. I argue that it is possible to view the disability 
community through a lens of physical and mental differences that attract stigma, but also 
consider these differences as the building blocks of disability identities that are not 
merely negative.  
 
Stigma and Identity 
 
 In 1993, landmark disability activist Irving Kenneth Zola produced a brief but 
important essay on the importance of naming and labels, and there adduces a few of the 
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effects that naming can produce upon a person with disabilities. Zola claims that “we 
must go beyond a list of ‘do’s’ and ‘don’ts’ to an analysis of the functions of [labels]” 
(1993, 168), and so focuses on function rather than the search for “better” terminology. 
He argues that labels are both “connotational and associational” (168). First, when one is 
seen as “sick” or “crazy,” a multitude of other traits are brought forward that are 
frequently associated with illness and madness: “weakness, helplessness, dependency, 
regressiveness, abnormality of appearance and depreciation of every mode of physical 
and mental functioning” (168). Second, the label becomes the foundation for 
explanations of far-flung behavior and signals a set of permanent characteristics: 
Call a person sick or crazy and all their behavior becomes dismissible. … Because 
someone has been labeled ill, all their activity and beliefs—past, present, and 
future—become related to and explainable in terms of their illness. … In the case 
of a person with a chronic illness and/or a permanent disability, their traits, once 
perceived to be temporary accompaniments of an illness, become indelible 
characteristics (Zola, 1993, 168). 
 
Zola also argues that labels have the “potential for spread, pervasiveness, [and] 
generalization” meaning that the labels come to refer to the person in general and are 
interpreted in black or white terms. Think here of referencing “the amputee down the 
hall” or interpreting blindness to mean “totally without vision,” something untrue for 
most blind persons (Zola 1993, 169). This links to the “spreading effect” I consider in the 
previous chapter. Spread and generalization are central to stigma. Longmore calls this a 
“spoiling process”; when a trait “obscure[s] all other characteristics behind that one and 
swallow up the social identity of the individual within that restrictive category” 
(Longmore 1985, 419, quoted in Zola 1993, 169). So, we see here that a trait is 
emphasized over the whole in situations of labeling; this precisely mirrors my analysis of 
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the problematic situation in bioethical conversations regarding new reproductive 
technologies, which I discussed at length in the previous chapter. 
 Zola argues in conclusion that often the grammar of labels produces effects 
beyond the power of the labels themselves (1993, 170-171); I here briefly go through the 
grammar of labels in the manner he does, piece by piece, to show the tensions involved. 
Zola argues that the use of nouns and adjectives (“Blind,” “One-Legged”) necessarily 
positions one’s trait as primarily important. Nouns “can only perpetuate the equation of 
the individual equaling the disability. No matter what noun we use, it substitutes one 
categorical definition for another” (170). Adjectives, meanwhile, “tend to treat the whole 
person” and are “far from connoting a specific quality of the individual” (170). 
Prepositions are better (as in “persons with disabilities” and “people of color”) primarily 
because they are awkward and create pause; also, the relationships indicated between the 
terms they combine necessarily separate the terms: prepositions “imply both ‘a 
relationship to’ and a ‘separation from’” the attribute which is referenced (170). Finally, 
verbs have both passive and active tenses and so can be limiting; Zola here uses the 
difference between “using a wheelchair” and “being confined to a wheelchair” to express 
the distinction (170). The fine distinction between to “have” and “to be” becomes 
important in these cases, because verbs either “can categorize” or “relate attributes” 
(170).   
 Throughout this catalogue of grammar we can see that the issue of primary 
importance is releasing the person with a disability from definition merely by way of the 
disability; this is not a rejection of the trait but a rejection of definition via the trait. The 
preference is strongly for using language to express attributes, not to categorize, as Zola 
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suggests. This fits with my analysis regarding synecdoche, which I would now like to 
explicitly connect with the notion of stigma.  
 In short, the concept of stigma captures the core of the issues I have discussed so 
far, including spreading effects, emphasis of traits over wholes, and generalization on the 
basis of socially-undesirable traits. Investigating stigma suggests an answer to what kind 
of community the disability community is. I argue that one can consider it a community 
made up of persons who have experienced the effects of fear, isolation and prejudice on 
the basis of actual or perceived bodily or mental difference.
79
 This is not the end of the 
possibilities for disability identity, but it is the beginning in today’s political context. The 
medical model has already taught us why the concept of disability is considered 
exhausted by way of the notion of limitation. But, investigating stigma helps us fill out 
the picture of the disabled subject by suggesting answers to questions that have been 
haunting this project from the beginning—specifically, how is disability linked with 
death and fear?  
 The mainstay text in disability studies for accounts of stigma is Erving Goffman’s 
sociological study, Stigma: Notes on the Management of a Spoiled Identity (1963). 
According to Snyder and Mitchell, Goffman’s “theory of stigma…has been influential to 
cultural model discourses because [it formulates] theories of passing, psychic formation, 
and materiality as social processes” (2006, 7).80 Goffman’s work takes the notion of 
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 The text of the Americans with Disabilities Act has the issue of perception built in to its definition of 
disability, claiming disability status for persons who are perceived to have a disability trait. “The term 
‘disability’ means with respect to an individual (a) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 
one or more of the major life activities of such an individual; (b) a record of such an impairment; (c) being 
regarded as having such an impairment” (ADA quoted in Riley 2005, 7; emphasis mine). 
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 Snyder and Mitchell give similar priority to Judith Butler’s work on “sex/gender binaries” (2006, 7). In 
this chapter, I speak briefly to the problems tied to the attempted analogy by the DRM and other activist 
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stigma from the field of social psychology, and notes that there it is considered “the 
situation of the individual who is disqualified from full social acceptance” (1963, Preface, 
cf. 8). Yet, Goffman’s work is prescient because of the way in which he receives and 
adjusts the idea of stigma; he writes that for him, “stigma …will be used to refer to an 
attribute that is deeply discrediting” (1963, 3). So, while acceptance is still at issue, 
Goffman links the social and the biological in his treatment of stigma. Goffman explicitly 
addresses spread and generalization by exploring the discrediting effects of certain traits.  
 Goffman specifies that stigma is produced when there is lack of fit between an 
ideal (in his words: “virtual”) and an actual identity; without a norm, stigma loses its 
footing (1963, 2-7). In other words, stigma arises “where there is some expectation on all 
sides that those in a given category should not only support a particular norm but also 
realize it” (6). The operation of a norm and perceived lack of fit with that norm can 
produce shame for the individual experiencing stigma (7). More importantly, however, 
for this discussion, is the social response attracted by the stigma. Goffman writes, 
An individual who might have been received easily in ordinary social intercourse 
possesses a trait that can obtrude itself upon attention and turn those of us whom 
he meets away from him, breaking the claim that his other attributes have on us 
(5). 
 
The presence of a single trait provides a basis for social rejection that is, at least in part, 
explicable by way of the “spreading” or “generalization” effect that is stimulated by that 
trait. Goffman argues that others not only “impute” further “imperfections” on the basis 
of one trait but also tend to assign “some desirable but undesired attributes, often of a 
supernatural cast, such as ‘sixth sense,’ or ‘understanding’” to those with the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
groups between sex/gender and impairment/disability, but further discussion is outside the scope of this 
project. 
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“imperfection” (1963, 5). This latter phenomenon should be familiar to anyone who has 
seen the trope of exceptional wisdom and insight played out on television or the movie 
screen, an attribute regularly assigned to the ill and dying as well as to the physically or 
mentally different.
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Goffman’s articulation of a “trait that can obtrude itself upon attention” is 
resonant with synecdoche (the identification of a part with a whole). He suggests that in 
the case of stigma, “imperfections” are assumed on the basis of one trait encountered in 
another person (1963, 5). Genetic determinism, meanwhile, is also a case of a single trait 
obtruding upon attention. Furthermore, it is connected to essentializing and naturalizing 
moves that make particular traits simultaneously highly important and a signal of a 
“natural kind”—for example, the natural kind of a “disabled” or “defective” person.    
 Goffman helpfully pushes one toward a rejection of a false binary between abled 
and disabled precisely by way of his analysis of stigma. He notes that although one may 
not already be discredited, one can always be interpreted as discreditable: 
The most fortunate of normals is likely to have his half-hidden failing, and for 
every little failing there is a social occasion when it will loom large, creating a 
shameful gap between virtual and actual social identity. Therefore the 
occasionally precarious and the constantly precarious form a single continuum, 
their situation in life analyzable by the same framework (1963, 127).  
 
We can read the echoes of Goffman in the work of Rosemarie Garland-Thomson and her 
discussion of the normate. 
 Lerita Coleman Brown’s “Stigma: An Enigma Demystified” represents a helpful 
conceptual bridge into theorizing about disability (2010). Drawing on Goffman’s work, 
Coleman Brown argues that “stigma is a response to the dilemma of difference” (179). 
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 I return to this, below, in my discussion of Christie Hartley’s work. 
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She writes: “What is most poignant about Goffman’s description of stigma is that it 
suggests that all human differences are potentially stigmatizable” (179, emphasis mine). 
So, for Coleman Brown (as well as for Goffman), “stigmas reflect the value judgments of 
a dominant group” (180). With a turn, again, to social psychology, Coleman Brown 
categorizes stigma as a mode of “cognitive processing” which helps us categorize and 
respond to difference (183). But, she is especially intent to argue that the fear so often 
involved in stigma as a complex affective response specifically expressive of learned 
behaviors: “interest and curiosity about stigma or human differences may be natural for 
children, but they must learn fear and avoidance as well as which categories or attributes 
to dislike, fear, or stigmatize…certain negative emotions become attached to social 
categories” (183). Stigma thinking for Coleman Brown is thus deeply connected to 
schemas and stereotyping. 
 For Coleman Brown, stigma is a “special and insidious kind of social 
categorization” which is a “process of generalizing from a single experience” (2010, 
184). Like Goffman, she argues that stigma is “the attribute that colors the perception of 
the entire person” and “other aspects of the person are ignored” (184). So, as we have 
seen, the notion of stigma perfectly captures the general thrust of the disability critique of 
negative genetic selection, specifically with regard to synecdoche. Overall, for Coleman 
Brown, stigma “maintains” the status quo of social relations and brings stigmatized and 
unstigmatized persons “together in a perpetual inferior/superior relationship” (184, 185, 
189). This binary is maintained despite Goffman’s insight that stigmatization exists on a 
continuum to which no one is immune (cf. Coleman Brown 2010, 187). While the 
workings of stigma can help uncover the openness all have to stigmatization give the fact 
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of human difference, it also maintains itself through the encouragement of social 
exclusions and its support of the status quo. 
 It is clear that to be stigmatized is undesirable (cf. Goffman 1963 and Coleman 
Brown 2010, 187). But Coleman Brown helps us glean slightly more from the concept of 
stigma when she suggests that stigma causes fear because it is, at root, “uncontrollable” – 
“human differences serves as the basis for stigmas” and so one can be stigmatized at any 
time (2010, 187). In that sense, Coleman Brown argues, the structure of stigma imitates 
the structure of death:  
The unpredictability of stigma is similar to the unpredictability of death…the 
development of a stigmatized condition in a loved one or in oneself represents a 
major breach of trust—a destruction of the belief that life is predictable. In a 
sense, stigma represents a kind of death—a social death…nonstigmatized people, 
through avoidance and social rejection, often treat stigmatized people as if they 
were invisible, nonexistent, or dead (188). 
 
As our overall discussion of disability reminds us, the linkage between stigma and death 
does not stop there, especially when stigmatized traits are precisely traits that remind us 
of human vulnerability or mortality. As Coleman Brown argues, “many stigmas, in 
particular childhood cancer, remove the visual disguises of mortality. Such stigmas can 
act as a symbolic reminder of everyone’s inevitable death” (188). At this point it should 
be clear that to those who would seek immortality, like transhumanists, stigmatized 
persons represent a particularly painful reminder. 
 It is important to note, before moving on, that exclusions and stigma which 
accompany bodily difference are very strict (cf. Goffman 1963, 127-128). Ectrodactyly 
and syndactyly, which result in missing fingers and toes and the “partial fusion of the 
bones of the fingers and toes,” may seem relatively insignificant over the course of a life 
(Parens and Asch 2000, 8). But when Bree Walker Lampley, a news personality who had 
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both these traits, called ectrodactyly “minor” and stated her intention to continue a 
pregnancy although she knew the resulting child would have that particular trait, the 
media was scandalized and she was widely criticized as “irresponsible” (9). Another 
testament to the stringency of stigma is the fact that, as Goffman argues, a stigma which 
has been “repaired” or “corrected” is still a limiting stigma:  
Where such repair is possible, what often results is not the acquisition of fully 
normal status, but a transformation of self from someone with a particular blemish 
into someone with a record of having corrected a particular blemish (1963, 9). 
 
The faintest whiff of deviance from the norm is enough for the pernicious effects of 
stigma to operate; this speaks to the strength of operative norms. 
Genetic definitions of normality and abnormality, health and deviance, are an 
important front line of stigmatizing responses to what Coleman Brown calls the 
“dilemma of difference” (2010, 179). Stigma can attach to any perceived difference, but 
difference (as opposed to identity) is everywhere. Overly-deterministic conceptions of 
genetic action support idealized “canonical genotypes” and serve to mark deviance from 
this canon as abnormality. But, as Scully points out, variation in the human genome is 
constant. As I have argued throughout this project, choosing a presumed “normal” 
genome as a standard useful for measuring deviance is a mistake. This mistake 
contributes to stigmatization against persons with behaviors and characteristics which are 
presumed to be determined by genetic factors. 
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Conclusion 
 
 While issues of disability identity and disability models are of course not resolved 
by way of my analyses and discussion here, I would note that it is fully consistent with 
Rohrer’s political ironism to accept the ambiguity surrounding disability. It is also a 
testament to the important linkages between feminism and disability theory. To accept 
stigma as part of disability identity is not to resign oneself to the idea that disability is a 
merely negative identity.  
In the next chapter, I investigate images of disability in theories of liberalism as 
another way to pursue “locations” of disability. I do so also because I seek to outline the 
ways that discourse in bioethics, including transhumanism, which paints the disabled 
body as risk or limitation, is echoed or finds its corollary in political discussions of 
disability. I argue that in the contractualist Christie Hartley’s version of liberalism, 
reciprocity and exchange among citizens is interpreted and presented as an inescapably 
asymmetrical experience for the cognitively limited, but is not presented as such for abled 
others. This is yet another iteration of the false binary between the abled and disabled 
body, dependence and independence. I suggest that there are more transformative views 
of political life available, and highlight those forwarded by Eva Kittay and Anita Silvers. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
RECIPROCITY AND TROPE: DISABILITY AND LIBERALISM 
 
“His Courage Made Them Champions.” 
 
Radio film tagline (2003, dir. Michael Tollin, emphasis mine) 
 
 
In this chapter, I first lay out criticisms of Rawls raised from the perspective of 
disability studies. Second, I take up Christie Hartley’s attempt to work within a Rawlsian 
framework to better accommodate people with disabilities. I argue that although her 
theory is an advance on Rawls’, it still has limitations for creating just political conditions 
for persons with disabilities. Finally, using Eva Kittay and Anita Silver’s analyses, I show 
that there are more transformative ways of discussing and theorizing within the liberal 
tradition. This chapter represents an attempt to engage the question of disability outside 
of bioethics, where the binary between ability and disability at play in bioethics still has 
the power to impact even the best attempts at inclusion. I here follow through on my 
work throughout this project to attend to “locations” of disability. 
In both traditional liberal and bioethics literature, I argue that an ideal subject has 
real-world negative implications for persons with disabilities and contribute to their 
stereotyping and oppression. This ideal subject is a choice-maker with an open future, 
evades stigma and risks associated with embodiment, and is fully rational and 
independent. In short, this ideal subject is constructed against the stigma associated with 
disability and the disabled body.  
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John Rawls and the Heritage of Liberalism 
 
The political philosophy of John Rawls is often the subject of significant critique 
on the basis of its exclusions of persons with disabilities. This debate occurs both inside 
and outside of the social contract tradition (e.g. Davis 2002, 107-108; Hartley 2009a, 
2011; Kittay 1999; Nussbaum 2007; Reinders 2000; Silvers and Francis 2005; Stark 
2007; Young 2006; Wolff 2009). Serious issues for disability rights include Rawls’ 
construction of personhood, which is exclusionary, especially of those who experience 
cognitive limitation (1996, 18-19); Rawls’ stipulation that those behind the veil of 
ignorance are abled (2001, 18, 21);
82
 problems stemming from Rawls’ difference 
principle (Silvers 2009, 179); and the explicit avoidance of disability as a problem for 
justice in his account (Silvers 2009, 79; cf. Rawls 1996, 20). Eva Feder Kittay, Martha 
Nussbaum, Anita Silvers and Leslie Francis have critiqued Rawls regarding issues such 
as these and on the basis of their significance articulated discreet liberal theories of 
justice which seek to open up and re-define liberal citizenship and personhood (Kittay 
1999 [justice as care]; Nussbaum 2007 [capabilities approach to justice]; e.g. 140-5; 
Silvers and Francis 2005 [justice through trust]). These efforts are also met with critique 
(Engster 2005; Fine 2005; Hartley 2011; Silvers 2009; Wong 2007). 
 This critical literature from a disability perspective coalesces on Rawlsian 
characterizations of liberalism, as well as John Rawls’ specific theory of justice as 
fairness, in order to discuss the ways in which the disability community is excluded or 
included in liberal political frameworks. Some, like Martha Nussbaum and contractualist 
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 I owe this point to Stacy Clifford, who articulates it in “The Disabled Contract: Explaining the Exclusion 
and Function of Disability,” a paper given at Vanderbilt University in November 2011. 
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Christie Hartley, accept Rawls’ characterization of liberalism’s basic tenets while at the 
same time developing new themes around capability and cooperation, respectively. 
Others, like Eva Kittay and Anita Silvers, seek to substantially transform liberalism as 
well as critique Rawls.  
Importantly, as Rawls admits, there is no “settled meaning of liberalism.” Instead, 
“it has many forms and many features” that can represent its ethos and yet differ in 
content (2007, 11). That said, by reading Rawls, we can isolate key thesis, including 
liberalism’s general conception of the state and its prescribed role in the lives of 
individuals and the theoretical character of citizens in a liberal state. This work has 
already been done excellently elsewhere, so I will not cover it in detail here.  
 Let me instead outline what I consider the highlights of the “liberal” subject in 
Rawlsian-style accounts: first, this individual must not bear cognitive difference, for fear 
of being displaced from social life. Second, this individual is “atomistic” and can 
evaluate and perhaps participate in the building of a legitimate regime. Third, access to 
freedom, equality and membership in society all appear to hinge on whether or not an 
individual can conceive of the good in a variety of ways. Without the two moral powers 
or two types of reason Rawls outlines, social recognition of personhood is in peril. Any 
blockages to this type of function can only be temporary; the liberal subject will not have 
permanent deviation from the Rawlsian conception of personhood. The liberal subject is 
reasoned, moral, and atomistic, and is not a person with cognitive disability. The liberal 
subject is either disabled and excluded, or not disabled and included; there are no gray 
areas with regard to fitness in the Rawlsian account of the political subject.  
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A Contractualist Account of Liberalism 
  
In a discussion of obligations of justice to persons with cognitive limitations, 
Christie Hartley attempts to solve the difficulty of extending social contract theories to 
include such persons by replacing what she interprets as basic political relationships of 
mutual advantage with relationships proper (2009a, 142-3). In doing so, however, she 
not only extends values already embedded in contractualism into a trope, but also 
relegates members of the disability community to the role of virtuous helper to the abled 
– a move that invokes the very problems (related to mutual advantage) she attempts to 
avoid. I argue that Hartley ultimately makes the mistake of valuing persons with 
disabilities on the basis of the edification provided to the abled by way of their inclusion; 
this is reminiscent of the charity model of disability, which I described in chapter three. 
In addition, I argue, Hartley’s unfortunate description of the benefits connected to 
including persons with cognitive difference within the scope of social relationships 
mirrors the problematic figure of the “magic Negro” in Hollywood film (Glenn and 
Cunningham, 2009).
83
 In this vein it is helpful to consider the way in which black 
oppression and disability oppression operate by similar logic. Most generally, I link the 
notion of reciprocity or mutual advantage in the context of social contracts, which 
assumes a binary between ability and disability, to the stereotyping of persons with 
disabilities. 
                                                          
83
 Unlike Hartley, I will avoid using the term “mentally disabled,” except where it is absolutely necessarily 
to refer clearly to her argument. I reject this label because it refers to a heterogeneous group with 
terminology that not only reifies a blurry and unstable category but also encourages a monolithic view of 
disabilities (Carlson 2010, 113-20). The phrase also emphasizes traits over persons. 
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Like other critics of Rawls and social contract theories, Hartley notes that 
common sentiment considers persons with cognitive limitation subjects of justice, but 
leading theories of justice fail to provide the structure necessary for this inclusion (2009a, 
138). Given the difficulties stemming from Rawls’ notion of personhood, Hartley 
chooses to return to the “core ideas” of contractualism, which she considers the 
background for Rawls’ view, in order to establish grounds for more universal inclusion 
(Hartley, 2009a, 141; 2009b). Contractualism, for Hartley, includes theories of “domestic 
justice” that understand society “as a system of cooperation over time” (2009a, 141). A 
system of this sort “is just when the terms of cooperation are fair and establish a society 
based on relations of mutual respect among members viewed as free and equal” (142). 
While she accepts much of what Rawls considers important for fair cooperation, 
including publicly recognizable rules for interaction and terms that are reasonable for all 
parties to accept, she departs from his account when she takes care to characterize the 
“contractualist idea of fair cooperation” as distinct “from the idea of cooperation for 
mutual advantage” (142).84  
Hartley rightly worries that cooperation for mutual advantage can support 
significantly unequal terms of cooperation in liberal contexts, given the requirement that 
cooperation makes parties “better off” than they were outside of the cooperative context. 
This requirement can make bargaining among already unequal parties ineradicably 
asymmetrical, as she outlines (2009a, 142-3). Meanwhile, Hartley contends, 
contractualists would “require that terms of cooperation among members of society be 
reasonable or justifiable to all members viewed as equals and not merely terms that are 
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rationally advantageous to all members in the sense of allowing individuals to better their 
situation by working with others” (143, emphasis mine). 
Hartley goes on to make two significant revisions within the scheme of 
“cooperation for mutual advantage” in order to make the terms of fair cooperation 
acceptable to the contractualist requirement that members are “viewed as equals.” First, 
she desires a conceptual change, endorsing the idea of reciprocity rather than mutual 
advantage, which would suggest that fair cooperation “does not require that those who 
count as cooperating members of society be such that their cooperative contributions to 
society outweigh the costs of their participation” (2009a, 143). This, reasons Hartley, 
abolishes the problem of unequal bargaining power among parties. Second, Hartley 
wishes to replace the too-prevalent “production model” of cooperation, which figures 
cooperative social relationships as primarily productive of goods that are external objects, 
with the “relationship model” of cooperation, which would figure cooperative social 
relationships as creating and transforming relationships themselves to a particular end 
(143-4). That end is the contractualist ideal of “mutual respect” among free and equal 
persons (139). 
Yet, Hartley cautions, “it is important to keep in mind that cooperation of any 
kind involves individuals working together with others for a common end” (2009a, 143). 
So, taking society to mean a sphere in which cooperation occurs over time, with 
relationships as the focus of production rather than production of goods, Hartley’s key 
move is the insertion of “reciprocity” as a norm in social relationships, along with the 
aforementioned commitment to “relationships of mutual respect” (139). Her revisions, 
she hopes, mean that “those with mental disabilities should indeed count as members of 
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society since they have the capacity to engage in cooperative projects that are of 
fundamental importance to contractualist society” (139).  
More specifically, and to reiterate, Hartley has reason to believe that 
contractualists can uniquely include the persons with cognitive disability under the 
umbrella of justice “by properly appreciating the numerous ways in which persons with 
mental disabilities make substantial contributions to the creation, establishment, and 
maintenance of a society based on relations of mutual respect” (2009a, 139). It is 
important to note that Hartley also considers it necessary that the interests of those who 
lack Rawls’ two moral powers should be represented by a trustee genuinely committed to 
the interests of those they represent (146-147). This is a point I will not consider here, in 
favor of focusing upon Hartley’s vision of reciprocity in relationships.  
To accomplish her aim of including in a theory of justice those who lack the two 
moral powers outlined by Rawls, Hartley details these “substantial contributions” and 
explains how they are connected to the aim of creating, establishing, and maintaining a 
“society based on relations of mutual respect” with reciprocity as ruling norm. Remember 
that Hartley is attempting a partial reworking of cooperative social life (2009a, 139). An 
immediate aim, then, is to replace the central notion of cooperative production with the 
broader cooperative relationships (143-4). This move, Hartley believes, substantially 
revises the list of goods relevant to justice in a way unavailable to non-contractualist 
approaches.  
Because Hartley values reciprocity over mutual advantage in social cooperation, 
she includes persons with cognitive difference as “free and equal” members of society 
who deserve “mutual respect” on the basis of their contributions, whatever they may be, 
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and even if the costs of including such individuals outweighs the benefit (2009a, 142). 
Yet, her definition of cognitive disability highlights lack in the very area of contributions, 
however widely the concept is construed. She writes: “I understand a mental disability to 
be any kind of mental impairment that interferes with someone’s ability to form, pursue, 
or carry out valued projects in society” (139). Elsewhere, she notes that “what is 
important…is that an individual is able to cooperatively contribute to one of the main 
institutions [of society]. Nearly all human beings, excepting infants with anencephaly or 
the permanently comatose, can do that” (2011, 128). Despite this near-universal 
description of what cooperation is and can be, Hartley’s definition of “mental disability” 
retains the substance of the binary and hierarchy so often operating between the disabled 
and the abled. For her, the disabled can do what the abled can do (although not 
everything), but with interference. Understanding cognitive limitation this way belies the 
“mutual respect” to which Hartley is committed. How can all persons be viewed as “free 
and equal” when reciprocity must be interpreted as an endemically asymmetrical 
experience for the mentally disabled, without being interpreted as such for others? 
Reciprocity suggests that cooperative relationships need not be tit-for-tat; instead, one 
person can contribute in one way, while someone else may contribute in another. Yet, if 
the disabled can do what the abled can do, but with interference, it seems their 
contributions must always fall short of what an abled person could do in their stead. 
Again, the central project of Hartley’s contractualist effort to include the mentally 
disabled rests on her view of reciprocity (within cooperative relationships, not merely 
relationships of production). Hartley is seeking ways to describe how a person with 
cognitive difference engages in relationships of reciprocity, relationships in which these 
153 
 
individuals are typically viewed as the only beneficiaries (because they are considered 
fundamentally needy or inescapably vulnerable) (2009a, 139; 2009b, 29). Keeping this 
general setting in mind, a closer look at the relationships of reciprocity Hartley outlines 
shows that there is a further dead end for inclusion on her account. This goes beyond the 
asymmetry touched on above.  
In her account, Hartley tends to describe the benefits of cooperating with 
members of the disability community as primarily existing for the enjoyment of the abled. 
To put the point slightly differently: while it is taken as a given that persons with 
disabilities are fundamentally needy, Hartley’s way of justifying responses to that 
neediness involves tropes that play on what (given an abled/disabled binary) an abled 
person might have to gain from a disabled person. As it turns out, what the abled have to 
gain is of personal advantage to them; this means that Hartley has fallen back on the idea 
of mutual advantage at the same time as she is trying to escape it. This problem appears 
in all of her subsequent examples (subsequent to the initial, economic example) of 
cooperative contributions that those with cognitive limitation might make on the level of 
relationships (2009a, 150-5).  
I turn now to her examples in order to make my critique more concrete. To 
discuss the cooperative contributions she has in mind, Hartley relates several primary 
narratives about persons with disabilities. She details the relationship between Eva Feder 
Kittay and her daughter, Sesha, who, despite her constraints in the area of language, 
“communicates some of her preferences” and enjoys music, experiences which can be 
shared (2009a, 151). Hartley also reports that Sesha provides Kittay with emotional 
support that Kittay estimates as invaluable (151). Hartley further mentions the 
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relationship between Sophia Wong and her son, Leo, who helps “the Wongs realize the 
importance of patience and compassion,” when the family plays card games together 
(151). Hartley writes: “By resisting the temptation to take advantage of him and go for a 
win, the members of Leo’s family develop skills that are distinctive of fair cooperation” 
(151). This fair cooperation, as I have shown, is a key component of Hartley’s 
contractualist account.
85
  
Hartley’s main narrative features Radio, the title character of Radio (2003). Radio 
is described as an extraordinarily virtuous boy, who embodies many characteristics 
praised in widely-accepted schemes of morality, as well as virtues helpful in a 
contractualist context. His primary relationship is with a local football coach and his 
team. According to Hartley, Radio encourages the coach and those on the team to focus 
on “what is of value in life,” to be selfless and kind, and helps them “better understand 
their own humanity” (2009a, 154). Hartley emphasizes Radio’s gain through these 
relationships when she writes: “Radio was not always this way. When he first met Coach 
Jones and others at school, he would not speak and was extremely shy. With tenderness 
and attention from others, Radio’s personality was revealed” (154, fn. 42). Of Radio’s 
personality itself, Hartley provides the following details:  
Radio is not concerned with material success or social reputation. He is not 
prideful. He is genuinely kind to everyone he meets and is happy to be included in 
whatever is going on, valuing and making the most of what is before him. Those 
in Radio’s community who develop relationships with him gain a new perspective 
on what is of value in life (154).  
 
Because Radio “isn’t arrogant or proud,” Radio provides one key service to those around 
him; namely, he “humbles those before him” who are reminded that those attitudes are 
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criticism is in no way targeted toward the families themselves and should not be interpreted as such. 
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not valuable (154, my emphasis). Like the “fair cooperation” encouraged in the Wong 
family by way of playing board games with Leo, for Hartley humility is a virtue of 
utmost importance in the society she envisions. She writes, “the ability to humble those 
who are arrogant or proud is an especially important contribution to a contractualist 
society because of the danger arrogance poses to relationships of mutual respect” (155).  
Overall, Sesha, Leo and Radio all provide lessons in key contractualist virtues for 
those around them.
86
 Hartley focuses on the one-dimensional idea that Sesha provides 
emotional support for her mother (the benefit of which is taken with Kittay as she enters 
other interactions). Leo, again, provides the lesson of fair cooperation to his family, a 
virtue of contractualist justice. Radio provides the lesson of humility, yet another virtue 
of contractualist justice. Taking these primary examples together, we can conclude that 
cooperating with those who are disabled, on Hartley’s view, is meant to edify the abled in 
our (specifically contractualist) political and social interactions. It is important to note 
that Hartley cannot be suggesting that Sesha, Leo and Radio are the only possible sources 
of these experiences and benefits; rather, it would be appropriate on her view to see such 
persons as only one possible source of edification in contractualist virtues. Further, on 
Hartley’s view, it seems persons with disabilities can be counted upon to embody 
traditional social values that they can impart to those around them. This means that caring 
for the disabled, as seen from the view of the abled, can be considered of “mutual 
advantage” in the very way that Hartley would like to avoid. 
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 Hartley does briefly acknowledge that not all disabled persons are “kind like Radio” (2009a, 155). Yet, 
she fails to expand upon or incorporate this idea theoretically or through narrative. She does not, for 
example, present an individual whose characteristics might typically be considered “a-social” but with 
whom one should cooperate regardless. I deal with Hartley’s intermediate case (Donna Williams) below. 
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Moreover, the disabled persons Hartley describes usually have stable families, as 
evidenced by the centrality of her narratives regarding Sesha and Leo (2009a, 150-5). 
Yet, familial stability is usually enabled by wealth and shaken by poverty. Because the 
financial costs of maintaining care for persons with cognitive limitation are high and 
social support is scarce, financial difficulty and disability often go hand-in-hand, with 
disastrous results for family life (Kittay 2001, 572). While Hartley’s inclusive 
contractualism as presented relies on capable, loving families with access to resources 
and a tight, formative connection between family and society, she does not provide an 
acknowledgment that specific measures are necessary to support such families or this 
connection (2009a, 150 and 152). Additionally, in Hartley’s description of the Wong and 
Kittay families, abled members are free to leave (free to enter the social world), while the 
disabled member is relegated to a role within the home—providing a type of education in 
values that is useful to the abled as they enter the social world (152, cf. the moral 
education of the charity model, above). Family members take their lessons away with 
them, and Leo and Sesha are left behind (cf. Fineman 2002). 
Despite Hartley’s intent to make the creation and transformation of relationships a 
central goal of social cooperation in a contractualist context (2009a, 143-4), her examples 
outline a particular set of pre-defined contractualist virtues as the end goal of social 
cooperation.
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 That is, a cooperative relationship is not valuable as such but only insofar 
as it fits into these virtues or values. This distinction, though fine, is important. Hartley 
has not demonstrated that creating and transforming mutually-respectful relationships are 
ends in themselves; such relationships are not fostered for their own sake, but valuable 
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contractualist virtues are fostered by way of relationships. This effectively places the 
emphasis on these virtues rather than relationships themselves. The relationships are 
subject to a telos that is fully articulated regardless of, and perhaps despite, fresh or 
otherwise suppressed social relationships and modes or methods of relating. In contrast, 
the work of disability theorists and activists like Robert McRuer take for granted that 
liberating movements would transform the social world, not simply allow persons with 
disabilities into the one that already exists (2006).  
Hartley is responding to a supposed need to justify, in some reciprocal (if not 
mutually-advantaged) way, social support and justice for persons with cognitive 
limitation. Hartley’s lack of specificity with regard to benefits belonging to these persons 
within the greater social world (beyond foundational care or home life) is problematic 
and maintains focus upon the abled and their reasons for providing this foundational care. 
Reciprocity in the social contract context seems to rely (perhaps intractably) upon the 
idea that disabled persons embody opportunities for the edification of the abled, while 
maintaining a strict distance and delineation between the groups. This requires the 
endorsement of destructive tropes, including the idea that all persons with disabilities are 
(or should be) loving, kind, fair, and so on. This is a view rife with extremely limiting 
and unfair expectations. 
 
The Magic Negro, Black Oppression, and Disability Oppression 
 
There is a close parallel between the position of persons with disabilities in the 
reciprocity Hartley discusses (which may be, merely, mutual advantage after all) and the 
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view of the "magic Negro" as it is presented, historically and presently, in media and 
film, which highlights the difficulties with her view. Cerise L. Glenn and Landra J. 
Cunningham present the theme of the “magic Negro” in their essay “The Power of Black 
Magic: The Magical Negro and White Salvation in Film” (2009). There, Glenn and 
Cunningham explain the connection between images seen in films and traditional 
prejudices against black individuals. Arguing that the relationship between blacks and 
whites is “unsettled” and still evolving, they conclude that images in movies are 
extremely important (136). Likewise, I argue that the relationship between the abled and 
the disabled is unsettled, as are the categories, which are fundamentally unstable, and 
therefore relating images to the oppressed disability community should be an enterprise 
undertaken with the greatest caution and the homogeneous ascription of personality traits 
to such persons should be avoided at all costs. Hartley has already introduced the medium 
of film into her account by taking the figure of Radio as a central narrative. Given this 
introduction, Hartley either believes that the relationship between the abled and disabled 
is settled such that the image of Radio can be used unproblematically in a theoretical 
space, or she sees the relationship as unsettled yet has not considered the impact that film 
images may have upon both theory and the interaction between the abled and the 
disabled. 
To draw out the relationship between Hartley’s descriptions of Radio, Leo and 
Sesha and the figure of the Magic Negro, I turn to a description of the figure and its 
connection to relationships between black and white characters in film. Glenn and 
Cunningham note that many products of Hollywood, including recent and historical 
films, appear to be celebrating relationships between black and white characters, but, the 
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plot, themes and characterizations have racist undertones and relate back to “racist 
stereotypes, such as mammy, jezebel and Uncle Tom, as well as the mainstream 
traditional association of Blacks with folk wisdom and spiritual insight” (2009, 136). In 
this manner, blacks have appeared as one-dimensional caricatures: “Instead of having life 
histories or love interests, Black characters possess magical powers” (137). Glenn and 
Cunningham note that these images seem chosen particularly to “comfort and appeal to 
white viewers,” and the problems related to such images are only exacerbated by the lack 
of interaction with black persons among “Hollywood screenwriters” (137). 
Flat and misleading representations of black persons may seem like a problem of 
the past, when “Sidney Poitier and other Black actors were placed in White worlds to 
help White people improve themselves”; “These magical Negroes were often wise, 
morally upright Blacks who serve as the moral conscience of White characters” (Glenn 
and Cunningham 2009, 137). But, such flat versions of black characters (created, it 
seems, merely to draw white characters along a moral path) have not disappeared over 
time. According to Glenn and Cunningham, the magic Negro crops up in many recent 
blockbuster films, including (to name only a few) The Green Mile (1999), the Matrix 
trilogy (1999 and 2003), The Legend of Bagger Vance (2000), Nurse Betty (2000) and 
Bruce Almighty (2003). 
The magic Negro image trades on “the superior moral nature associated with the 
oppressed” (Glenn and Cunningham 2009, 138); for example, “the magical Negro is 
[seen as] markedly selfless” (151).88 A black character in this guise will assist her white 
counterparts, “help him or her discover and utilize his or her spirituality,” or represent 
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“folk wisdom” in order “to resolve the character’s dilemma” (Entman and Rojecki, 2001, 
quoted in Glenn and Cunningham, 2009, 138). The magic Negro often lacks significant 
aims or goals of her own, figuring merely as a helpmeet or guide for other characters. 
Citing the work of bell hooks (1995), Glenn and Cunningham worry that “because these 
roles depict a utopian relationship between Blacks and Whites, Whites may believe that 
these ideal harmonious relationships depict current social status; therefore, racial 
problems only exist in the minds of Black people” (2009, 137).  
Likewise, I worry that Hartley’s depiction of persons with disabilities describes a 
“reciprocity” between the disabled and the abled that emphasizes moral benefit and 
improvement for the abled at the expense of empowered roles for the disabled. Hartley’s 
image of the “mentally disabled” individual, like the magic Negro, seems to position 
these subjects within political life primarily for the moral improvement of the abled. The 
improvement available is specifically with regard to contractualist virtues, and does not 
refer to new or transformative relationships themselves—again, a fine distinction, but a 
vastly important one. Like the magic Negro, Hartley’s image of the disabled individual 
lacks significant aims or goals of her own; like the magic Negro, Hartley’s image trades 
on “the superior moral nature associated with the oppressed.” This idealization creates 
unfair expectations and limits persons with disabilities in ways that persons seen as abled 
need not experience. Again, this is reminiscent of the problems perpetuated by the magic 
Negro image. Among abled persons, a stingy or humorless person is not viewed as less 
deserving of rights than a generous person. Our view of the contributions of persons with 
disabilities (specifically those salient for affording such individuals rights) should not be 
clouded by expectations regarding how ennobling one considers the experience of their 
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company. For an example of an ennobled and wise disabled character in pop culture, 
think of Forrest Gump, played by Tom Hanks, titular character of the 1994 film.  
To return to Hartley’s view of reciprocity, it is important to note that Radio’s 
personality was, according to Hartley, “revealed” through the kindness of the football 
team and coach (2009a, 154). She does not mention, or seem to believe, that it was 
enabled or created through interaction with others; instead, it seems an innate part of 
Radio, waiting to be enjoyed by those around him if only they would give him a chance. 
This belies Hartley’s overall aim to place “transformative” relationships at the center of 
social cooperation. Radio is not presented in her account as a “transformed” character, 
even if some supposedly innate aspects of his personality were revealed through social 
interaction. His “transformative” effects on others, meanwhile, are limited to reminding 
them of virtues already commonly held; he provides lessons that could likely have been 
encountered elsewhere. The official tagline of Radio is: “His Courage Made Them 
champions” (2003, emphasis mine). This articulation reveals that the focus of the film 
(which Hartley does not attempt to mitigate or contextualize) is clearly the benefit given 
to the abled community through its interaction with Radio. 
Hartley’s depictions, especially of Radio, and their connection to the “magic 
Negro” trope can be reinforced by reference to a further trope, this time linked directly to 
stereotypical views of persons within the disability community: the “supercrip.”89 Eli 
Clare critiques the notion of the “inspirational” disabled person, the “believe-it-or-not 
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disability story” (1999, 2). Clare refers to this as “supercrip crap” (2). Clare understands 
the “supercrip” trope to uphold the inferiority of disability and the superiority of the abled 
body; the view relates the idea that “disability and achievement contradict each other and 
that any disabled person who overcomes this contradiction is heroic” (8, cf. Ware 2002, 
144). Others have noted the constancy of these images in the media (Riley 2005; Ware 
2002). Diane De Vries, subject of Gelya Frank’s multi-year ethnographic studies, was the 
“poster child” of many charities as the result of her swimming despite lacking limbs 
(Frank 2000). De Vries and Clare both register deep unease with the trope, and Clare 
describes the way he has internalized the trope. Taking the figure of the supercrip into 
consideration, Radio appears more one-dimensional than ever. “His courage” which 
“made them champions” is an unbelievable feat; Radio must be a hero to participate in 
that kind of achievement.  
Important work has been done on the issue of black oppression that has been 
picked up to great benefit within disability studies. I am thinking specifically of the work 
of Frantz Fanon, which, alongside work done on the oppression of women by Sandra 
Bartky, features prominently in James Charlton’s discussion of the workings of false 
consciousness (1998). He notes that those who are abled and those who are disabled are 
both contributors to the notion that the disabled are fundamentally powerless and needy. 
Writes Charlton: “when blatantly pejorative attitudes are not held, people with disabilities 
often experience a paradoxical set of ‘sympathetic’ notions like the courageous or noble 
individual” (1998, 51). Charlton emphasizes the importance of contestation in response to 
these attitudes; he encourages “demanding recognition, respect, and responsibility” (54). 
Demands like this are a key part of what seems to be missing from Hartley’s account of 
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reciprocity, which begins with the assumption of fundamental asymmetry by definitional 
fiat. Charlton emphatically rejects the circular logic of equating disability with inferiority 
(68). He argues that the “worth” of persons with disabilities “is reduced to cost-benefit 
analysis” (70). This rings true when it comes to widespread notions of mutual advantage 
in social contract theory, as Hartley herself argues (2009a, 141-143). And, if reciprocity 
collapses into mutual advantage and relies upon stereotypes regarding the disabled, it is 
also true of reciprocity as Hartley has conceived of it. 
Perhaps Hartley’s vision of reciprocity is merely a way to maintain and police the 
boundary between “ability” and “disability,” a way to reinscribe the binary from within 
relationships. Elizabeth Spelman’s essay “‘Race’ and the Labor of Identity” spells out the 
work that must be done by persons oppressed because of their race precisely in order to 
uphold the notion that whiteness is superior (2002). She argues that this invisible work is 
a type of “acclamation on demand” and involves supporting the feeling of superiority 
enjoyed by whites (339). In the case of the trope of the supercrip, or the champion 
football players in Radio, it is clear that the acceptance or internalization of these ways of 
comparing abled and disabled achievement is a labor of identity. Clare’s desire to climb 
mountains, which he explicitly troubles even while enjoying it immensely, reinforces the 
importance and meaning of this achievement along with aspects of ableism. 
Now that the above tropes have been described and briefly explored, I hope to 
have made the case that Hartley’s chosen ideals of cooperation with the disabled, as 
represented by her depictions of Sesha, Leo and Radio, have unfortunate connections to 
traditional prejudices against the disabled. Let me briefly summarize some of the main 
points. Think of the classroom: there, everyday challenges, including disobedience, could 
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be viewed as a result of inadequate accommodation; yet, given Hartley’s ideal types, 
disobedience among the disabled all too easily appear as a character flaw, especially if 
overtures of friendship had already been extended to them from other classmates or from 
a teacher. This is particularly true given an educational context which already supports 
this interpretation (Cook, 2004). Think of morals: Hartley’s examples perpetuate the 
stereotype that those who lack intellect are innocently ethical, serving as a reminder of 
genuine human spirit; this ethical nature is not even construed as wisdom, but as 
simplicity (Carlson 2010, 24, 29). Think again of the character of Forrest Gump and the 
depiction of his gentle reminders to those around him about what is of value in life; his 
parallel is Radio.  
Through Radio, Hartley perpetuates the stereotype of what Eli Clare calls the 
“supercrip.” Even further, Radio’s image reveals that jocularity seems to be expected of 
the mentally disabled (Radio is clearly depicted as a good sport, “happy to be included in 
whatever is going on”). These stereotypes inevitably meet with foils in real life because 
the disability community is a heterogeneous group of singular individuals with unique 
histories, personalities, preferences, and quirks. No particular characteristics ought to be 
used as reasons to deny or to afford persons with disabilities a position in a scheme of 
justice—in just the same way as these characteristics among the abled are not used to 
mete out social goods and benefits. 
Hartley, of course, is not unaware that the disability community includes unkind 
individuals. For example, she speaks of an autistic woman named Donna Williams, “who 
found direct or emotional communication painful and debilitating as she was growing 
up…because of her behavior, Donna was considered uncooperative and sometimes 
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disruptive.” But Hartley goes on to say that “Donna was misunderstood” and that “it was 
not that she could not communicate or that she did not want to communicate.” Instead, 
“she just could not [communicate] in the typical manner, at least not yet” (2009a, 156, 
emphasis mine). While this narrative would seem to exonerate Hartley of some of the 
claims I make against her, her “not yet” implicitly denies that Williams may simply be, or 
become, a quiet person who does not enjoy regular interaction. Not knowing Williams, I 
must concede that Hartley may be right and that her personality may have been hidden by 
those around her. I do not concede, however, the more significant theoretical point: that 
every disabled person should be expected to (at least eventually) be cooperative in a way 
opposed to Williams’ relatively “uncooperative” behavior – or that their value or social 
worth depends on cooperative behavior. I maintain that Hartley’s theory lends itself to the 
unrealistic and unfair expectation that all disabled persons are either already sociable in 
the way she describes, preconceived through contractualist values, or that they can or 
should be nurtured until they are sociable in that way. The idea that persons are justly 
open to exclusion pursuant to failures in sociability is extremely objectionable.  
In “Justice for the Disabled: A Contractualist Approach,” Hartley anticipates some 
of my arguments. She writes: “Some may think that, in my account, the contributions that 
can be made by those with severe mental disabilities are ‘uncomfortably derivative’ and a 
mere matter of what those with severe mental impairments can do for others by engaging 
in relationships with them” (2009b, 29, emphasis mine). She softens this objection by 
responding that while “those with disabilities are often cast as noncontributing burdens 
on others,” in fact “individuals with severe mental disabilities do provide others with 
benefits, which is itself important to recognize” (29). While Hartley is correct that the 
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contributions of persons with disabilities are often undervalued or hidden, in her 
narratives they are shown acting merely as helpers to the abled, and seem to be one-
dimensional persons most notable for their virtuous character. Hartley goes on, to assert 
that it is the “cooperative relationships” which “are themselves important to contractualist 
society,” and repeats her commitment to mutual respect, along with mutual trust and 
support (29). Yet, multi-dimensional “cooperative relationships” are missing from her 
examples. Instead, contractualist values stand in their place; these are set as the goal of 
such cooperation and already delimit these relationships.  
As I indicated at the outset, Hartley’s account aims to demonstrate the potential 
inclusiveness offered by contractualist theory, one thread within the much larger liberal 
tradition of social contract theory. Yet, Hartley does not deal adequately with historical 
systems of oppression affecting the disability community and the place of filmic images 
she uses in their perpetuation. Like one-dimensional images of black characters in 
Hollywood films, the stereotypes implied in her narratives figure the mentally disabled 
individual as an accessible other who reflects already-valued social behaviors.  
Hartley’s move to revivify core values of contractualism in order to include the 
claims of members of the disability community is based on a demeaning view of 
disability; that is, the differentiation of reciprocity from mutual advantage results in the 
reversion to common stereotypes and tropes regarding persons with disabilities. This 
support for homogenizing and limiting images of persons with mental disabilities 
undermines her stated aims (2009a, 142-3; 2009b, 29). Reciprocity and mutual advantage 
more generally appear to support a binary between “abled” and “disabled” and, when 
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carried out within the context of this binary, these structures link to negative stereotyping 
of persons with disabilities.  
 Because Hartley is aiming to include persons with disabilities, we are given more 
information about the disabled subject than about the abled subject in liberal contexts. 
But, the images we are given, of the supercrip, the Magic Negro, and opportunities for 
moral education through the disabled body for those who are abled, are limiting and 
disappointing. We also see that disability is still constructed by way of lack – this time, 
lack within cooperation that the abled subject does not experience. In other words, while 
both subjects are figured as cooperative, the primary liberal subject is abled and therefore 
fully cooperative while the disabled subject is other and cooperative in a limited way.  
 
Possibilities for Transformed Theorizing 
 
 In my discussion so far in this chapter, I have dedicated my effort to finding the 
figure of disability within liberal contexts and discussing the limiting way disability 
appears in Hartley’s political schemes. I do not wish, however, to argue that liberalism 
cannot accommodate difference or be more inclusive of persons with disabilities. For that 
reason, I now turn to two theoretical points of view, within the liberal tradition, which I 
argue are more transformative than Hartley’s and represent a significant improvement 
upon her view. 
 I start with Anita Silvers’ three-pronged distinction among and classification of 
strategies used to respond to difference, which she suggests in order to minimize 
confusions and avoid over-generalizations when discussing the disability community. 
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These are 1) differences that should be denied, 2) differences that should be mitigated, 
and 3) differences that should be embraced (Silvers 2009, 169).  Differences that should 
be denied are those that are “illusory,” i.e. prejudices which are attributed wrongly to 
inherent traits (171). Differences that should be mitigated are those that are related to 
what has been called “impairment”; for example, deafness. These also include differences 
arising from historical injustice, such as actual differences (like those in pay or education) 
attributable to misconceptions regarding ability (173). Differences that should be 
embraced are those related to talent (and capability sets). Talent, as we shall see, is a 
central idea in Silvers’ notion of justice (184). To this I add the reminder that those who 
embody difference should be celebrated, taking the idea from Marsha Saxton, who notes 
that “we in the disability rights community resist the notion that our humanness can be 
evaluated and then reduced to a flawed gene” (Saxton 2000, 161). Building in the 
responsive structure of embracing differences rejects the spread, generalization, and 
synecdoche associated with stigmatizing practices. Silvers argues that responding to 
difference in social and political settings should involve the use of all three strategies 
(170).  
 The third of these, “differences which should be embraced,” is representative of a 
provision and an attitude she believes is missing from accounts of justice built by Rawls 
and Martha Nussbaum (Silvers 2009, 169). A central test case for Silvers can explain her 
objections to both of these theorists, while at the same time showcasing the intuition 
behind her contribution of “justice for talent” as it applies to disability. On Silvers’ view, 
commonsense notions of justice would reject the type of outcome represented by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School 
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District v. Rowley (1982). In that case, the Court held that Amy Rowley, a deaf 
elementary student at a public school, should not be given an interpreter in a public 
classroom (although she did receive tutoring and therapy) (Silvers 2009, 180). This 
decision was representative of parts of (then current) EHA legislation (the Education For 
All Handicapped Children Act, passed in 1975), but not its “mainstreaming” ethos; 
furthermore, Silvers notices that today’s ruling legislation (the Americans with 
Disabilities Act) does not uphold the spirit or intent of the decision (184-6). Rowley 
maintained a “B” average without an interpreter, which met or even exceeded baseline 
expectations for classroom performance among her peers (180-3, 187). Rowley, then, 
performed better, on average, than some of her hearing classmates. Because of her 
performance, there was no need, in the Court’s majority opinion, for further public 
expenditure on Rowley’s behalf (181). This is despite the fact that Rowley could 
understand only around 50 percent of classroom proceedings, including instructions from 
the teacher. Had she been given an interpreter, Silvers presumes that she could have 
outperformed her classmates in accordance with her potential (180). 
 Here, the problem is that a “baseline” or “threshold” notion of equality as it was 
applied in this case does not conform to what most persons, Silvers argues, would believe 
is just – that Rowley be provided with an interpreter (Silvers 2009, 183). The “equal 
treatment” given to Rowley did not ensure justice in her case, because her talent was not 
considered and her difference was not embraced (180, 184). Rowley’s case shows why a 
focus only on the two strategies of mitigating or ignoring difference can lead to unjust 
results (197). Note, also, that her disability was not fully mitigated; it was, instead, 
mitigated to a baseline degree necessary for what the Court considered “normalcy.” 
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Writes Silvers: “assimilation and compensation” merely “take justice to be a matter of 
advancing outliers to normalcy” (192). 
 Silvers points to another issue in Rawlsian liberal theory which I have not, as yet, 
considered. She argues that Rawls’s theory of justice, with its difference principle of 
extra social support for the “worst off,” would lead to the same conclusion that the Court 
reached in Rowley’s case. Because Rowley was not the “worst off” in the classroom – 
she outperformed some of her peers – she is not the appropriate recipient of extra social 
expenditure (Silvers 2009, 187). Silvers finds the notion of the “worst off” generally 
troubling in the case of persons with disabilities. She argues that this principle leads to 
jockeying for position among the disadvantaged and results in an unhelpful hierarchy, 
one that accords benefit to being seen as less advantaged than others. Thus, an already 
vulnerable class is fragmented (179, 194-7). She writes:   
 Theories of justice aimed at mitigating the disadvantage of the worst off face 
difficulties in accounting for disapprobation [of the intuitive] sort. Focused on 
deficiency, they neglect Amy and those like her whose losses, however unfair, do 
not depress their wellbeing drastically (187). 
 
For Silvers, it is wrong to suppose that “different ways in which people can be very badly 
off must be commensurable” (179), or that some individuals cannot be both better and 
worse off, like Amy Rowley (187). Beyond these worries, Silvers also has concerns about 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, which invokes thresholds and baseline notions (182); 
Silvers believes this approach would have to support the Court’s decision in Board of 
Education v. Rowley (181). On her view, capability theory views justice merely as 
“equality of basic outcomes,” although it does have the strength of a baseline 
requirement, regardless of what resources and social support are necessary (182). Silvers 
argues, however, that there is no obligation to assist the disabled in exceeding 
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“benchmarks” “so their opportunities….equal those of nondisabled people” (183). This 
drawback of Nussbaum’s view is significant for persons with disabilities, as is the 
drawback of the notion of the “worst off” that Rawls offers. 
 For Silvers, justice for talent means that “social support” should be provided for 
exercising talent, which “engenders personal benefits by cultivating individuals’ 
incentive and self-esteem” (2009, 192). Impediments to this ideal “impoverish productive 
cooperative social relations” (192). She does not see this as a challenge to liberalism’s 
basic commitments, but rather a refinement and reminder of what those commitments 
really mean: “preference for talent seems patently acceptable to justice and is a principle 
endorsed by both proponents and opponents of race-based affirmative action [for 
example]” (191). Silvers wants to revitalize the cooperation that political liberalism is 
founded upon, and her comments regarding justice for talent bring to the fore a further 
project. Silvers and Francis both articulate a notion of “justice through trust,” which 
“calls for principles aimed directly at facilitating cooperative interaction among different 
kinds of people rather than among people who are the same” (Silvers 2009 192-3; Silvers 
and Francis 2005). Silvers’ commentary on justice for talent, together with the reminder 
provided by justice through trust – that diversity is vital to collaborative democracy – 
assist the move past mere mitigation of difference to embracing difference (Silvers 2009, 
184). 
 I appreciate Silvers’ contributions to liberal theory and now would also affirm 
Eva Kittay’s contribution in her liberal scheme of “justice as care.” Key to the discourse 
of the “ethics of care” is the contention that autonomy, rendered in traditional liberal 
theory as accomplishing key acts without significant assistance, must be replaced or 
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transformed as the central characteristic of personhood (Kittay 2001, 570). This theory is 
applied to questions of vulnerability and how to justly treat those with disabilities. These 
efforts, generally, are geared toward recognizing the flaws in common notions of both 
autonomy and dependency. Given these insights, theorists like Kittay wish to recast the 
role of the “dependent”—including individuals with disabilities—and open up space for a 
responsive ethic (570). Tied to this aim is that of recasting the role of the care-giver and 
providing social support to them in an attempt to mitigate the impact of biased views of 
the meaning of that support (573). “Justice as caring” is the expression of the responsive 
ethic that Kittay outlines. 
 Kittay brings the experience of raising her daughter, Sesha, to bear upon the issue 
of what is owed the cognitively disabled in a just liberal society. Kittay and her partner 
were already committed academics at the time she gave birth to Sesha. Upon discovering 
that Sesha could never share in what Kittay and her partner most valued (for the purposes 
of this discussion, we could even say that Sesha could not share in Kittay's conception of 
the good as she conceived it at that time), Kittay began to undergo the life-changing 
experience of raising Sesha and recognizing her unique conception of the good. She 
criticizes liberal notions of personhood for being unable to treat her daughter as a citizen 
of any country (2001, 567) or as a subject of justice (574) or as a person (568). In other 
words, the traditional liberal subject excludes Sesha. She finds this untenable and, 
additionally, counter-intuitive, arguing that all feel the pangs of injustice when we hear 
stories of the abuse or neglect of the dependent and persons with disabilities, including 
those with cognitive difference (558). 
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 Kittay writes: “constructed only as a problem, Sesha and other developmentally 
disabled persons appear to have no claim to the aids and supports that they need to live 
and live well” (2001, 567). But Sesha does not have to be a problem; justice as caring can 
treat her as a person. This is because justice as caring acknowledges that “being a person 
has little to do with rationality and everything to do with relationships to our world and to 
those in it” (568). Kittay argues that liberal notions of personhood must be overhauled in 
light of this recognition if we are to successfully extend justice to the disabled. On 
Kittay’s view of justice as caring,   
being a person means having the capacity to be in certain relationships with other 
persons, to sustain contact with other persons, to shape one’s own world and the 
world of others, and to have a life that another person can conceive of as an 
imaginative possibility for him or herself (568). 
 
For Kittay, it is clear that Sesha is able to enjoy her own conception of the good, and 
fulfills the above sense of personhood. She enjoys music and laughter and the people she 
knows and loves (cf. Hartley 2009, 151). On Kittay’s view, focusing on her deficiency is 
unjust, and “only by considering her in the fullness of her joys and capacities can we 
view her impairments in light of her life, her interests, her happiness—and not as 
projections of her ‘able” parents or of an able-biased society.” But, as mentioned above, 
it is only through the appropriate social support for family care and care workers, along 
with social support for Sesha herself, will help expose the fullness of her personhood and 
allow focus to be reoriented away from Sesha’s differences (Kittay 2001, 567).   
 For Kittay, “justice as caring” can open up the opportunity for society to support 
diverse ways of living. She writes: “those who have developmental disabilities require 
more supports than those without these impairments. However, they also provide 
different and rich opportunities for relationships and experiencing new ways of seeing the 
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world” (2001, 567). This outcome, however, is threatened by society’s bias against 
dependence. On Kittay’s view, independence is a “fiction,” which  
turns those whose dependence cannot be masked into pariahs, or makes them 
objects of disdain or pity. It causes us to refuse assistance when it is needed. It 
encourages us either to deny that assistance to others when they require it or to be 
givers of care because we fear having to receive care ourselves. In acknowledging 
dependency, we respect the fact that as individuals our dependency relations are 
constitutive of who we are and that, as a society, we are inextricably dependent on 
one another (2001, 570). 
 
For Kittay, then, an overhaul of the liberal conception of personhood is required. The 
over-emphasis on rationality in that context, she argues, is problematic because it leaves 
out significantly vulnerable populations and denies them justice rightly deserved (2001, 
562-5). For Kittay, social interdependence renders us all vulnerable, and it would be a 
mistake of hubris to forget or deny “the independent animals we are” (2001, 576).  
Importantly, Kittay’s work can point to the stigma of dependence (recall here 
Garland-Thomson’s view of disability as a “pervasive cultural concept”) which has an 
easily overlooked effect on dependency workers and their dignity and flourishing, and 
which in turn (if unattended to or unmitigated) has deleterious effects upon the dependent 
themselves and their social and political opportunities (2001, 571; cf. Goffman 1963, 20-
23). Kittay is a rich resource on the topic of dependency and care, and my limited 
overview of some of her key ideas in no way exhausts her insights. Kittay’s fundamental 
critique of the notions of independence and dependence separate her view from that of 
Christie Hartley. She avoids the problem of asymmetry that Hartley encounters by way of 
the transformative view of subjectivity she brings to bear on all persons, not simply 
persons with disabilities.  
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 Eva Kittay, who articulates justice as caring, and Anita Silvers, who articulates 
justice for talent, both make important steps toward the inclusion of the disability 
community in accounts of justice while simultaneously fighting stigma and refusing 
synecdoche. While liberalism is haunted by the exclusion of persons with disabilities, 
more transformative views are available, and the work of Kittay and Silvers represents 
those possibilities. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 This chapter represents a political interlude in my project, one which I undertook 
quite deliberately in order to understand the way that disability and ability are opposed to 
each other and constructed in a liberal context. I found that in traditional Rawlsian 
liberalism and the heritage of that liberalism, just as in the case of bioethics, disability 
tends to be interpreted as lack and a strong boundary line between “ability” and 
“disability” is policed and maintained.  
 Bioethics and liberal discourse inform each other (e.g. Carson 1994, Loughlin 
1995, Pauer-Studer 2006). The transhumanist utopias I consider in this project are not 
only biologically but also politically outlined; for instance, Bostrom imagines a world of 
wide access to technologies and new political and moral possibilities opened up as a 
result of cognitive enhancement (Bostrom 2004, 2008). Traditional liberalism and 
transhumanism mimic each other by positing a fantasy subject that is not dependent and 
that can choose without limitation; this subject is cooperative, rational, and atomistic. 
This fantasy is detached from interpersonal realities and the contingencies of social and 
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political life; the focus in both these discourses on atomism and individuality obscures 
fundamental human interdependence. In both locations, the disabled subject is illicitly 
constructed as uniquely dependent and limited. 
 I have employed the cultural model, along with the concept of stigma, to better 
understand the construction of disability and its appearance in multiple contexts. While 
disability need not be a negative signifier, it is often assumed to be such, and to connote 
naturalized characteristics of negativity and lack. But all bodies are open to stigma; 
human differences are equally vulnerable to stigmatization and so the “abled” subject is 
not so much “abled” as “temporarily able-bodied” by way of social circumstance (TAB, 
cf. Brueggemann et al. 2001).  
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CONCLUSION 
 
TRANSHUMANIST UTOPIAS IN CONTEXT 
 
In this project, I challenged views in bioethics and political liberalism that 
implicitly or explicitly questioned the existence and value of persons in the disability 
community. I traced the borders of the social acceptance of particular bodies and 
iterations of the bio-political question: who should live? I investigated the fantasies of 
transhumanism and exposed the ableist assumptions and heritage which drive and shape 
it. My motivation, here, was to track the denigration of dependence, difference, and the 
body, alongside the over-valuation of the avoidance of death, longevity, and intelligence 
(of a particular kind) in the literature of bioethics. In the course of these pages, I 
uncovered and exposed one debate in which bigoted and prejudicial attitudes are 
expressed and fed: the enhancement debate. My main focusing question was: what 
desires or wishes do transhumanist utopias represent, and what can these utopias teach us 
about ableism in bioethical contexts? 
 In carrying out my project, I was committed to understanding disability in such a 
way that would recognize the centrality of society’s responsibility to make a place for, 
respond to, and attend to persons and their needs by revisiting the terms of philosophical 
debate in bioethics, the provision of medical care, political institutions, and institutional 
barriers of all kinds.  
 Transhumanist strategies reinscribe disability onto the body, ignoring its social 
contours and construction. As exemplified in the work of Bostrom and Savulescu, 
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transhumanism views the current human body through the lens of risk, and views 
biotechnology through the lens of choice. The risk that the human body encounters is 
often conceived of as the risk of disablement, including disablement through aging, 
illness or accident. For these thinkers, then, the disabled body is uniquely linked to 
limitation, risk, and ultimately, death. In contrast to this body, I argue, transhumanist 
utopias focus on an ideal subject, one which would experience no restriction with regard 
to pleasures, choice-making, or opportunities—the techno-liberal subject, a subject whose 
future is mediated by the choice to use technology. This fixation on a utopian version of 
what the human subject should be comes at the expense of already-existing persons. 
Each section of the preceding pages represents an engagement with the ways in 
which meanings and definitions of disability are built and sustained in various social, 
political, and philosophical contexts—that is, a variety of “locations” of disability were 
explored. In chapter one, I investigated a history of enhancement technologies, which is 
also a history of how illness and deviance, and therefore disability, have been defined 
against changing conceptions of health. In chapter two, I call into question the implicit 
naturalization and biologization of disability inherent in Julian Savulescu’s suggestion 
that negative genetic selection is not only a desirable “human enhancement” technique 
but also a moral obligation. This naturalization process is also a feature of genetic 
counseling practices and bioethical debate regarding what parents owe children when 
contemplating childbirth, and feeds the development of disability as risk in enhancement 
discussions. I attempted to delineate and work from a position which seeks reproductive 
justice and is pointedly critical of the deeply ableist context in which pre-natal testing 
technology is developed, employed, and recommended by the medical community to 
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women and parent(s) who are expecting. Finally, in chapters three and four, I discussed 
disability within a variety of political contexts, both practical and theoretical. 
I now linger to offer a few further reflections on transhumanism and 
transhumanist utopias. Most importantly, I suggest that for the transhumanist, positive 
and negative eugenics are linked together. While these “strategies” of enhancement are 
often tackled as separate, Peter Singer explicitly acknowledges their connection (see 
chapter one) and transhumanists implicitly acknowledge their connection (see chapter 
two). Transhumanism continually treats the two modes as co-extensive: to rid the world 
of disability is to enhance the human. Recall that Savulescu claims that we must enhance 
or go extinct, and that his preferred mode of enhancement is genetic selection (selection 
against marked bodies). Transhumanism seems to here enact a reversal of the feminist 
insight that subjectivity is interconnected and persons are significantly interdependent; 
transhumanists perversely acknowledge the importance of intersubjectivity when they 
implicitly claim that for any single person to be enhanced, all must be “enhanced” 
(culled). This is the heart of the linkage between positive and negative eugenics—
enhancement seems to require, for the transhumanist, the rejection of disability and 
embodiment generally as risk and limitation. This is posed as necessary for the realization 
of enhancement for the individual and even in order to save the world (Savulescu 2009). 
As I indicated at the outset, transhumanist literature is written by white men and 
seems directed toward their specific concerns, with little regard to its potential ableist, 
sexist, and racist impacts. This is especially clear in my case study, negative genetic 
selection. Meanwhile, there is a masculinist “tint” to much bioethical literature written on 
enhancement (e.g. concern about shortness of stature) and this orientation extends to 
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transhumanism. In many ways, transhumanism is an expression of its setting in bioethics, 
and bioethics is in turn influenced by transhumanism. In the social milieu of prenatal 
testing, one receives the impression that reproduction would be perfected if women were 
not involved at all—the womb is a risky place for the fetus to gestate. Transhumanist 
argumentation transforms all embodiment into risk—recall Bostrom’s imagery of the 
paper hut, and Savulescu’s treatment of procreative beneficence as a risky game of Wheel 
of Fortune. The fetus is transformed into a site of risk, and autonomous “reproducers” 
should embrace their role as risk managers in order to stave off undesirable outcomes. 
 Transhumanism sees freedom as the freedom to make choices, and the freedom to 
make choices as positioned as a route to bliss and happiness. Transhumanism extends the 
prerogatives of humanism instead of calling its boundaries into question; transhumanism 
seeks a broader field of action, a secure future, not transgressed boundaries and 
transformative hybridity. Transhumanist enhancement is simply a romantic dream of 
endless autonomy. “Better” and “best” for the transhumanist references social prejudices 
without questioning them. Finally, the “freedom” of choice-making is opposed to the 
“risks” of disability and embodiment; transhumanism reinforces illicit boundary lines 
between disability and ability. Because transhumanist visions of the future do not 
question stigmas, these visions serve to reify them. 
In conclusion, I offer a suggestion for further philosophical reflection on the 
issues that were brought up in the course of this project. A revised version of 
“enhancement” could focus on the revision of political and social circumstances, seeking 
justice for those with disabilities and acceptance of diverse forms of embodiment. Cost-
and-benefit analyses connected to the bio-political question of who should live must be 
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challenged, and appropriate housing, transportation, schooling, and medical care must be 
sought. These would be true “enhancements.” Enhancement can be made an expression 
of care. 
We should seek augmentations—political, social, and technological—that bridge 
the gap between the body and individual life goals as articulated by those upon whom 
the suggested technology would intervene; this makes enhancement an expression of 
care, and would resemble neither positive nor negative eugenics. We should reject 
enhancement strategies which rely, for their desirability, on the connection of a proposed 
technology to maximized, optimized autonomy for a future human, a future human whose 
details are constrained by existing prejudices and whose happiness depends on added 
capabilities and unencumbered choice-making rather than complex interdependence.   
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